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Abstract 
Since the early days of information technology, there have been many stakeholders who 
used the technological capabilities for their own benefit, be it legal operations, or illegal 
access to computational assets and sensitive information. Every year, businesses invest 
large amounts of effort into upgrading their IT infrastructure, yet, even today, they are 
unprepared to protect their most valuable assets: data and knowledge. This lack of 
protection was the main reason for the creation of this dissertation. During this study, 
intrusion detection, a field of information security, is evaluated through the use of several 
machine learning models performing signature and hybrid detection. This is a challenging 
field, mainly due to the high velocity and imbalanced nature of network traffic. To 
construct machine learning models capable of intrusion detection, the applied  
methodologies were the CRISP-DM process model designed to help data scientists with 
the planning, creation and integration of machine learning models into a business 
information infrastructure, and design science research interested in answering research 
questions with information technology artefacts. The two methodologies have a lot in 
common, which is further elaborated in the study. The goals of this dissertation were two-
fold: first, to create an intrusion detector that could provide a high level of intrusion 
detection performance measured using accuracy and recall and second, to identify 
potential techniques that can increase intrusion detection performance. Out of the 
designed models, a hybrid autoencoder and stacking neural network model managed to 
achieve detection performance comparable to the best models that appeared in the related 
literature, with good detections on minority classes. To achieve this result, the techniques 
identified were synthetic sampling, advanced hyperparameter optimization, model 
ensembles and autoencoder networks. In addition, the dissertation set up a soft hierarchy 
among the different detection techniques in terms of performance and provides a brief 
outlook on potential future practical applications of network intrusion detection models 
as well. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The need to protect information systems and resources from misuse had arisen as early 
as 1972 and 1980, when James P. Anderson outlined that the USAF had become 
increasingly aware of information security related issues (Anderson (1972) and (1980)). 
Since then, the reported number of system intrusions grew at an alarming rate, especially 
from the early 2000s, which, according to reports like Beek et al. (2019) only increased 
in severity. The most common cyber attacks were the following: 
• DDoS in the early 2000s (Lau et al. (2000), Smith (2014)), causing significant 
revenue loss by shutting down services, 
• Botnet infections in relation to DDoS (Smith (2014)), taking computational 
resources from legitimate clients and using those resources for illegal conduct, 
• ransomwares, specialized malwares (Beek et al. (2019)), encrypting information 
and demanding ransom for decryption, 
• and more recently, deepfake attacks (Damiani (2019), Statt (2019)), where deep 
learning models are used to impersonate stakeholders in key positions to gain 
access to sensitive information or to conduct fraud. 
The presence of these attacks changes among economic sectors, the most targeted being 
financial services, healthcare and education. Several methods exist for countering these 
malicious activities at different layers of an information system, a concept often referred 
to as defense in depth. One example is machine learning. Intrusive activities have well-
defined patterns, detecting them is simple enough for a specialized system supported by 
the same machine learning algorithms. Furthermore, in some cases, like deepfake attacks, 
machine learning might be the only effective method of detection. 
Despite cybercrime becoming more and more common, machine learning techniques are 
still not widespread and utilized enough in IT security. This is my motivation for studying 
network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) from a data mining perspective. My main 
goal was to provide a novel intrusion detection solution applying machine learning 
methods. To fulfill this goal, I set up, parameterized, trained and tested several intrusion 
detection models, implementing artificial neural network architectures. I combined two 
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approaches in my research: the design science research methodology and the CRISP-DM 
process model. 
Throughout the dissertation I created four models in total for intrusion detection, going 
from simple classification ensembles to more complex neural network stacking models 
and hybrid anomaly-signature detection solutions implemented with the help of 
autoencoder networks. To evaluate how well each can detect intrusive behavior, I used 
the KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD benchmark datasets for modeling, and the accuracy 
and recall metrics for model evaluation. I proved that machine learning is a suitable 
approach for detecting intrusions. Based on certain per-class and aggregate measures, at 
least one of the proposed models (V3) can compete and outperform works in the related 
literature. More details on the proposed models are available in chapter 4.2, and the 
comparison with the related literature in chapter 5.6. 
In the following chapters of my dissertation I will introduce the concept of intrusions, 
intrusion detection and intrusion detection systems (IDS), the machine learning models 
and techniques that I used, or could have used for intrusion detection and the wider 
research conducted in the field in chapter 2. In chapter 3, I detail my choice of 
methodology based on the design science research methodology and CRISP-DM process 
model, followed by the design, implementation and evaluation of the machine learning 
model-based detectors I created in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions I 
collected with a brief outlook on practical application and further research possibilities. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, I introduce the core concepts of my dissertation: intrusions, and intrusion 
detection systems. I follow this up describing data mining, its key characteristics and the 
different machine learning algorithms it uses, both supervised and unsupervised. I found 
this introduction important, as machine learning has gained recognition in the last decades 
in detecting intrusion attempts. Moreover, I discuss artificial neural networks and 
autoencoder networks in a separate chapter to detail how important they were to the 
detectors I implemented. Further chapters provide an introduction to the overall intrusion 
detection research, identifying the key literature within the field like McHugh (2000), 
Stolfo et al. (2000); Tavallaee et al. (2009), Tsai et al. (2009), Ippoliti (2011), Buczak 
and Guven (2015), Dua and Du (2016) and Molina-Coronado et al. (2020). 
2.1. WHAT IS INTRUSION DETECTION? 
According to Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014, pp. 303, 305) “Intrusion is a 
deliberate and unauthorized attempt to access information, manipulate information and 
render a system unreliable or unusable. Intrusion itself is a set of actions aimed to 
compromise the security of computer and network components in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability”. Intrusion detection is a set of actions to detect such events, to 
raise alerts, and to provide information to prevent them. Bruneau (2001, p. 2) described 
it as a collection of “unrelenting active attempts in discovering or detecting the presence 
of intrusive activities.” These attempts refer to all processes aimed at discovering 
unauthorized use of network or computer resources. Dua and Du (2016, p. 10) defined 
intrusions and intrusion detection as “any unauthorized attempt to access, manipulate, 
modify, or destroy information or to use a computer system remotely to spam, hack, or 
modify other computers. An IDS intelligently monitors activities that occur in a 
computing resource, e.g., network traffic and computer usage, to analyze the events and 
generate reactions”. This is a more up to date description that accounts for botnet 
activities and includes both network and host intrusion detection. Molina-Coronado et al. 
(2020, p. 2) defined intrusion detection systems the following way “Intrusion Detection 
Systems are deployed to uncover cyberattacks that may harm information systems.” In 
further chapters of this dissertation, when I talk about intrusion detection systems, I will 
mean a system designed to detect attempts at unauthorized access to an information 
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system coming from a wider external network. The key assumption for such a system to 
function is that intrusive behavior is discernable from normal activity. 
According to Scarfone and Mell, (2007), Dua and Du, (2016) and Molina-Coronado et 
al. (2020), the following types of IDS exist: 
• Network based (NIDS): monitoring traffic on network devices or segments with 
the aim of detecting malicious traffic aimed at devices within the protected 
network boundaries. Network intrusion detectors are usually deployed in DMZs, 
as part of an intelligent firewall, VPN servers, remote access servers and wireless 
network access points. 
• Host based (HIDS): monitoring the resource consumption on a single system for 
suspicious activity. This host can be a critical IT infrastructure element, typically 
an application or database server. Together with NIDS, these are the most 
researched and mature fields. 
• Wireless: monitoring wireless network traffic for possible intrusions. The 
characteristics of wireless communication makes it a special category of network 
intrusion detection. 
• Network behavior analysis: monitoring network traffic to identify unusual flows 
(which could be a result of a DDoS attack). 
Many techniques have been developed to create intrusion detection systems, from manual 
oversight in the early days, though expert and rule-based solutions to data science and 
machine learning. Data science plays a key role in modern intrusion detection, as it is the 
only technique that can handle the sheer volume of network traffic effectively. From a 
data scientific point of view, Scarfone and Mell (2007), Dua and Du (2016) and Molina-
Coronado et al. (2020) distinguished the most common classes of intrusion detection: 
• Misuse / signature detection: IDS that generates alarms when a known intrusion 
occurs. Known attacks can be detected reliably with low false positive rates, 
however new attacks cannot be detected. Misuse detectors describe known attacks 
as malicious patterns; therefore, they require data on the attacks first to be able to 
detect them. 
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• Anomaly-based detection: alarms are triggered when a traffic flow behaves in a 
significantly different way compared to normal traffic patterns. Subsequently, 
they can detect previously unknown attacks at the cost of a higher false positive 
rate. Ippoliti (2011) noted the key difference between anomaly and signature-
based methods: anomaly detectors detect what their name suggests: anomalies in 
traffic and not intrusions: legitimate albeit unusual usage might raise alerts in an 
anomaly detection model, while a carefully constructed attack could remain 
undetected if it behaves like normal activity. 
• Hybrid detection: to improve the detection performance of IDSs, some 
researchers proposed to combine anomaly and misuse detection into hybrid 
detectors. The underlying idea is to combine the benefits of the two, like the ability 
to detect known attacks with low false positive rates, while maintaining some 
ability of detecting new attacks when needed. Zhang and Zulkernine (2006), 
Zhang, Zulkernine and Haque (2008), Dua and Du (2016) and Molina-Coronado 
et al. (2020) identified four possible configuration for hybrid intrusion detection, 
also visible in Figure 1: 
o Parallel detection: used to correlate signature and anomaly detection 
results to provide a stronger detection (Figure 1.a). Network traffic is 
flagged as attack if either the anomaly or the signature detector identifies 
it as such. 
o Signature-Anomaly sequence detection: designed to improve detection 
ability on unknown attacks missed by the signature detector (Figure 1.b). 
o Anomaly-Signature sequence detection: designed to reduce false 
positive rates (Figure 1.c). The anomaly detector flags suspicious traffic, 
then the misuse detector confirms the flagged anomalies. 
o Complex mixture detection: any detection approach using anomaly and 
signature detectors simultaneously, that did not fit in the categories above. 
For example, the model demonstrated in Figure 1.d, where traffic is 
evaluated by an anomaly detector first. Normal traffic is further evaluated 
by a signature detector to identify attacks missed, while suspicious traffic 
is evaluated by a second anomaly detector to refine detections of the first 
model. 
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Figure 1: Types of hybrid intrusion detection. Source: Molina-Coronado et al., (2020) 
Even with data science and machine learning techniques, intrusion detection is a complex 
and challenging task for the reasons below: 
• The most important challenge from a data science point of view, is the imbalanced 
representation of normal and intrusive activity. Normally, the volume of normal 
traffic outweighs that of attacks. At the sime time stakeholders are more interested 
in precisely detecting attacks. This implies that a learning system not only needs 
to be able to address an imbalance between normal and attack behavior, but it also 
has to be more effective at detecting attacks, even if it means a higher number of 
legitimate behavior gets flagged. 
• A second challenge is the definition of performance. This could be the number of 
attacks detected, but could also mean the amount of time under which detection 
alerts are generated by the IDS. Both are correct depending on context. Metrics 
measuring detection peformance can do som from different perspectives, some 
less effective than others. Ultimately, the task determines the set of useful 
performance metrics, which is the accurate detection of attacks rather than normal 
traffic in case of intrusion detection. 
• The amount of data available for intrusion detection is high, both in characteristics 
and in traffic records. The former requires a conscious effort at choosing the 
characteristics that best describe all or given attack patterns either through 
selection or information compression. The number of traffic records poses a 
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challenge when machine learning models are trained, but this can be mitigated by 
sampling the traffic. A further complication comes with the interpretation if 
traffic. They could be treated as individual packets, or as a communication flow. 
This distinction is important, as different attacks are effective at different levels. 
After reviewing the approaches used for intrusion detection and the challenges it involves, 
I found network-based misuse / signature detection to be an interesting field to study, 
while also planning to include at least one hybrid intrusion detection. Therefore, three out 
of four of my proposed machine learning models performed signature detection only, with 
the fourth being a hybrid anomaly-signature detector. I used decision trees and artificial 
neural network (ANN) architectures set up in ensembles as machine learning models. 
Further algorithms, particularly used for sampling, were k-nearest neighbors (KNN) and 
support vector machines (SVM). I describe them in detail in the next chapter. 
2.2. DATA MINING 
Data mining has several definitions, Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth (1996) defined 
it as a part of a wider process called knowledge discovery in databases (KDD). KDD is 
determined as “the overall process of discovering useful knowledge from data” (Fayyad, 
Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth (1996, p. 40)) and data mining as “a process using 
statistical, mathematical and artificial intelligence techniques to extract and identify 
useful information and subsequent knowledge from large sets of data”. From the 
perspective of an IDS, the hidden knowledge is the unknown intent behind the source of 
the network traffic and the data is the inbound network traffic. The goal is to set apart 
traffic sent with malicious intent from the legitimate. 
The terms data mining and machine learning, depending on interpretation, are often used 
as synonyms. In this dissertation I will use the following definition for machine learning: 
“it is a field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being explicitly 
programmed to” (Samuel (1959), indirect quote). The definitions of KDD, data mining 
and machine learning make the relationship among them clearer (Figure 2). Data mining 
is an activity in the KDD process, producing patterns to discover interesting knowledge. 
Machine learning algorithms are frequently, though not exclusively, used in data mining 
to generate these patterns. 
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Figure 2: The relationships between KDD, data mining and machine learning. Based on Fayyad, 
Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth (1996) 
The most common tasks and algorithms of data mining were organized by Sharda, Delen 
and Turban (2018). They distinguished prediction, association and segmentation tasks. 
Prediction is referred to as the act of telling about the future. Prediction is further divided 
into classification and regression. Classification attempts to predict categorical, while 
regression attempts to predict numerical outcomes. This distinction is not as clear as it 
might sound at fist. Many algorithms, that were designed to perform one method, were 
extended to be applicable to the other as well. Typical example is the family of 
generalized regression models with linear and logistic regression performing regression 
and classification respectively. A counter example is the family of decision tree 
algorithms, initially created for classification, later extended to perform regression. 
Association discovers interesting relationships between entities in large databases. For 
example, two products that are frequently purchased together. Two methods used for 
relationship detection are link and sequence analysis. Link analysis does not take the order 
of precedence between entities into account, while sequence analysis does. 
In segmentation the goal is to split up and group structured data based on a similarity 
metric. Partitioning include clustering and outlier analysis techniques. The former creates 
homogenous groups where members in one group are more similar compared to members 
from other groups. Outlier analysis tries to find entities that are more dissimilar to others. 
By excluding these dissimilar entities, the effectiveness of following data mining 
algorithms can be improved. 
A different classification of machine learning algorithms can be based on the learning 
process they use, according to Russel and Norwig (2010): 
• Supervised learning the algorithm observes pairs of input-output observations 
and learns a function mapping from input to output. In supervised learning, input 
characteristics are called explanatory features and output is called target feature. 
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• Unsupervised learning, the algorithm learns patterns in the input, even though 
no expected output is supplied. These algorithms often perform self-organization 
as part of the learning process. 
• Semi-supervised learning, the algorithm receives only a few examples with valid 
output, and the model must make decisions with data missing those labels. 
Out of the data mining methods, classification, clustering and outlier analysis are the most 
common in intrusion detection. These methods can be organized into supervised and 
unsupervised types, the former representing techniques used for signature detection, the 
latter for anomaly detection. Just like with the categorization of Sharda, Delen and Turban 
(2018), some overlap between the categories exist, for example, SVMs, a supervised 
learning algorithm, can be altered for anomaly detection as a semi-supervised algorithm. 
Another example has been provided by Yao, Zhao and Maguire (2003), where an 
unsupervised association rule mining algorithm was extended with supervised learning 
models. The border between supervised and unsupervised learning approaches is not as 
clear as it might seem to be at first. 
To systematically carry out data mining projects, a general process flow is required. Some 
of the most popular data mining process models are the cross industry standard process 
for data mining (CRISP-DM) designed by Chapman et al. (2000), the SEMMA model by 
Sharda, Delen and Turban (2018) and the knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) 
process I mentioned earlier from Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth (1996). 
 
Figure 3: The CRISP-DM process model. Source: Chapman et al. (2000) 
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The CRISP-DM process shown in Figure 3 starts with a good understanding of the 
business and the associated need for data mining and ends with the deployment of a 
machine learning model that satisfies the specified business need. The process itself is 
iterative consisting of the following steps: 
1. Business understanding: a key element of any data mining project is figuring out 
what the project is set to achieve. In this stage the tasks are to formulate business 
questions, and to develop a project plan with the necessary resources and budget 
assigned. 
2. Data understanding: the next step in the process is to find and understand the 
relevant data that might come from many sources. To acquire this understanding, 
many simple statistical and graphical techniques are used. 
3. Data preparation: the purpose of data preparation (or data preprocessing) is to 
take the data identified in the previous step and prepare it for the data mining 
algorithms, for example, by scaling the numerical features. 
4. Model building: modeling techniques are selected and applied to a prepared data 
set to address needs and answer questions specified in the business understanding 
step. 
5. Testing and evaluation: The models are assessed and evaluated for their 
generalization capability. 
6. Deployment: model development and assessment are not the end of the data 
mining project. Knowledge acquired must be organized and presented in a way an 
end user can benefit from. Even with deployed models, annual re-evaluation 
might be necessary to maintain high performance, occasionally starting a new 
iteration of the CRISP-DM process. 
Apart from CRISP-DM, the SEMMA methodology can be used, visible in Figure 4. It is 
an acronym standing for sample, explore, modify, model and assess. It starts with a 
representative data sample, applies exploratory statistical and visual analysis techniques, 
selects and transforms the most important predictive features, models them to predict 
outcomes and confirms the performance of a model. The main difference between CRISP-
DM and SEMMA is that CRISP-DM takes a more comprehensive approach to the data 
mining process, including business and data understanding earlier, and model operation 
later in the process. SEMMA implicitly assumes that business understanding has been 
achieved before data mining and treats model operation as a separate process altogether.  
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Figure 4: The SEMMA process model for data mining. Source: Sharda, Delen and Turban (2018) 
The third process model is the KDD model (Figure 5). Compared to CRISP-DM, it is 
even more comprehensive, where data mining is only an important step, rather than the 
key focus. The complete list of activities of the KDD process: 
1. Data selection: selection and query of data for analysis. Involves data integration, 
where data from multiple sources are joined together. 
2. Data cleaning and preprocessing: remove noise and inconsistencies in data. 
Handle missing and outlier observations. 
3. Data transformation: prepare data for analysis and data mining by performing 
aggregations and operations on data features. 
4. Data mining: train models to detect hidden patterns. 
5. Interpretation and evaluation: evaluate detected patterns to see whether they 
provide acceptable results and are interesting from a business perspective. 
Sample
(representative sample 
of the data)
Explore
(visualization and data 
description)
Modify
(select variables, transform 
variable representation)
Model
(use statistical and machine 
learning models)
Assess
(evaluate accuracy and 
usefulness of models)
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Figure 5: Knowledge discovery in databases. Source: Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro and Smyth (1996) 
Data mining has become a popular tool in addressing many complex business questions 
and opportunities. Sharda, Delen and Turban (2018) listed many economic fields where 
it can be useful, including customer relationship management, banking, retail and 
logistics, manufacturing and production, insurance, computer hardware and software, 
government and defense, travel industry, healthcare and medicine, entertainment 
industry, homeland security and law enforcement and sports. Intrusion detection can be 
applied in computer hardware and software, where it supports the detection of computer 
network security breaches, and in homeland security and law enforcement, where it plays 
a critical role in stopping malicious attacks on critical information infrastructures. 
Thanks to data mining, organizational data, information and knowledge became the 
primary sources of competition on a global scale according to Nemati and Barko (2001). 
Organizations that successfully leverage the decision-enhancing environment realized by 
data mining can both obtain and maintain a lasting competitive advantage. This is the 
main strategic benefit of data mining. 
The following chapters discuss data mining techniques sorted by type: starting with 
supervised and followed by unsupervised learning. Following that, I introduce the only 
machine learning algorithm I made an exception with, artificial neural network 
algorithms. I found them to be pivotal for my research, thus I dedicated an entire chapter 
to their introduction, focusing on fully connected feed-forward networks and autoencoder 
networks. In the last chapter, I will introduce techniques I used to improve model training 
and prediction performance. These include ensemble methods, combining results from 
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multiple base models, synthetic sampling methods, the metrics I used to evaluate 
predictions and hyperparameter optimization. 
These chapters involve formula definitions when describing the different machine 
learning algorithms, many of which share common elements, for example explanatory 
and target features. I indicated the target feature for a hypothetical dataset with the letter 
𝑦 and the target feature values for a given observation as 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑦, ∀𝑖 = 1. . . 𝑛. The target 
feature can also be described in the terms of set theory, where 𝑌 stands for the set of all 
possible values the target feature can take 𝑌𝑗 ∈ 𝑌, ∀𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘. A similar notation can be 
created for the explanatory features as well. In this case, the complete set of explanatory 
variables is marked with 𝑋, with 𝑋𝑠 ∈ 𝑋, ∀𝑠 = 1. . . 𝑚 as the features of 𝑋. As a matrix, 𝑋 
can be traversed “row wise” as well, where the “rows” act as the observations of an entity 
or event. These are marked as 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋, ∀𝑖 = 1. . . 𝑛. Last, I defined the set of possible 
values for a given feature 𝑋𝑠 as 𝑥𝑢
(𝑠)
∈ 𝑋𝑠, ∀𝑢 = 1. . . 𝑣
𝑠 for ∀𝑠 = 1. . . 𝑚. 
Additional notation I used are the standard notation for probability (𝑃(∙)) and conditional 
probability (𝑃(∙ | ∙)), the notation for weight matrices (W) and the hat (∙)̂ notation for 
values estimated by the machine learning models. I will provide descriptions for every 
other new parameter or value that might appear in the introduced formulas in paragraphs 
preceding or following said introduction. 
2.2.1.  SUPERVISED LEARNING 
A learning process is called supervised when the algorithm is provided with reference 
target information to compare learned patterns with. Based on the learned context, new 
observations can be predicted with higher probability of correctly identifying the real 
value than just by guessing randomly. The types of supervised learning are classification 
(where the reference is categorical) and regression (where the reference is numerical). 
Intrusion detection is concerned with predicting the class of incoming traffic; therefore, 
classification is a better fit. Training a classifier model can be time consuming, hence it 
is often performed off-line, while application is strictly on-line. 
The greatest challenge with classification, especially for intrusion detection, is that the 
appropriate class labels must be acquired prior, which is often a tedious task itself. When 
determining the typical classification algorithms used for intrusion detection, I primarily 
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used the findings of Han, Kamber and Pei (2011), Bodon and Buza (2014) and Dua and 
Du (2016). 
Decision Trees 
Decision trees are sets of hierarchical if-then decisions generated by recursive partitioning 
algorithms according to a set purity measure. An example decision tree for a hypothetical 
credit scoring application can be seen in Figure 6. Represented in tree-like structures, an 
object can be classified starting from the root node and moving along the edges (~rules) 
towards the leaves. The final class of the object is provided by the label of the leaf node. 
 
Figure 6: Decision tree. Based on: Han, Kamber and Pei (2011) 
The construction process of decision trees according to Han, Kamber and Pei (2011) 
involve the following steps: 
• Initially, the tree consists of a single root node. 
• If all observations within a node belong to a single class, then the node becomes 
a leaf with the class value as label. 
• Otherwise, an attribute is selected according to a purity measure. This purity 
measure is either the information gain ratio based on the Shannon-entropy, or the 
Gini index. This measure determines which attribute and value is selected for 
partitioning. 
• The sample is then partitioned into subsamples. 
Age? 
Employed? Student? 
Credit accepted Credit accepted Credit rejected Credit rejected 
<=35 >35 
yes no yes no 
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• The above steps repeat recursively for each subsample until a stopping criterion 
is met: 
o If all observations on a node belong to a single class, then the associated 
class value will become the label of the leaf node. 
o If one feature can only be selected once and the list of available features 
for partitioning is empty. In this and the following cases, the label is 
determined by a simple majority vote. 
o The number of observations is less than a predefined threshold (prior 
minimum number of observations rule). 
o The number of observations in either node after a split would be smaller 
than a predefined threshold (posterior minimum number of observations 
rule) 
The most common algorithms for creating decision trees are Interactive Dichotomizer 3 
(ID3) by Quinlan (1986) and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) from Breiman 
et al. (1984). The main difference between the two is the measure for finding a critical 
attribute value for partitioning the tree. ID3-based algorithms use information gain ratio 
and the Shannon-entropy, CARTs prefer the Gini index. Consider target Y a probabilistic 
feature that can take k possible values with 𝑃(𝑌𝑗)(𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘) probability, then the 
Shannon-entropy of Y will be calculated as 
𝐻(𝑌) = 𝐻(𝑃(𝑌𝑗), … , 𝑃(𝑌𝑘)) = −∑𝑃(𝑌𝑗)𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑃(𝑌𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
Entropy is a core concept in information theory; it refers to the uncertainty about the value 
of Y. If we observe probabilistic feature 𝑋𝑠, then the uncertainty of Y changes to 
𝐻(𝑌|𝑋𝑠) = ∑𝑃(𝑋𝑠 = 𝑥𝑢
(𝑠)
)𝐻(𝑌|𝑋𝑠 = 𝑥𝑢
(𝑠)
)
𝑣𝑠
𝑢=1
 
Meaning, if one observes the unique values of 𝑋𝑠, the uncertainty decreases by 
𝐼(𝑌, 𝑋𝑠) = 𝐻(𝑌) − 𝐻(𝑌|𝑋𝑠) 
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This quantifies the information gained from feature 𝑋𝑠 about Y. The entropy 𝐻(𝑌|𝑋𝑠) has 
a bias towards attributes with a large number of unique values according to Quinlan 
(1986). Information gain ratio eliminates this bias by normalizing information gain with 
the entropy of variable 𝑋𝑠: 
𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜(𝑋𝑠) =
𝐼(𝑌, 𝑋𝑠)
𝐻(𝑋𝑠)
 
To find the 𝑋𝑠 feature which contributes the most to the value of Y, the information gain 
(or gain ratio) calculation is repeated for each 𝑠 = 1. . . 𝑚, and we select 𝑋𝑠 for which 
information gain (or gain ratio) is the highest. 
The CART algorithm uses the Gini index instead of information gain, which is formulated 
as 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖(𝑌) = 1 −∑𝑃(𝑌𝑗)
2
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
A key advantage of decision trees is the simplicity of their output for the end user. A 
disadvantage is their tendency to overfit: they learn specific details of the training data 
and generalize poorly on test data. This overfitting can be mitigated by pruning the 
decision trees, or in other words, replacing sub trees in a decision tree to improve 
predictions on the test set. The two most common methods for pruning are subtree 
replacement and subtree raising. 
Support Vector Machines 
Support vector machines (SVMs) are algorithms used for regression, classification and 
anomaly detection, designed by Cortes and Vapnik (1995). It constructs a 
m-1-dimensional separating hyperplane on m-dimensional data. A separation is 
considered good, when it has the highest distance (or margin) to the nearest data points, 
as the higher the margin, the lower the generalization error will be. A 2-dimensional 
example with optimal margin for SVM can be seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Optimal separating hyperplane with maximized margin created by SVM. Based on Cortes and 
Vapnik (1995) 
Support vector classifiers take numerical observations 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 and a binary 
target vector 𝑌 = {1,−1}𝑛. They solve the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑊,𝑏,𝜉
‖𝑊‖2
2
2
+ 𝐶∑𝜉𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Subject to 𝑦𝑖(𝑊
𝑇𝛷(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑏) ≥ 1 − 𝜉𝑖, 
𝜉𝑖 ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 
Its dual problem obtained from Lagrange multipliers is 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝛼
1
2
𝛼𝑇𝑄𝛼 − 𝑒𝑇𝛼 
Subject to 𝑦𝑇𝛼 = 0 
0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 𝐶, ∀𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 
Where 𝑒 is a vector of ones of length n, 𝐶 > 0 is a tradeoff value for soft margin 
separation, Q is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 positive semidefinite matrix, for which 𝑄𝑖1𝑖2 ≡
𝑦𝑖1𝑦𝑖2𝐾(𝑥𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑖2), where 𝐾(𝑥𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑖2) = Φ(x𝑖1)
𝑇Φ(x𝑖2) is the kernel function, most 
commonly linear, though other, more sophisticated kernel functions exist, such as 
gaussian, radial basis function and sigmoid. Φ stands for a function that transforms xi 
observations into a feature space with higher dimension. This is often referred to as the 
kernel trick and it is used for linearly inseparable data in m dimensions. Furthermore, 
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𝜉𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛) are the errors made by the SVM model on noisy data, used for soft 
margin classification, in other words, how much does the model permit classes on the 
“wrong” side of the hyperplane. With the dual solved, the decision function will be the 
following: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∑𝑦𝑖𝛼𝑖𝐾(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥) + 𝜌
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
An advantage of SVMs is their simplicity: they find an optimal separating hyperplane. 
This hyperplane has been proven to have the highest margin, therefore SVM models tend 
to generalize well even when the number of explanatory features is high. They are 
applicable to linearly inseparable patterns in data, although then the model requires the 
use of the kernel trick and the C and 𝜉𝑖 parameters. The only difficulty is finding the 
correct value for C. If too large, the model will generalize poorly, if too small, it will have 
a high error rate. The best strategy for finding C is to experiment, for example, with 
hyperparameter optimization and cross validation. A smaller issue with SVM is that it 
implicitly performs binary classification. This can be mitigated by using either one versus 
one or one vs rest classification strategies, meaning m SVM models are trained each 
comparing two classes, or a selected class and all the remaining classes. 
K-Nearest Neighbor 
The k-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithm searches the variable space around 𝑥𝑖 selected 
observation and selects the K nearest neighbors around it based on a distance metric (Han, 
Kamber and Pei (2011), Bodon and Buza (2014) and Dua and Du (2016)). Then, 𝑦𝑖 will 
be estimated as the (weighted or non-weighted) arithmetic mean of the neighboring target 
values (in case of regression) or by the relative frequency of 𝑌𝑗 values in the neighborhood 
of 𝑦𝑖 (classification). A demonstrative example of KNN with K = 1 is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: KNN classification with K=1. Source: Navlani (2018) 
Some of the key challenges with k-nearest neighbor algorithm is finding an appropriate 
distance measure and a good K value for separation. The most common answer for the 
former is the Euclidean distance (assuming both 𝑥𝑖1 and 𝑥𝑖2 are observations with only 
numerical features): 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖2) =  ‖𝑥𝑖1 − 𝑥𝑖2‖2 
Finding the right value for K is more complicated: a small K might provide a good 
distinction between classes or a more accurate regression, but it is more sensitive to noise 
in the data. The best approach for finding K is trying out multiple settings and choosing 
the one with the best overall results. 
KNN is a lazy classifier, it trains models fast. Testing, however, is slower and has a higher 
memory consumption, as the algorithm needs the complete training data for predictions. 
These characteristics make KNN less applicable on data that either has too many 
observations or too many features, regardless of how well KNN performs on said data. 
Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks use factored joint probability distributions in a graphical model to 
decide about uncertain features (Han, Kamber and Pei (2011), Bodon and Buza (2014) 
and Dua and Du (2016)). Bayesian networks rely on the Bayes-theorem for classification. 
Considering observation x𝑖 and features 𝑋1. . . 𝑋𝑚, let us mark 𝑥𝑖1 . . . 𝑥𝑖𝑚  as the observation 
values for each feature. Let 𝑌𝑗 mark the probabilistic event that 𝑥𝑖 belongs to class j, where 
𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘. According to the Bayes rule: 
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𝑃(𝑌𝑗|𝑥𝑖) =
𝑃(𝑥𝑖, 𝑌𝑗)
𝑃(𝑥𝑖)
=
𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗)𝑃(𝑌𝑗)
𝑃(𝑥𝑖)
 
Where 𝑃(𝑌𝑗|𝑥𝑖) is the posterior probability of Yj (how the likelihood of event 𝑌𝑗 changed 
knowing information about observation 𝑥𝑖), 𝑃(𝑌𝑗) is the prior probability of Yj (the 
likelihood of 𝑌𝑗 not knowing anything about 𝑥𝑖). Similarly, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗) denotes the posterior 
probability of 𝑥𝑖 knowing about the value of 𝑌𝑗. Bayesian networks assign 𝑌𝑗 to 𝑥𝑖 where 
𝑃(𝑌𝑗|𝑥𝑖) is the highest out of 𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘 classes. 
As 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) is constant for every class and 𝑃(𝑌𝑗) is either provided already or can be 
estimated from sample (with relative frequencies, for example), Bayesian networks only 
need to maximize 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗) in order to maximize 𝑃(𝑌𝑗|𝑥𝑖). The data needed to calculate 
every possible 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗) probability is often not available in practice; therefore, some 
versions of Bayesian networks make assumptions about the probabilities to simplify 
calculations. For example, Naïve Bayes networks assume the conditional independence 
of 𝑋1. . . 𝑋𝑚. In this case, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗) can be simplified as 
𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑌𝑗) =∏𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑠|𝑌𝑗)
𝑚
𝑠=1
 
For each class value. 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑠|𝑌𝑗) probabilities can be estimated from the available data. If 
𝑋𝑠 is categorical, then 𝑃(𝑥𝑖𝑠|𝑌𝑗) can be estimated with relative frequencies. When 𝑋𝑠 is 
numerical and the distribution of 𝑃(𝑋𝑠|𝑌𝑗) is known, then the probability in question can 
be determined by estimating the parameters of the distribution with statistical methods. 
The most important advantages of naïve Bayes are robustness (the models remain stable 
even if the conditional independence assumption is violated) and theoretical importance 
(the results of many neural network and curve fitting algorithm equals the maximum 
likelihood hypothesis provided by the naïve Bayes algorithm). The disadvantages of naïve 
Bayes models are their tendency to lose accuracy when their assumptions (conditional 
independence and the equal importance of every attribute) are violated. However, when 
the naïve Bayes algorithm is combined with feature selection techniques, then its 
classifications can rival the performance of decision trees and neural networks. 
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2.2.2. UNSUPERVISED LEARNING 
According to Russel and Norwig (2010, p. 694) “In unsupervised learning the agent 
learns patterns in the input even though no explicit feedback is supplied”. Unsupervised 
learning is more useful for anomaly detection, as it provides more stable performance 
compared to signature detection models, are less costly to train and work well on 
previously unknown patterns. However, many unsupervised techniques can only handle 
numerical inputs, and differentiating attacks from normal activities is still a challenging 
task. The two most common type of unsupervised learning are clustering and outlier 
analysis. 
Clustering algorithms partition a collection of entities into segments whose members 
share a similar characteristic, while members between segments are less likely to share 
that characteristic (Sharda, Delen and Turban (2018)). Many clustering algorithms have 
been invented, using different heuristics for similarity, therefore they might create 
different clusters even on the same data. The most common types of clustering algorithms 
are, according to (Bodon and Buza (2014)): 
• Partitioning methods divide data into 𝐶𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘 disjoint groups (or clusters), 
each containing at least one observation. 
• Hierarchical methods construct hierarchical data structures, commonly referred 
to as dendrograms. 
• Density-based methods overcome the common inability of earlier clustering 
algorithms to create clusters other than elliptical in shape. For a density-based 
cluster to be valid, at least 𝑛∗ observations need to be in a predetermined radius 
from any other observation in the same cluster. Apart from clustering, density-
based methods can be used for outlier analysis as well, making them well suited 
for intrusion detection.  
Han, Kamber and Pei (2011) and Bodon and Buza (2014) refers to outliers as data with 
unusual and distinctively different characteristics from a larger set of observations. Often, 
outliers are either results of errors in data recording or inherent to the studied phenomena. 
If the latter is the case, then outliers themselves are the interesting patterns to be found. 
They could, for example, indicate fraudulent activities in a banking environment, or 
intrusive behavior in computer networks. 
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The task of outlier analysis is finding 𝑛∗ outlier values in a dataset with n observations 
(𝑛∗ ≪ 𝑛). This can be broken down to two questions: how to determine which 
observations are inconsistent with a large enough part of the data, and what are the 
effective methods for detecting them. Outliers could be defined by more than one feature, 
which excludes most (but not all) statistical analysis techniques used for outlier detection. 
A common way of creating multidimensional outlier detectors is the modification of pre-
existing classification and clustering methods. 
In the following subchapters, I will describe the most common algorithms used for 
clustering and outlier analysis with the help of Han, Kamber and Pei (2011), Bodon and 
Buza (2014) and Dua and Du (2016). 
K-means clustering 
K-means is the oldest and most common algorithm for clustering. It takes n observations 
and partitions them into k disjoint clusters. Observations in the same cluster are more 
similar to each other than to observations in other clusters. This “closeness” is captured 
by a distance function, most commonly the Euclidean distance, measured from the 
arithmetic mean of all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗 , ∀𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘, often represented as 𝑐𝑗 centroid of a cluster. 
The goal of k-means clustering is to minimize a predetermined criteria function. The steps 
performed by the algorithm are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: K-means clustering algorithm. Source: Piech (2012) 
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1. Start with 𝑋 represented in a Euclidean space (Figure 9 (a)). Choose k points in 
space at random at first (Figure 9. (b)), mark them as the initial centroids (𝑐𝑗 , 𝑗 =
1. . . 𝑘). 
2. Assign all 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋 observations to the nearest 𝑐𝑗 (Figure 9. (c)), based on a distance 
measure. 
3. Re-calculate 𝑐𝑗 centroids for each cluster (Figure 9. (d)). 
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until a criteria function converges (Figure 9. (e)-(f)). This 
criteria function can be the squared error function: 
𝑆𝐸 =∑∑‖𝑥𝑖
(𝑗)
− 𝑐𝑗‖
2
2
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
In the formula above 𝑥𝑖
(𝑗)
 is an observation belonging to 𝐶𝑗 cluster with 𝑐𝑗 centroid. This 
error function is the sum of distances for each observation and cluster. 
The k-means algorithm works well when clusters form compact groups. It is a simple and 
fast algorithm that scales well with larger datasets. It is, however, not guaranteed to find 
global optima: it converges on a partitioning, even when a cluster setup could exist with 
lower squared error. Moreover, the algorithm only works with observations defined in a 
vector space, therefore categorical features must be excluded or encoded to numerical 
first. 
Many variations of k-means were invented. These are different in their cluster 
initialization, in the distance functions from centroids or in what they treat as centroids. 
One of these variations is called k-medoid clustering, aiming to address two 
disadvantages with k-means: k-medoid results are less sensitive to outliers, and the 
algorithm is dependent on similarity metrics only, therefore observations are no longer 
required to be representable in Euclidean vector spaces. In k-medoid, a cluster centroid is 
not an arithmetic mean, but an actual observation (𝑐𝑗 ∈ 𝑋 ∀𝑗 = 1. . . 𝑘), called the medoid. 
As a result, the criteria function is altered; the squared distance is calculated from these 
medoids. 
The k-means algorithm can be adapted for outlier analysis as well demonstrated by Dua 
and Du (2016). Without explicitly defining k, the clusters are also constrained by a 
threshold r. The difference from standard k-means algorithm comes when the distance 
between 𝑐𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖 is greater than threshold r. When that happens, a new cluster is 
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initialized with 𝑥𝑖 as its initial centroid. The challenge of determining which clusters can 
be considered normal and which clusters as anomalous remains. The assumption is that 
normal data outnumbers anomalous data, therefore the clusters that contain more than a 
set 𝛼 percentage of the training data are labelled as normal, the rest as anomaly. 
DBSCAN 
DBSCAN, or density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise is a clustering 
algorithm using two parameters (𝜀, a radius-like parameter and 𝑛∗, a threshold for the 
number of observations) for determining the density of a cluster developed. I has been 
developed by Ester et al. (1996) and it requires X explanatory features to be represented 
in an n-dimensional Euclidean space, just like k-means. Then, the neighborhood of 𝑥𝑖 
(𝑁𝜀(𝑥𝑖)) is the set of observations that fall within an 𝜀 radius around 𝑥𝑖. Further 
terminology of DBSCAN is based on the following definitions: 
• Observation 𝑥𝑖 is directly density-reachable from 𝑥𝑗 if 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝜀(𝑥𝑗) and |𝑁𝜀(𝑥𝑗)| ≥
 𝑛∗ (core point condition). Two core observations are density-reachable from each 
other, a border observation is directly density-reachable from a core observation, 
but a core observation is not directly density reachable from a border observation. 
• Observation 𝑥𝑖 is directly density-reachable from 𝑥𝑗 if there exists a chain of 
observations {𝑥1
∗, . . . , 𝑥𝑛
∗} 𝑥1
∗ = 𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑛
∗ = 𝑥𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖+1
∗  is directly density reachable 
from 𝑥𝑖
∗. 
• Observation 𝑥𝑖 is density-connected to 𝑥𝑗 if an observation 𝑥ℓ exists, such that 
both 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are density-reachable from 𝑥ℓ. 
Then, a cluster in DBSCAN can be defined as a set of density-connected observations. 
Observations, that were not assigned to any cluster will be considered as noise (or, in the 
case of outlier analysis, as the outliers themselves). Figure 10 demonstrates different types 
of observations determined by the DBSCAN algorithm. 
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Figure 10: Point types in DBSCAN clustering. Source: Lutins (2017) 
The DBSCAN algorithm can detect non-elliptical clusters, however, it is highly sensitive 
to the two input hyperparameters, ε and 𝑛∗. Finding these optimal parameters may not 
even be feasible if observation densities within a cluster are not uniform. 
One Class SVM 
The support vector machine algorithm is considered to be a supervised classification 
model, however, Schölkopf et al. (2000) proved that it can be modified to perform outlier 
analysis as well. One class SVM is an algorithm that learns a function with a returned 
value of +1 in a small region capturing a large portion of data points (called origin) and -1 
everywhere else. To separate data from the origin, it solves the following quadratic 
problem: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑤,𝜉,𝜌
‖𝑊‖2
2
+
1
𝜈𝑛
∑𝜉𝑖 − 𝜌
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Subject to (𝑊𝑇𝛷(𝑥𝑖)) ≥ 𝜌 − 𝜉𝑖, 
𝜉𝑖 ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛 
Note, that apart from a change to the C parameter, the problem definition remains largely 
the same. The 𝜈 ∈ (0, 1) parameter sets an upper limit on the fraction of outliers and a 
lower limit on the training examples used as support vectors simultaneously. The 𝜌 
parameter represents the margin separating outliers from the origin data, basically the 
distance of the separating hyperplane from the origin. The decision function can be 
determined by solving the Lagrange dual problem: 
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min
𝛼
1
2
𝛼𝑇𝐾(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)𝛼 
Subject to 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤
1
𝜈𝑛
, ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1  
Thus, the decision function will take the form of: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∑𝛼𝑖𝐾(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥) − 𝜌
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
One class SVM shares most advantages and disadvantages with the original SVM 
algorithm, the only major difference being that outlier classification is inherently a binary 
classification problem, therefore one class SVMs do not need adjustments for multiclass 
classification. 
2.2.3. NEURAL NETWORKS 
In this chapter I introduce the most common artificial neural network model, the feed-
forward multilayer perceptron model. These models consist of parallel operating elements 
called neurons, each performing simple partitioning or fitting operations. Neural networks 
are powerful models, due to how, given enough neurons, they can approximate any 
arbitrary function. I based the first half of this chapter on the works of Rumelhart et al. 
(1988), Russel and Norwig (2010, pp. 727–737) and Kingma and Ba (2014). In the second 
half I introduce a specialized neural network architecture called autoencoder network. 
Autoencoder networks were designed to reconstruct their input data. A clever exploitation 
of this reconstruction on normal traffic makes autoencoders better suited for anomaly 
detection. My discussion on autoencoder networks is based on Ng and others, (2011), 
Kingma and Welling, (2013) and Sohn, Lee and Yan, (2015). 
Artificial neural networks are designed to model the activity of the human brain, though 
this mathematical model cannot be claimed to be 100% accurate, as some operations in 
artificial neural networks were rather based on practical experiences. ANNs form 
networks of massively parallel distributed processing units called neurons. The schematic 
model for one neuron is presented in Figure 11. Each neuron is either connected with 
input observation values (𝑥𝑖
𝑠) or the outputs of other neurons (𝑎𝑞
ℓ−1, where ℓ refers to the 
layer the current neuron is part of and 𝑞 = 1. . . 𝑁ℓ−1 iterates over the neurons of layer 
ℓ − 1). Each connection has a weight 𝑤𝑞𝑝
ℓ ∈ 𝑊 (where 𝑝 = 1. . . 𝑁ℓ iterates over the 
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neurons of layer ℓ) associated with it determining the strength of the connection. The first 
weight (𝑤0𝑝
ℓ ∈ 𝑾) refers to the bias value (𝑏𝑝
ℓ), with its associated activation usually, but 
not necessarily equal to one. Activation 𝑎𝑝
ℓ  of neuron p is calculated by aggregating the 
products of prior activations and their associated weights. This aggregation is marked as 
𝑧𝑝
ℓ for convenience. 
 
Figure 11: Simple mathematical model for a neuron. Based on Russel and Norwig (2010) 
Mathematically, neurons perform a sum of products between activations of the previous 
layer and their respective weights, then apply a function on the aggregation: 
𝑧𝑝
ℓ = ∑ 𝑎𝑞
ℓ−1𝑤𝑞𝑝
ℓ
𝑁ℓ−1
𝑞=0
 
𝑎𝑝
ℓ = 𝑓(𝑧𝑝
ℓ) 
This function is the activation function (𝑓). The most common are sigmoid, tangent 
hyperbolic, RELU and leaky RELU: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑑: 𝑓(𝑧) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ: 𝑓(𝑧) =
𝑒𝑧 − 𝑒−𝑧
𝑒𝑧 + 𝑒−𝑧
 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑈: 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑧) 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑦 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑈: 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜀𝑧, 𝑧); 0 < 𝜀 ≪ 1 
Each of these activation functions were based and developed on practical considerations, 
rather than on observed brain activity. This is one of the reasons why neural networks 
cannot be considered accurate mathematical models of the human brain. These activation 
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functions map a value from (-∞, ∞) to a set interval, and must be differentiable over the 
same interval. Differentiability is an important aspect of activation functions, which will 
become clear once back propagation is introduced. 
In total, two neural network architectures can be developed: 
1. Feed-forward networks: connections between neurons form a directed acyclic 
graph. They have no internal state other than their weights. 
2. Recurrent networks: feeds output back into its own inputs. Their initial state 
depends on prior inputs as well as the weights, making them adept at modeling 
memory. They are better suited for problems possessing inherent sequential and 
temporal patterns, for example, text processing and NLP problems. They can be 
useful for intrusion detection if the intrusion detector is tasked to evaluate 
sequences of network packets. This temporal characteristic is not available for the 
benchmark datasets I used, therefore, though they have potential, this chapter will 
not discuss RNNs any further. 
Feed-forward neural networks are structured into layers (Figure 12), collections of 
neurons taking inputs from neurons in a preceding layer and propagating their output to 
neurons in the following layer. A layer receiving inputs from the environment is called 
an input layer, a layer propagating its outputs to the environment is called an output layer. 
All the remaining layers between input and output layers are called hidden layers. 
 
Figure 12: Architecture of a multilayer feedforward neural network. Source: own edit 
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Multilayer feed-forward neural networks are surprisingly flexible models. They can 
support both classification and regression problems. McCulloch and Pitts (1943) argued 
that a network constructed by a sufficiently large number of neurons is capable of 
approximating any desirable function with categorical or numerical output. As the 
primary use case of neural networks in intrusion detection is signature detection, 
primarily a classification task, the classification aspects of neural networks will be the 
primary focus of this chapter. 
One challenge for multilayer feed-forward networks is how to produce more than a single 
output value. In this case, original expected output vectors are available, indicated as 𝑦𝑖. 
To quantify the performance of the network, the activations of the output layer (𝑎𝑖
𝐿 = ?̂?𝑖) 
are compared to this expected output. This is performed with the help of loss functions. 
In classification a particular loss function is the cross-entropy loss: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = −∑𝑦𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑖
𝐿)
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
𝛼
2
‖𝑊‖2
2 
The point of a loss function is to take two vectors of class probabilities and compare them 
to one another. The difference between ground truth values and predictions is the loss for 
a given observation. Calculate the arithmetic mean of this loss for all observations to get 
the global loss of the network. Other popular loss functions include mean squared loss (or 
mean squared error, MSE) function, measuring ANN performance in regression tasks. 
Calculating cross-entropy loss, however, requires class membership vector values to be 
interpretable on a (0, 1) interval each with one single value much closer to one than the 
rest. The softmax function can calculate vectors with such criteria: 
𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑎𝑖
𝐿) =
𝑒𝑎𝑖
𝐿
∑ 𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝐿
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
Where k stands for both the number of classes and the number of output neurons. The 
expected output 𝑦𝑖 is a vector of length k, where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1 if and only if the observation 
represented by 𝑦𝑖 belongs to 𝑌𝑗, otherwise 0. The softmax function takes a vector of length 
k and returns a vector at the same length with class membership probabilities. The 
probability located at index j will be the highest, if an observation belongs to 𝑌𝑗. This way, 
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the loss for one observation and the overall loss for all observations can both be 
calculated. 
One additional element in the loss function is 
𝛼
2
‖𝑊‖2
2, commonly referred to as L2 
regularization or ridge regression. The purpose of L2 is to penalize weight updates too 
great in magnitude, preventing the neural network model from overfitting the data. The 
magnitude of this regularization penalty is controlled by parameter 𝛼. Other 
regularizations are L1 and elastic net regularizations. L1 regularization (or lasso 
regression) is denoted as 𝛼‖𝑊‖1. Its main purpose, like L2, is to prevent the network 
from overfitting, but it regularizes weights (𝑤𝑞𝑝
ℓ ) to zero more, therefore it is suitable for 
feature selection or for enforcing weight sparsity. Finally, elastic net regularization 
combines the benefits of L1 (weight sparsity) and L2 (small coefficients) regularizations. 
In an elastic net α is multiplied by an additional component controlling the tradeoff 
between L1 and L2 regularization. Apart from L1, L2 and elastic net, other regularization 
techniques are available as well. One such example is the dropout rate (Srivastava et al., 
(2014)), where, during training, a fraction of neurons are temporarily excluded from the 
model at each iteration, introducing randomness to neuron activations at each hidden 
layer, making the network overall more robust and generalize better on unseen data. 
Learning in a neural network is synonymous with the minimization of the mean loss 
function. This optimization process involves the iterative incremental adjustment of W 
by taking the partial derivative of the loss function with regards to the weights. This is 
simple considering only the output layer; however, the true challenge lies in propagating 
the loss over to the hidden layers. This challenge has been solved when backpropagation 
was introduced. 
Backpropagation propagates the loss measured at the output layer towards the input layer. 
To do this, backpropagation has to determine the sensitivity of the loss function to the 
weights. This is performed for each weight by applying the chain rule twice: 
𝛻𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑊 ←
𝜕𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝑤
𝑝,𝑁ℓ
ℓ
= 𝑎
𝑁ℓ
ℓ−1 ∗ 𝑓′(𝑧𝑝
ℓ) ∗
𝜕𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝑎𝑝
ℓ
 
Where 
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𝜕𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝑎𝑗
ℓ
=
{
 
 
∑ 𝑤
𝑝,𝑁ℓ+1
ℓ+1 ∗ 𝑓′(𝑧𝑝
ℓ+1) ∗
𝜕𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝜕𝑎𝑝
ℓ+1
,   𝑖𝑓 ℓ 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 ℎ𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟
𝑁ℓ+1
𝑝=0
𝑎𝑖
𝐿 − 𝑦𝑖,   𝑖𝑓 ℓ 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟
 
With the formula above, the algorithm calculates the gradient vector (𝛻𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑊), holding 
information on how much each weight needs to change to minimize the loss function: 
𝑊𝑡+1 = 𝑊𝑡 − 𝜂𝛻𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑊
𝑡  
Where t is the iteration step and 𝜂 is a special parameter called learning rate. It is a model 
hyperparameter controlling the size of a step at each iteration to ensure the training 
reaches a global minimum. It is a sensitive value, set it too low and training will take a 
long time, set it too high and the model will fail to converge, or it will even diverge. More 
advanced optimization methods permit a dynamic learning rate, enabling the training 
process to start from higher learning rates (faster) and end on lower learning rates for 
better convergence. For example, inverse scaling learning rate reduces the initial learning 
rate by dividing it with the current iteration step (t) raised to a predetermined value. 
An iteration can be one complete pass over all (𝑋, 𝑦) input-output pairs. This is 
computationally expensive, other methods, like minibatch stochastic gradient descent 
(SGD) are preferred, where, the algorithm uses small slices of input observations before 
a single weight update, repeated for all 𝑋. A whole pass of the entire input in SGD is 
referred to as an epoch, which in turn repeats until a set number or convergence is reached. 
The other improvements to SGD involve Adam (Kingma and Ba (2014)), which 
introduced adaptive bias-corrected first and second moments to gradient descent for 
automated weight adjustments. Adam has been widely adopted as a solver for neural 
networks. 
An advantage of neural networks is that they operate as universal function approximators. 
Given enough time and input, they can learn non-linear functions of any complexity. 
The disadvantages of neural networks are: 
• The algorithm has no guarantees to finding global optimum, neural network 
instances must be trained multiple times with different weight initializations. 
• They tend to overfit presented data. This can be offset by applying L1 or L2 
regularization. 
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• Neural networks require the tuning of several hyperparameters, such as learning 
rate, the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons per hidden layer. 
Hyperparameter optimization strategies are required to find an optimal value for 
each. 
•  Neural networks are sensitive to feature scaling, mitigated by feature 
normalization. 
• Neural networks are often too complex for a human observer to understand, often 
referred to as black box systems. 
Autoencoder Networks 
Autoencoder networks are unsupervised neural network algorithms created when the 
target vectors are set to be identical to the input vectors. They are particularly useful in 
finding outlier patterns, a characteristic that can be exploited for anomaly detection. The 
architecture of a basic autoencoder network is available in Figure 13. More complex 
versions of this model have been designed, although all of them can be divided into an 
encoder, learning interesting patterns about the input data, a bottleneck creating a limited 
representation, and the decoder reconstructing the input from this limited representation. 
 
Figure 13: Architecture of an autoencoder network. Source: own edit 
Training on an autoencoder is performed using the same backpropagation process used 
to train feed-forward neural networks. The most important differences lie in the network 
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architecture, the choice of true output to compare predicted outputs to and, in the case of 
intrusion detection, in which class of traffic is provided for the network to train on. With 
these considerations an autoencoder is trained the following way: 
• The data is split to normal and anomalous (~attack) traffic 
• The autoencoder is trained only using normal traffic, thus it learns patterns 
between normal connection features only 
• Reconstruction loss on new normal connections is expected to be lower, and 
higher on attacks. This reconstruction loss, unlike with fully connected neural 
networks, is the half of the mean squared error function: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐸 =
1
2𝑛
∑‖?̂?𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖‖2
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑥𝑖 stands for the true input observations and ?̂?𝑖 is the reconstructed input. 
So far, I only introduced dense autoencoders with one hidden layer, but more complex 
autoencoder networks exist. By introducing additional hidden layers, one can construct 
an autoencoder capable of learning nonlinear relationships between the input features. 
These multilayer autoencoders are often referred to as deep autoencoders. 
A second restriction imposed on deep autoencoders is that neuron counts in encoder layers 
must be monotonically decreasing and monotonically increasing in decoder layers. This 
restriction can be lifted, by introducing a sparsity constraint to the network (Ng and 
others, (2011)). Sparsity in all neural networks refers to the sparsity of activations when 
a selected 𝑥𝑖 observation is fed to the network. Its main difference compared to dropout 
is that sparsity is maintained even after training has ended and a given 𝑞∗ neuron might 
activate for some 𝑥𝑖 input and not for others. Sparsity can be achieved by applying a 
constraint as regularization: 
• Regularize the loss function with L1, as lasso regression encourages sparsity. 
• Use Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL divergence). KL divergence is a measure 
of difference between two distributions. When used for sparsity in autoencoders, 
it penalizes the average activation of all neurons in all layers to a predetermined 
rate, indicated as ρ. The formula of KL divergence for hidden neuron q: 
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∑𝐾𝐿(𝜌||?̂?𝑞)
𝑁ℓ
𝑞=1
=∑𝜌𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝜌
?̂?𝑞
+ (1 − 𝜌)𝑙𝑜𝑔
1 − 𝜌
1 − ?̂?𝑞
𝑁ℓ
𝑞=1
 
Where ?̂?𝑞 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑎𝑞
ℓ(𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the average activation of q over all 𝑥𝑖 inputs. This formula, 
like L1, is added as a regularization constraint to the loss function of the autoencoder: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑆𝐴𝐸 =
1
2𝑛
∑‖?̂?𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖‖2
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝛽∑𝐾𝐿(𝜌||?̂?𝑞)
𝑁ℓ
𝑞=1
 
Where β controls the effect of the KL divergence penalty on the loss function. The first 
part of the formula remained unchanged from ½ MSE. With sparsity introduced, neuron 
counts in encoder and decoder layers are permitted, and even encouraged, to increase 
beyond the number of preceding, as only a handful of them will be active at a time. An 
autoencoder regularized by sparsity constraints is called a sparse autoencoder (SAE). 
The last variants of autoencoders I detailed are called variational autoencoders (VAE), 
developed by Kingma and Welling (2013). Variational autoencoders are created when, 
instead of learning an arbitrary function, the model learns the parameters of a 
multidimensional distribution. Compared to previous AEs, this model can not only reduce 
input dimensionality, but it is also capable of providing new samples itself. In this regard 
VAEs can be considered as generative models. This is achieved by dividing the bottleneck 
to mean and standard deviation vectors of neurons. The outputs of these two are used 
together with a random variable drawn from a predetermined distribution (usually 
normal) to generate new samples. 
The loss of this model is the same as with sparse autoencoders: reconstruction loss 
regularized by KL divergence between the learned latent distribution and the prior 
distribution. 
An extension of VAEs can also be fed with classification target class values (𝑦𝑖) as a 
separate one hot encoded input. Then, the model is trained to learn not only a single latent 
distribution, but a set of latent distributions for each 𝑦𝑖. This model is called conditional 
variational autoencoder (Sohn, Lee and Yan, 2015). CVAEs allows more control over the 
generated samples, for example, generate observations per intrusion type to train an IDS. 
I decided to use fully connected deep autoencoder networks with no regularization for the 
model introduced in chapter 4.2.4 as part of a hybrid intrusion detector. 
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2.2.4. ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES USED IN DATA MINING 
Machine learning algorithms form the core techniques data scientists use; however, they 
use other tools to assist them with data processing, model testing and model performance 
improvement. In this chapter I will briefly introduce these tools in more detail: model 
ensembles, synthetic sampling, hyperparameter optimization and model evaluation 
metrics. 
Ensemble methods 
The idea behind ensemble methods is to combine multiple machine learning models to 
get an aggregate prediction with the goal to provide better results than what any of them 
could achieve. In this chapter I use the term base models to describe the different machine 
learning models that contribute to the ensemble, and aggregate model to describe the 
ensemble. This chapter introduces the three most common ensemble models: bagging, 
boosting and model stacking, based on Smolyakov (2017) and Budzik (2019). 
Bagging, or bootstrap aggregation aims to sample the training data with replacement 
(bootstrap sampling) to create an ensemble of models (Figure 14). This sampling process 
is repeated for each base model, and the final decision is calculated as either an arithmetic 
mean or a simple majority vote of base model predictions. Bagging is most effective when 
the base models have low bias but high variance, typically random forests. 
 
Figure 14: Bagging model training process. Based on Budzik (2019) 
With boosting, performance is improved by concentrating modeling efforts on errors 
made by weak models (Figure 15). These base models are trained sequentially, where 
incorrectly predicted observations are weighted more than correct ones. The aggregate 
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boosting result is calculated either as a weighted arithmetic mean or by weighted majority 
voting. Models with low variance and high bias are well suited for boosting, for example, 
gradient boosting. 
 
Figure 15: Boosting model training process. Based on Budzik (2019) 
With model stacking, base model results are combined using a meta-model. This could 
be as simple as a linear function of the intermediary results, or a complex machine 
learning model itself (Figure 16). Stacking, compared to boosting and bagging, can 
reduce model variance and bias at the same time, providing powerful aggregate predictor 
models. This improvement stems from the heterogeneity of the base models, which could 
be achieved in two ways: by training models of the same kind, but on different feature 
sets, or by training different machine learning models (more common). Considering the 
advantageous property of simultaneously reducing variance and bias in model 
predictions, I decided to use this ensemble design for my intrusion detectors. 
 
Figure 16: Stacking model training process with results combination. Based on Budzik (2019) 
Ensemble models can improve results by reducing model variance, bias or both. 
Therefore, they are useful for creating aggregate models with improved classification or 
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regression performance. A drawback of model ensembles is an increase in complexity as 
multiple models have to be trained and maintained simultaneously. 
Synthetic sampling methods 
In classification, a way to combat imbalanced class values is to under-sample the majority 
class, or to over-sample the minority class. However, when class imbalance is too great, 
more sophisticated methods are needed. One such sophisticated method is synthetic 
sampling, where a machine learning model is trained to recognize relationships between 
data and a target feature with the goal to provide new artificial samples for minority 
classes, or to reduce the number of observations of the majority class, while maintaining 
patterns that make the target recognizable still. There are three methods for synthetic 
sampling: 
• Over-sampling methods, 
• Under-sampling methods and 
• Combination of over- and under-sampling methods 
The first oversampling method is SMOTE (synthetic minority over-sampling technique), 
developed by Chawla et al. (2002). In SMOTE, the minority class is over-sampled by 
selecting one observation from minority at a time and introducing new synthetic 
observations at random along the line connecting the selected observation and one of its 
k nearest neighbors from the same minority class. An advantage of SMOTE is that it 
forces the following machine learning model to create larger and less specific decision 
regions between classes forcing them to generalize better. 
By itself, I used SMOTE only in one model, however it is important building block for 
more advanced synthetic sampling methods, like SVM SMOTE, recommended by 
Nguyen, Cooper and Kamei (2009). The core purpose of SVM SMOTE remains the same, 
but instead of using the k nearest neighbor algorithm only, it also applies the maximum 
margin classification of SVMs to sample observations from border regions only. The 
benefit compared to SMOTE that it samples the border regions between majority and 
minority classes, thus improving model generalization even further. The drawback is that 
neither k nearest neighbors, nor SVMs are recognized for their fast execution on large 
amounts of data. Later, it has been empirically proven (by Lopez-Martin, Carro and 
Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019), for example), that models that were fed with observations 
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by an SVM SMOTE sampler, achieved higher classification performance, than those that 
were fed by other synthetic samplers. 
Turning to under-sampling methods, the first technique used to under-sample the training 
data is called edited nearest neighbors (ENN) created by Wilson (1972). It is based on the 
k nearest neighbor algorithm, however, instead of sampling from a line between two 
neighbors, it removes observations which do not “agree” with their neighborhood enough. 
This agreement can, for example, be described by the relative distribution of minority and 
majority class values within the neighborhood. 
A second technique (Tomek (1976)) is based on identifying Tomek links within the 
dataset. Two observations in a dataset form a Tomek link, if they are nearest neighbors 
of each other. Under-sampling with Tomek links is the removal of such observations 
either from the majority class only, or from the minority classes as well. 
I did not use edited nearest neighbors or Tomek links under-sampling for my intrusion 
detectors directly. However, they both played a role in creating combined under-, and 
over-sampling methods. I used both ENN and Tomek links in tandem with SMOTE, first 
over-sampling the minority classes, followed by under-sampling the majority class. 
Further details of how this combination works can be found in Batista, Prati and Monard 
(2004). 
Evaluation metrics 
Due to the comparability of the performance classification models, the data mining 
community developed several evaluation metrics. For almost every metric I used, the 
input has been provided by the confusion matrix, available in Han, Kamber and Pei (2011) 
and in Table 1 as well. It shows the predictions made by the classifier in rows and the 
ground truth class values in columns. The cells contain the true positive (TP), false 
positive (FP), false negative (FN) and true negative (TN) predictions. Table 1 is a 
confusion matrix for binary classification, although it can be extended for the multiclass 
case as well. 
 Ground truth 
+ - 
Prediction 
+ True positive (TP) False positive (FP) 
- False negative (FN) True negative (TN) 
Table 1: Confusion matrix for classifier performance. Source: Han, Kamber and Pei (2011) 
The most common metric based on the confusion matrix is accuracy: 
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
It is sensitive to high imbalance between target feature values; therefore, it is less useful 
for evaluating intrusion detection performance. Other metrics to use to extend accuracy 
are precision, recall, F1-score, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the 
area under the ROC curve (AUC). The formula of the first three: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
𝐹1 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
2𝑇𝑃
2𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
Precision measures the exactness of positive labeling, the coverage of the correct positive 
labels among all positive-labelled samples. Recall measures the completeness of positive 
labelling, the fraction of correctly labelled positive samples among all positive samples. 
It is often referred to as sensitivity and detection rate. The F1-score combines the two in 
a weighted harmonic mean. The weight is almost always set to one, meaning precision 
and recall are treated equally important. 
Precision, recall and F1-score are per-class measures, meaning they provide multiple 
values for each class value in multiclass classification. Sometimes, it is more desirable to 
calculate one single aggregate value describing the trained model. For these situations, 
three averaging schemes were constructed by Pedregosa et al. (2011): 
• Micro: calculates metrics globally by counting total true positives, false negatives 
and false positives. 
• Macro: calculates metrics for each label and calculate their unweighted arithmetic 
mean. This does not take class imbalance into account, which makes it easier to 
highlight performance on minority classes. 
• Weighted: calculates metrics for each class value and averages them weighted by 
the number of observations that belong to that class. This method does take class 
imbalance into account. 
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The efficiency of an intrusion detector can be measured with false positive rate as well, 
indicating the percentage of observations misclassified as positive over all observations: 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 
The ROC curve mentioned earlier visualizes all possible cuts between positive and 
negative predictions. It is a measure based on sensitivity and false positive rate (or 1-
specificity) (Figure 17). In a ROC curve a good prediction with a good cut value 
converges to the top right or the bottom left corner (in the latter case, changing the class 
labels is a viable option). The diagonal line represents the results of random guessing. 
 
Figure 17: ROC curve. Source: scikit-learn developers (2018) 
The formulas for sensitivity and specificity are: 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
 
ROC curve is a visualization technique, it is difficult to interpret quantitatively. AUC is 
a metric can be calculated from ROC curves, which is easier to interpret as a measurement 
of overall generalization ability. A 0.5 AUC score indicates random guessing, a value 
closer to 1 an almost perfect classification. 
The metrics introduced so far are all used for evaluating classification performance. 
However, due to the application of autoencoder networks, and how they are evaluated, I 
found it useful to introduce one metric used for measuring regression performance. This 
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metric is the mean squared error, measuring the average squared difference of 
predictions from true values: 
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
1
𝑛
∑(?̂?𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Compared to the earlier formula shown in chapter 2.2.3, ŷi and yi refer to scalar ground 
truth and predicted target features, rather than vectorized features. 
All these model performance metrics have their own unique characteristics, which makes 
choosing them more challenging. Intrusion detection is a classification task, where the 
difference in the representation of attacks compared to normal traffic can be uneven. 
Accuracy and precision are less useful metrics here, as both require class values to be 
equally distributed. Although, a case could be made for accuracy, due to how common it 
is even in papers studying intrusion detection. A second characteristic of intrusion 
detection, is how expensive the wrong classification of an attack as normal traffic is, 
compared to the reverse case. This calls for the importance of recall and false positive 
rate as values better characterizing this kind of error in face of imbalanced classes. 
Personally, I opted in to demonstrating the accuracy and recall achieved by my models, 
the latter for the reason I just described, and the former for its common appearance in 
intrusion detection literature. For aggregating recall, I decided to use macro averaging, 
highlighting the imbalanced nature of the dataset I worked with. 
Hyperparameter optimization 
Machine learning models require parameters set up prior to training. These parameters 
could directly influence the performance achieved by a model, therefore an automated 
approach for selecting these is crucial. This approach is called hyperparameter 
optimization, a method wrapped over regular train-test-evaluate process of machine 
learning. In this sense, the meaning behind the notations used for {𝑋, 𝑦} is slightly 
different for hyperparameter optimization: 𝑋 indicates the hyperparameter space where 
optimization algorithms sample from, where 𝑋𝑠, s=1...m are the hyperparameters and 
𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1. . . 𝑛 are samples from the hyperparameter space. The target feature (y) is an 
outcome performance metric of the internal machine learning model, where 𝑦𝑖 is the 
metric achieved when the hyperparameter sample was 𝑥𝑖. The challenge is that no prior 
information is available on the value of 𝑦𝑖, but it can be estimated by calculating ?̂?𝑖. The 
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goal of hyperparameter optimization is to find a 𝑥𝑖
∗ parameter combination, for which ?̂?𝑖 
reaches its maximum (or, in case y is a loss metric, its minimum). 
First, I introduce the two most common methods for hyperparameter optimization, 
followed by more intelligent approaches. The common methods: 
• Grid search: 𝑋 is divided into equally sized segments (~grids) between 
[𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠 , 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠 ], ∀𝑠 = 1. . . 𝑚. At each step a parameter combination from the grid is 
chosen for evaluation. The best performing combination of hyperparameters will 
be the final choice to train the machine learning model with. Grid search evaluates 
all grid combinations generated from 𝑋 exactly once, in this sense it ensures 
optimal results; however, its time complexity increases exponentially with 𝑚 and 
the number of grids selected for each 𝑋𝑠. 
• Random search: randomly generates 𝑥𝑖 values from 𝑋 a set number of times. The 
final parameter combination (𝑥𝑖
∗) is determined by the best model performance. It 
is linear in the number of trials set in advance; therefore, it calculates faster 
compared to grid search strategy; however, it does not guarantee optimal 
hyperparameters. 
Grid and random search both have their respective issues either with execution time or 
with performance. One idea to solve these issues is to find algorithms designed to 
optimize more intelligently, for example, Bayesian optimization with gaussian process 
priors (Brochu, Cora and De Freitas (2010) and Snoek, Larochelle and Adams (2012)) or 
tree-structured parzen estimators (Bergstra et al. (2011)). 
Bayesian optimization is interested in finding the maximum of function 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑦𝑖 on a 
bounded set of hyperparameters. This function is expensive to evaluate; therefore, a 
probabilistic model is calculated to approximate it. Bayesian optimization uses all 
information (all earlier evaluations of 𝑓(𝑥)) to approximate the target metric value. This 
results in a process that can find the maximum of 𝑓(𝑥) at additional computational cost, 
which is still lower than attempting to calculate an additional value of the function to be 
approximated. For Bayesian optimization to work, two choices must be made: first, a 
prior over function must be selected to approximate 𝑓(𝑥); second, one must chose an 
acquisition function to construct a utility function from the model posterior to calculate a 
new point in 𝑋 to evaluate. 
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Gaussian processes (GP) are a good choice for the prior over function. GP is defined by 
the assumption that any finite set of points form a multivariate gaussian distribution. Each 
GP can be derived and are characterized by a mean function and a covariance (or kernel) 
function. The mean function can be set to return zero constantly for convenience. This 
leaves the covariance function, which is a choice between the squared exponential 
function (or RBF kernel), the Matérn kernel, the rational quadratic kernel, the exp-sine-
squared kernel or the linear kernel. 
Several popular choices are available for the acquisition function as well. These all 
determine which 𝑥𝑖 in 𝑋 should be evaluated next. In general, these functions depend on 
all previous ?̂?𝑖 estimates, as well as the GP hyperparameters. This dependence on GP 
prior functions is characterized by the predictive mean function 𝜇(𝑥) and predictive 
variance function 𝜎2(𝑥). An additional formula is the best current value, which is denoted 
as 𝑥𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑓(𝑥𝑖). The most common acquisition functions: 
Probability of improvement: 
𝑃𝐼(𝑥) = Φ(𝑍), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑍 =
𝑓(𝑥𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡) − 𝜇(𝑥) − 𝜉
𝜎(𝑥)
 
Expected improvement: 
𝐸𝐼(𝑥) = {
(𝜇(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑥𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡) − 𝜉)Φ(𝑍) + 𝜎(𝑥)𝜙(𝑍), 𝑖𝑓 𝜎(𝑥) > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝜎(𝑥) = 0
 
GP upper confidence bound: 
𝑈𝐶𝐵(𝑥) = 𝜇(𝑥) + 𝜅𝜎(𝑥) 
In the formulas above Φ(∙) and 𝜙(∙) are the normal cumulative distribution (CDF) and 
probability functions (PF) respectively. 𝜉 and 𝜅 are parameters controlling the tradeoff 
between exploitation and exploration for the two improvement functions and the upper 
confidence bound function. 
In fact, exploitation (associated with the mean function) and exploration (associated with 
the variance function) are important concepts to Bayesian optimization. The first means 
that new 𝑥𝑖 recommendations will be calculated where earlier evaluations yielded higher 
target metric values. Exploration on the other hand encourages the evaluation of regions 
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where uncertainty is high. Finding the balance between the two is one of the core elements 
of Bayesian hyperparameter optimization. 
A more demonstrative example of Bayesian optimization can be seen in Figure 18. In the 
figure, solid back line denotes the prior (and posterior) mean, blue shaded areas the prior 
(and posterior) uncertainty and black dotted line shown the true mean of function 𝑓(𝑥). 
The acquisition function is denoted as a green line. The next 𝑥𝑖 value to evaluate are 
proposed based on the maximum of the acquisition function. 
 
Figure 18: Illustration of the Bayesian optimization. Source: Brochu, Cora and De Freitas (2010) 
Bayesian optimization is a more purposeful approach compared to random search and 
converges in less total iterations compared to grid search. However, it has drawbacks: the 
more purposeful hyperparameter recommendations require additional calculation 
overhead (cubic in the dimensions of the hyperparameter space (indicated as 𝑚)), which 
makes Bayesian optimization less suitable for simple machine learning models or when 
the model has a lot of parameters to set. Moreover, kernel functions and the tradeoff 
between exploration and exploitation are themselves hyperparameters to the optimization 
process itself. Finally, Bayesian optimization can only yield continuous numeric 
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hyperparameters and it cannot provide hyperparameter values dependent on other 
hyperparameter values. 
These drawbacks have been highlighted and addressed by the tree-structured parzen 
estimators (TPE) approach by Bergstra et al. (2011). Where Bayesian optimization 
modeled 𝑃(𝑦|𝑋) directly, TPE models 𝑃(𝑋|𝑦) and 𝑃(𝑦). This 𝑃(𝑋|𝑦) is modeled by 
transforming the tree-structured generative process by replacing the distributions with 
non-parametric densities. Using different observations in these non-parametric densities, 
these substitutions represent a learning algorithm that can produce a variety of densities 
over the space of hyperparameters. TPE defines two densities for 𝑃(𝑋|𝑦): 
𝑃(𝑋|𝑦) = {
ℎ(𝑋), 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 > 𝑦∗
𝑔(𝑋), 𝑖𝑓 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗
 
Important to note that TPE is an algorithm which minimizes ?̂?𝑖, rather than maximizing 
it. Though this change is only technical, it does affect function notation. In the formula 
above, ℎ(𝑋) represents the density formed using 𝑥𝑖 hyperparameter samples lower than 
a selected threshold y*, while 𝑔(𝑋) represents distribution from all the remaining 
observations. Unlike GP, TPE supports a soft y* threshold, in order to keep some 𝑥𝑖 
samples from X to formulate ℎ(𝑋). For example, this y* can be chosen to be some quantile 
𝛾 of the observed ?̂?𝑖 values. TPE itself optimizes the expected improvement acquisition 
function, formulated as: 
𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑃𝐸(𝑋) = (𝛾 +
𝑔(𝑋)
ℎ(𝑋)
(1 − 𝛾))
−1
 
To maximize improvement, 𝑥𝑖 hyperparameter combinations which have high probability 
under ℎ(𝑋) and low probability under 𝑔(𝑋) should be selected. The tree structure enables 
it to easily draw many 𝑥𝑖 parameter combinations to evaluate. The ones with the highest 
expected improvement are selected at each iteration. 
TPE addresses issues with numerical only and independent hyperparameter features as 
well. It permits sampling discrete numerical and categorical distributions and extends 
continuous numerical values sampling with more than one distribution type to sample 
from with the help of stochastic expressions shown in Table 2. The attribute value for 
label is common for all the expressions, indicating an internal name of a given 
hyperparameter for better tracking. 
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Expression Description 
hp.choice(label, options) Returns an element from an options list. Elements can 
be nested stochastic expressions. 
hp.pchoice(label, p_options) Returns an element from a list of tuples in the format 
(prob, option). Permits the user to enforce bias among 
the choices. 
hp.uniform(label, low, high) Draws uniformly between low and high. 
hp.quniform(label, low, high, q) Draws uniformly between low and high. Better suited 
for handling discrete values. 
hp.loguniform(label, low, high) Draws values that are uniform in their exponent, from 
the interval [elow, ehigh]. 
hp.qloguniform(label, low, high, q) Draws values that are uniform in their exponent, from 
the interval [elow, ehigh]. Better suited for handling 
discrete values. 
hp.normal(label, mu, sigma) Draws a real value from a normal distribution with mu 
mean and sigma standard deviation. 
hp.qnormal(label, mu, sigma) Draws a discrete value from a normal distribution with 
mu mean and sigma standard deviation. 
hp.lognormal(label, mu, sigma) Draws values whose exponent is normally distributed 
with mu mean and sigma standard deviation. 
hp.qlognormal(label, mu, sigma, q) Draws values whose exponent is normally distributed 
with mu mean and sigma standard deviation. Better 
suited for handling discrete values. 
hp.randint(label, upper) Returns a random integer in the range [0, upper). No 
additional correlation is assumed between closer 
integer values compared to distant values during 
optimization. 
Table 2: Hyperopt (python implementation of TPE) stochastic sampling functions. Source: Bergstra, 
Yamins and Cox (2013) 
Apart from these improvements to the hyperparameter value definitions, TPE also 
improved execution time from being cubic in 𝑚 to being linear in both 𝑚 and 𝑛. With 
these advantages and considering the availability of a python implementation, I decided 
to use TPE hyperparameter optimization to improve my intrusion detectors. 
This concludes the data mining and machine learning context of my dissertation. In this 
chapter I introduced supervised and unsupervised learning and the most common 
algorithms in intrusion detection research from each. The introduction of neural networks 
and autoencoders, due to their importance to my work, received their own chapters. 
Finally, in the last part of this chapter I have shown additional techniques that I used to 
evaluate and improve the detection performance of my proposed models. Chapter 2.3 
introduces the pivotal early works on intrusion detection and reviews the research 
conducted in the literature. 
2.3. INTRUSION DETECTION RESEARCH – RELATED WORKS 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly introduce the field of intrusion detection research with 
articles that studied it using machine learning models. I will start this chapter with the 
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most important studies in the field and follow it up with dedicated survey papers to give 
a quick look on which machine learning models can be used for intrusion detection. Then, 
I will discuss further articles that either focused on or provided single-model detectors as 
part of their research. Afterwards, I introduce papers evaluating ensemble models and 
followed by those evaluating hybrid models. Special cases of hybrid models were 
extended with variational autoencoders. I discussed them in connection with hybrid 
intrusion detectors. I highlighted papers that used at least one of two additional techniques 
for intrusion detection as well: synthetic sampling and hyperparameter optimization. 
Finally, I close this chapter by listing the issues in the field formulated by the survey 
papers introduced earlier. 
One of the first studies of intrusion detection from a data mining perspective was Stolfo 
et al. (2000). They discussed the 1999 DARPA dataset for anomaly and misuse detection. 
They performed feature selection, classification, frequent pattern detection and sequence 
analysis. By the end of feature selection, the original traffic features were divided into 
four categories: 
• Intrinsic features: features describing all network connections. 
• Time-based traffic features: aggregate features describing connections that had 
the same destination host or service as a selected connection in the prior 2 seconds. 
• Host/service-based traffic features: same as above, but instead of a 2 second 
aggregation window, the authors used the previous 100 connections. 
• Content features: features describing the content of the traffic. 
These four groups of features were used to train three machine learning models with the 
RIPPER algorithm for rule construction (RIPPER: a rule induction algorithm based on 
the “divide and conquer” principle). The target variable consisted of 5 classes: DoS 
(denial of service attacks), R2L (unauthorized access from a remote machine), U2R 
(unauthorized local access to superuser privileges), probe (traffic surveillance), and 
normal behavior. 
Stolfo et al. (2000) expected the three models to perform better on different feature 
groups: 
• The time-based traffic model: containing intrinsic and time-based traffic 
features. This proved to be the best for detecting DoS and probing attacks. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
60 
 
• The host-based traffic model: containing intrinsic and host-based traffic 
features, best for detecting slow probing attacks. 
• The content model: containing intrinsic and content features, designed 
specifically for detecting R2L and U2R attacks. 
The three models were then combined into a meta-learner, which decided on the best 
performing models for each connection. Though not explicitly stated in the paper, this 
approach can be considered as a model ensemble. 
Stolfo et al. (2000) provided an important study of intrusion detection and one of the first 
benchmark datasets, the KDD Cup 1999, however the data they used were not without 
criticism. The most prominent of which can be read in McHugh (2000). His criticisms 
can be traced back to the unit of analysis problem: a single attack pattern can be tied to a 
single connection package, or to multiple packages over time, formulating a flow. This 
causes issues with evaluation methods used by Stolfo et al. (2000) and other participants 
analyzing the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. A second criticism of the dataset by McHugh 
(2000) complained about the underlying taxonomy: it has been developed from the 
attacker’s perspective. This provides additional information for detection algorithms that 
may not be available in a realistic scenario. Instead, McHugh (2000) proposed a 
classification scheme based on the protocol layer and the protocols used, or whether a 
completed protocol handshake is required to carry out an attack. Attack distributions were 
unrealistic as well, which have been noted first a decade later by Tavallaee et al. (2009). 
Both the training and test datasets of KDD Cup 1999 contained a large number of 
redundant records (78% and 75%, respectively), which caused machine learning 
algorithms to have biased predictions, first highlighted by Tavallaee et al. (2009). Instead, 
they proposed a new dataset, the NSL-KDD dataset having better balanced target classes, 
no redundancy and less observations overall. 
The works of McHugh (2000), Stolfo et al. (2000) and Tavallaee et al. (2009) were 
pivotal, but not the only ones in intrusion detection. In their literature review, Tsai et al. 
(2009), for example, wrote about intrusion detection research between 2000 and 2007. 
The authors reported that single model classifiers were used the most, however by 2008, 
hybrid classification techniques also began to gain attention. Ensemble models were not 
analyzed in depth, partly due to how these works contributed only a small fraction in the 
evaluated literature (only ~11%). 
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Moreover, Tsai et al. (2009) have taken a look at two additional characteristics of 
intrusion detection literature: the datasets used and whether feature selection was 
considered by a paper or not. They, just as Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014), 
determined that most of the available literature used one of three datasets: KDD Cup 
1999, DARPA 1998 and DARPA 1999, being the few available benchmark datasets at 
the time. 
Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014) identified six methods used for network 
anomaly detection: statistical methods, classification, clustering and outlier detection, soft 
computing, knowledge-based models and combination learners (Figure 19) Out of them, 
classification, clustering, outlier analysis, soft computing algorithms (specifically 
artificial neural networks) and combination learners were the most researched areas. 
 
Figure 19: Classification of network anomaly detection methods. Source: Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and 
Kalita (2014) 
Figure 20 shows the model classification scheme set up by of Ippoliti (2011). Compared 
to Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014), he grouped classification, clustering and 
outlier analysis under machine learning, distributed elements of soft computing between 
the remaining four categories and identified knowledge based and combination learners 
as rule based and hybrid approaches. 
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Figure 20: Relationship between detection methods. Source: Ippoliti (2011) 
Buczak and Guven (2015) discussed the potential of using data mining and machine 
learning algorithms for intrusion detection, more particularly for signature detection, 
anomaly detection and hybrid approaches, the latter two combined into one category due 
to their low representation in the studied literature. The covered algorithms can be seen 
in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: Machine learning approaches in intrusion detection. Coverage of Buczak and Guven (2015) 
The most common metrics for classifier evaluation in the literature were accuracy, 
detection rate (often referred to as recall or sensitivity), false alarm rate (or false positive 
rate) and AUC based on ROC curves. Recall and false positive rate better describe model 
performance in intrusion detection, as attacks that remain undetected are more harmful 
for an organization, as legitimate connections being detected as attacks. Accuracy for 
intrusion detection, due to the unbalanced nature of attack classes, is far less informative. 
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A more recent survey created by Molina-Coronado et al. (2020) evaluated intrusion 
detection research from the perspective of the KDD process of Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro 
and Smyth (1996). Therefore, they provide a more holistic review: 
• Data selection: the system from which data is collected matters a lot. One can 
collect data from root network devices, covering a broad range of network devices 
at the cost of having less data on horizontal traffic, or from access devices, which 
provides more data on horizonal communication, but for less network devices. 
Network traffic itself can be interpreted on packet and flow level, which 
complicates analysis further. 
• Construction of data features: it is tasked to acquire features from the captured 
raw traffic data. This includes both explanatory and target features, each having 
unique challenges associated. Explanatory features can come from the various 
packet headers, or from the content, and can describe one or more connection 
flows. Features from each must be collected if the goal is to create an intrusion 
detector for a wide array of attack patterns. Additionally, labelling attacks might 
be an even greater challenge. 
• Data preprocessing and transformation: involve feature noise reduction 
(outlier and missing value imputations), categorical feature encoding, continuous 
feature discretization and numerical feature scaling. 
• Data reduction: data reduction can be achieved by reducing the number of 
features or of traffic observations. The former can be achieved by selecting useful 
features or by projecting explanatory variables into a lower dimensional space. 
For example, PCA and AE can be used for dimensionality reduction. Sample 
dimensionality reduction (where an observation in the sample represents more 
than one observation from the old dataset) is less researched within the field. 
• Data mining: data mining for intrusion detection can take the form of misuse, 
anomaly and hybrid detection. In misuse detection, the most common algorithms 
used were ANNs, SVMs, k-nearest neighbor, naïve Bayes algorithms and decision 
trees. The combination of these methods into ensemble models was also proposed 
by multiple papers. Hybrid detection was divided into four categories, shown in 
Figure 1 and discussed in chapter 2.1. A second, less common taxonomy divided 
intrusion detection to batch and incremental learning. Batch learning is more 
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common, while incremental learning is better suited for stream data processing 
architectures. 
• Evaluation: prediction performance is only one of many evaluation criteria an 
intrusion detector can face, however papers published study this characteristic 
almost exclusively. Furthermore, not every metric is equally useful, due to the 
target class imbalance experienced in the data and the fact that attacks might have 
more severe consequences for the victim. 
The most used single-model methods for intrusion detection were ANNs, SVMs, decision 
trees, k-nearest neighbor algorithms and naïve Bayes algorithms. ANNs, decision trees 
and SVMs performed well as intrusion detectors, not without drawbacks though: in 
general, ANNs and SVMs are time intensive to train, while ANNs and decision trees are 
more susceptible to overfitting. I found the following papers studying single model 
signature detection either as their pronounced focus, or as part of a comparison with more 
advanced ensemble or hybrid detectors: Bouzida et al. (2004), So-In et al. (2014), Elhag 
et al. (2015), Petersen (2015), Aghdam and Kabiri (2016), Hasan et al. (2016), Almseidin 
et al. (2017), Yin et al. (2017), Ingre, Yadav and Soni (2017), Divekar et al. (2018), 
Parampottupadam and Moldovann (2018), Sakr, Tawfeeq and El-Sisi (2019), Sapre, 
Ahmadi and Islam (2019), Mahfouz, Venugopal and Shiva (2020). 
Aghdam and Kabiri (2016) performed feature selection on the NSL-KDD and KDD Cup 
1999 datasets using ant colony optimization, a special metaheuristic approach mimicking 
the foraging behavior of real-life ants. The authors mentioned no explicit classification 
algorithm, although ant colony optimization could be utilized as one, the means of which 
I studied in Brunner (2019) as well. 
Almseidin et al. (2017) compared several models on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, reporting 
random forest classifiers, an ensemble method, having the best overall performance in 
terms of precision, recall and AUC. Their work is not the only one which, either on 
purpose or by accident, compared single model approaches with model ensembles. The 
ensembles outperformed the single models in every case. 
Bouzida et al. (2004) experimented with k-nearest neighbor and decision tree approaches 
augmented by principal component analysis on the 10% sample of the KDD Cup 1999 
dataset. They reported good classification performance on as low as four components for 
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both models. They also reported predictions on R2L and U2R classes to be the most 
difficult. 
Elhag et al. (2015) proposed a genetic fuzzy system for classification in one versus one 
pairwise classification models rained on the 10% sample of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Their goal with it was to improve prediction performance on minority classes. The 
method they used was initially designed for association rule mining, but they extended it 
for classification. During training, just like Tavallaee et al. (2009), they removed 
duplicate observations. Performance evaluation shown comparable results to other fuzzy 
rule generation algorithms and to decision trees. Their proposed genetic fuzzy system 
performed well with underrepresented classes as well, while maintaining low false alarm 
rates. 
Hasan et al. (2016) studied the intrusion detection performance of SVM classifiers under 
different kernels. They found the Laplace kernel to provide the best performance on the 
NSL-KDD dataset, though they highlighted that SVM model performance is dependent 
on the used dataset. 
Ingre, Yadav and Soni (2017) used correlation-based feature selection and CART 
decision trees to perform predictions on the NSL-KDD dataset. They reported good 
classification performance on both binary and 5-class classification. 
Mahfouz, Venugopal and Shiva (2020) trained naïve Bayes, logistic regression, neural 
network, SVM, k-nearest neighbor and decision tree models in three setups on the NSL-
KDD dataset. The first and second setups were performed with and without feature 
selection. The third setup involved data resampling: random under sampling was used for 
majority classes, and SMOTE oversampling for minority classes. Models trained in setup 
three provided the best predictions. 
Parampottupadam and Moldovann (2018) used the H2O.ai implementation of artificial 
neural networks on a cloud architecture. Their model performed binary classification 
between normal and attack traffic on the NSL-KDD dataset, then a second neural network 
classified the attacks into multiple classes. The authors compared the performance of their 
neural network architecture with SVM, random forest, linear regression and naïve Bayes 
models. Overall, the proposed neural network architecture provided the best classification 
performance. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
66 
 
Petersen (2015) used the NSL-KDD dataset and four machine learning algorithms (ID3 
and CART decision trees, k-nearest neighbor and naïve Bayes) to perform three 
hypothetical experiments with binary, five class and 22-class classification schemes. A 
secondary analysis evaluated feature importance. The results provided shown that k-
nearest neighbor and ID3 decision tree algorithms had the best overall prediction 
performance. Out of the classification schemes, binary classification models performed 
better, however, Petersen (2015) noted, that a case for a five class classification could be 
created, as it provides additional clues for the intrusion detection system to act on. 
So-In et al. (2014) manually extended the KDD Cup 1999 dataset with a new class based 
on botnet signatures. Their model comparison covered decision trees, sequential rule 
construction, artificial neural networks, naïve Bayes, k-nearest neighbor algorithms and 
SVMs in different setups. Setup one involved binary classification between normal and 
attack traffic, setup two was 5-class multiclass attack detection and scenario three was 
6-class multiclass attack detection with the new botnet class. The authors reported good 
prediction performance, with the best performing models being decision trees, neural 
networks and k-nearest neighbor algorithms. 
Yin et al. (2017) used recurrent neural networks on the NSL-KDD dataset. Their choice 
of approach is interesting, as the original KDD Cup 1999 dataset does not contain any 
feature that is explicitly temporal, only implicitly temporal features in the form of time-
based traffic features. This lack of a temporal feature has been inherited by the NSL-KDD 
dataset and it makes sorting observations difficult be used for training RNN models, 
despite the potential gains of detecting attacks tied not only to a single traffic packet, but 
also to a flow of traffic. 
Divekar et al. (2018) used naïve Bayes, SVM, decision trees, random forests, neural 
networks and k-means clustering with majority voting over the clusters. The authors 
applied synthetic sampling and improved the models with grid search hyperparameter 
optimization as well. They reported model performances in terms of F1-score, where 
random forests performed slightly better than other, single-model classifiers.  
Sapre, Ahmadi and Islam (2019) Studied naïve Bayes, SVM, random forest, and neural 
network models for binary and multiclass classification. They reported artificial neural 
networks as the best, outperforming even random forests in some classes and setups. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
67 
 
Sakr, Tawfeeq and El-Sisi, (2019) combined binary-, and standard-based particle swarm 
optimizations (BPSO and SPSO) with support vector machines. First, feature selection 
was performed by BPSO, then a support vector machine was trained on the NSL-KDD 
dataset. SPSO played a part in the optimization of the SVM model, which managed to 
achieve good performance. 
A second group of researchers studied ensemble models with the intent of increasing 
overall intrusion detection performance by aggregating the results of multiple classifiers. 
Papers written on ensemble modeling are Chebrolu, Abraham and Thomas (2005), 
Folino, Pizzuti and Spezzano (2005), Mukkamala, Sung and Abraham (2005), Abadeh et 
al. (2007), Tian, Liu and Xiang (2009), Kevric, Jukic and Subasi (2017), Latah and Toker 
(2018) and Cavusoglu (2019). In the majority of these papers result combination has been 
based on a simple function of predictions, such as simple majority vote, average vote, 
rule-based evaluation, etc. The most common ensemble model used was the random 
forest algorithm due to its popularity. More complex boosting and stacking approaches 
were studied less in the intrusion detection literature. 
Abadeh et al. (2007) presented a parallelized fuzzy rule generation approach, each rule 
built using a genetic local search algorithm. Each set of fuzzy rules were later aggregated 
to perform ensemble classification. This approach was compared with other rule-based 
learning algorithms, where it achieved best performance. 
Tian, Liu and Xiang (2009) created a distributed learning model using artificial neural 
networks in a two-staged approach: in the first stage, a network learned a random subset 
of the KDD Cup 1999 10% dataset’s features. In the second phase, the class predictions 
of these models were collected by a final classifier improving prediction performance. 
Conceptually, this model is the most similar to a combination of ideas used for random 
forests, neural networks and stacking model ensembles. 
Chebrolu, Abraham and Thomas (2005) used a three-phased approach. They first 
performed feature selection on a sample created from the 10% sample of the KDD Cup 
1999 dataset. In the second phase, they created a Bayesian network and a CART decision 
tree, tested separately. Later, the two models were combined into a bagging classifier with 
improved overall detection performance compared to each base model. 
Folino, Pizzuti and Spezzano (2005) used distributed parallel genetic programming to 
train decision trees. These trees were then combined in an ensemble by using simple 
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majority vote. The solution was tested using the 10% sample of KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
The proposed model performed well on normal, DoS and proba attacks, but struggled on 
minority classes. 
Latah and Toker (2018) experimented with decision trees, random forests, bagging trees, 
multiple boosting algorithms, k-nearest neighbor algorithms, extreme learning machines, 
neural networks, SVMs, linear discriminant analyses and naïve Bayes algorithms. Some 
of these are single-model methods, others ensemble models. The authors achieved the 
best performance on LogitBoost out of the listed detectors. 
Mukkamala, Sung and Abraham (2005) discussed three different artificial neural 
networks (different in their optimization algorithms), SVMs and multiple adaptive 
regression spline (MARS) models. These results were improved further on when the 
authors aggregated the results with majority voting. The authors created two stacking 
models: one that combined the three ANNs, and a second adding the SVM and MARS 
models to the stack. The best performing ANN was the one with back propagation, though 
both stacking models improved on the results further. 
Cavusoglu (2019) used naïve Bayes, random forest, decision tree and k-nearest neighbor 
algorithms as single-model classifiers and as candidate base models for stacking 
classifiers combined with logistic regression. The author grouped the NSL-KDD data into 
multiple samples comparing each attack class to normal traffic. Each model was trained 
and evaluated on these with the option of formulating ensembles as well. Though not a 
conscious attempt at studying ensemble models, the resulting detectors of Cavusoglu 
(2019) all ended up being random forests or stacking classifiers. 
Kevric, Jukic and Subasi (2017) compared different models based on decision trees, then 
combined them into majority voting ensembles. One example is the NBtree model, which 
is a specialized decision tree with naïve Bayes classifiers at each leaf of the tree. 
More sophisticated models combine signature and anomaly detection, resulting in hybrid 
intrusion detectors. Only a few research papers evaluated hybrid detection. These had 
shown a lot of variations on how models can be combined. Studies evaluating hybrid 
detection were Zhang and Zulkernine (2006), Zhang, Zulkernine and Haque (2008), Kim, 
Lee and Kim (2014), Parsaei, Rostami and Javidan (2016) and Yao et al. (2017). 
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Zhang and Zulkernine (2006) and Zhang, Zulkernine and Haque (2008) demonstrated the 
applicability of random forest algorithms for hybrid intrusion detection. In their papers, 
signature detection is performed using random forests, and anomaly detection with outlier 
detection techniques applied on each leaf of every decision tree in the forest. For example, 
outlier detection can be based on a similarity score between two network traffic 
observations which appear in the same leaf for a large enough number of trees. The 
authors profiled the records for outlier detection not by attack class, but by network 
service, which is available in KDD Cup 1999. 
Similarly, Kim, Lee and Kim (2014) used decision trees and one-class SVMs for their 
hybrid intrusion detector. Their approach constructed a decision tree first to classify 
attacks present in the training dataset. Attacks unknown to the model were used to train 
one-class SVM models, one for each leaf of the decision tree having unknown attack 
classes. In this combination, the model managed to achieve good predictions with a low 
false positive rate. 
Yao et al. (2017) proposed a new hybrid multi-level data mining system for intrusion 
detection. The system consists of three components. The multi-level hybrid data 
engineering component is tasked with data preprocessing and with splitting the data to 
one versus rest samples. Then performs feature selection on the samples. The second 
component is called multi-level hybrid machine learning, and it is responsible for model 
training by clustering each data group first, then classifying each cluster using either an 
SVM model, an artificial neural network, a decision tree or a random forest. These are 
not evaluated immediately, because the next component, micro expert modify generates 
“impurity data” from the misclassified traffic, then trains a new decision tree model on 
this misclassified dataset to improve predictions further. The hybrid multi-level data 
mining system achieved better performance using the KDD Cup 1999 10% sample than 
many non-ensemble and ensemble approach used before, even on the more challenging 
minority classes. 
Parsaei, Rostami and Javidan (2016) focused their efforts on the minority classes of 
NSL-KDD. They used a combination of k-means and k-nearest neighbor algorithms. 
They first clustered the training data, and calculated two distances, one from the cluster 
centroids and one from the neighborhood of each traffic record. They used this aggregate 
feature for dimensionality reduction to a single explanatory feature. This feature was used 
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to train k-nearest neighbor algorithm. To increase performance, the authors used SMOTE 
sampling as well. 
So far, I have excluded one type of hybrid intrusion detection from the previous 
paragraphs due to their unique nature. The following authors all combined autoencoder 
and variational autoencoder networks with signature detectors to achieve an even greater 
level of prediction performance: Javaid et al. (2016), Al-Qatf et al. (2018), Lopez-Martin, 
Carro and Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019) and Yang et al. (2019). The utility of autoencoders 
comes from how they can be viewed as dimensionality reduction algorithms. On top of 
that, VAEs and CVAEs also perform well as data generative models, therefore, they can 
replace synthetic sampling techniques, as well as help machine learning models acquire 
more knowledge on minority classes. 
Al-Qatf et al. (2018) combined sparse autoencoders with SVM classifiers. This has been 
achieved by training the SAE on unlabeled data to generate a low dimensional 
representation. Following this, new data with target labels are fed to the encoder layers 
only. The reduced dimension explanatory features are then fed to the SVM classifier. The 
authors did not only report improved performance, but also improved the memory 
footprint and lowered training time for the SVM model. Similarly, Javaid et al. (2016), 
combined an autoencoder with multiclass logistic regression. Both reported classification 
performance greater than ensemble models. 
Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019) used different types of VAE 
models. The first model was a standard VAE conditioned by target labels at encoder input. 
It used cross-entropy loss regularized by KL divergence compared to standard normal 
distribution. The second variation split explanatory features at the output layer to 
numerical and categorical. The loss for numerical features was MSE, whereas the loss for 
categorical features remained the cross-entropy loss. KL divergence was not changed. 
The third model changed the conditioning: instead of the encoder input, it was applied on 
the decoder input. Out of the three models, the outputs of the third provided the best 
predictions, outperforming those using synthetic sampling. For their performance tests 
the authors used random forests, linear SVMs, logistic regression and neural networks, 
although their main focus was on sampling, rather than on prediction capabilities. 
Yang et al. (2019) combined improved CVAEs with neural networks. The improvement 
in their model was a target conditioning applied on the decoder layer only, which makes 
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their intrusion detector similar to the third model of Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas (2019). The main difference was that Yang et al. (2019) re-used the encoder 
for weight initialization in the detector neural network. They carried out numerous 
performance comparisons with single-model, ensemble and other AE supported hybrid 
models as well, reporting their CVAE + NN model achieving the highest detection 
performance. 
I also identified two techniques that could increase detection performance regardless of 
the model type used. One was synthetic sampling and the other was hyperparameter 
optimization, both used infrequently in the articles I researched. Synthetic sampling has 
been utilized by Parsaei, Rostami and Javidan (2016), Divekar et al. (2018), Lopez-
Martin, Carro and Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019), Yang et al. (2019) and Mahfouz, 
Venugopal and Shiva (2020). These papers compared SMOTE with their respective VAE 
variations or used to improve detections of their model. As SMOTE and VAE fulfill the 
same purpose, it is highly discouraged to use them at the same time. Hyperparameter 
optimization was used by Zhang, Zulkernine and Haque (2008), Hasan et al. (2016), Yin 
et al. (2017), Al-Qatf et al. (2018), Divekar et al. (2018), Sakr, Tawfeeq and El-Sisi 
(2019) and Yang et al. (2019). The most used optimization strategy was grid search. 
Based on my review of the literature, I experienced a hierarchy between the studied 
techniques, starting from single-model signature / anomaly detection, followed by 
ensemble models, then by hybrid models, and finally, new data generative approaches, 
like VAE models. 
Each review article I presented earlier in this chapter provided challenges and open 
questions in intrusion detection. Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya and Kalita (2014) brought up the 
following issues, questions and research topics: 
• The nature of attacks keeps changing over time; therefore, adaptability of models 
is a necessity. 
• A high rate of false alarms should be avoided; however, it cannot be eliminated 
completely. 
• There is an overarching need for benchmark intrusion datasets. 
• A fast and appropriate feature selection for all attack classes is needed. 
• Selection of non-correlated classifiers for building an effective ensemble 
approach. 
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Buczak and Guven (2015) advised the following criteria to compare machine learning 
algorithms with each other: 
• Performance measures do not work for comparison, as the trained machine 
learning algorithms were tested using different samples of the same dataset. 
• Due to the ever-changing nature of network attacks, intrusion detectors need to 
adapt quickly. IDS model training, however, is performed when traffic is the 
lowest, usually at night. It is expected form the training process to not take 24 
hours. A relatively low training time therefore is key to evaluation. 
• Intrusions should be detected fast. Quick classification of network traffic can 
improve reaction time and shows the processing capability of the system. 
• To help administrators examine model characteristics and update the system more 
easily, a model with lower complexity is preferred, though not mandated. 
Buczak and Guven (2015) furthermore gave the following advice on creating machine 
learning models for intrusion detection: 
• Intrusion detection is a field with a rapidly changing environment. Models must 
be trained on a daily basis, or when a new intrusion is discovered. To adopt faster, 
the whole model should not be retrained again, but incrementally as the 
administrators feed it with new data. 
• The KDD Cup 1999 dataset, as a benchmark, is widely accepted and used, 
however it has its own flaws. It contains too many redundant observations and the 
target class is unevenly distributed. Many tried to combat both by sampling the 
dataset, which makes performance comparisons complicated. The creators of the 
NSL-KDD dataset addressed this redundancy; therefore, it is a preferable 
alternative. 
Dua and Du (2016) identified multiple challenges for data mining algorithms in intrusion 
detection: 
• Modeling large-scale networks and creating graphs based on large networks is a 
difficult task. 
• The volume of heterogenous data, the dynamic threats, and the severe imbalance 
between normal and attack classes complicate threat detection. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
73 
 
• New data mining methods and adaptive systems are necessary to predict future 
attacks. 
• Use of online learning methods for dynamic modelling of network data. 
• Modelling data with skewed class distributions to handle rare event detection. 
There is a fundamental asymmetry in anomaly detection problems between 
normal activities and attacks. Classification should be more focused on classifying 
minority classes as attacks or anomalies. 
• One of the biggest challenges in anomaly detection is the selection of features that 
best characterize the user, or the system usage patterns. This is often carried out 
to reduce data dimensionality. 
Molina-Coronado et al. (2020) provided the following open issues in their review article: 
• Most papers provided insufficient information on the techniques applied for 
intrusion detection which hurt reproducibility. 
• They found issues with publicly available datasets, too. A large portion of data 
preprocessing has been carried out in them in advance. The authors recommend 
not to rely on a single benchmark dataset but to use two or more instead. 
Furthermore, encrypted data is increasingly prevalent, which is not present in 
these public datasets at all. 
• They highlighted the importance of dimensionality reduction, due to the large 
number of features, which is further increased when categorical features are 
encoded. 
• Instead of batch learning, incremental learning should receive more attention in 
the future. 
• The temporal nature of network traffic is underused, despite having a lot of 
potential. 
• Intrusion detection has many more characteristics apart from detection 
performance. However, only the latter is studied in the field. 
To summarize, I identified the following areas in need of substantial attention: 
• Design hybrid detection approaches and/or ensemble models for comprehensive, 
unbiased intrusion detections. 
• Mind the data: if the KDD Cup 1999 dataset is used, then an appropriate sample, 
and a good set of features should be selected. With NSL-KDD dataset, sampling 
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can be omitted, but some form of feature selection should be performed, 
nonetheless. 
• When measuring performance, false alarm rate and recall are more important than 
accuracy. 
3. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the research I have conducted, demonstrated with 
the tools, techniques and considerations of the design science methodology and the 
CRISP-DM process. These two have many intersections, as some steps in the CRISP-DM 
process supports design science activities. 
3.1. CONTEXT 
The context of intrusion detection, apart from the details discussed in chapter 2.1, were 
elaborated in Ahamad et al. (2009). They identified five reasons for developing intrusion 
detection systems: 
• Threats from malware: hackers use malware to steal private information. They 
leverage the vulnerabilities of web site structures, social networks and document 
transmissions not scanning for malware. Once and intrusion is successful, the 
malware will track the user’s keystrokes, spy on the users browsing habits and 
send the user’s personal information to the attacker. 
• Threats from botnets: botnets are groups of hijacked machines coordinated by 
attackers. Bots in a botnet are controlled by a hidden master computer. Computer 
and internet users suffer privacy breaches or financial losses, loss of valuable data, 
and damage to computer systems caused by botnets. 
• Threats from cyber warfare: cyber-attacks are critical military actions. The 
increasing dependence of traditional infrastructure on cyberinfrastructure leaves 
many vulnerabilities for cyber warriors to exploit. Cyber defense is an inevitable, 
challenging goal of military forces around the world. An efficient cyber defense 
requires conscious effort from multiple countries, states, institutions and industry 
members, as attacks can affect all of them. 
• Threats from mobile communication: the development of mobile 
communication caused the proliferation of reliable services. Investigations shown 
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that even financial transactions appeared in mobile services, which draws the 
interest of hackers as well. The mobile infrastructure and devices provide multiple 
opportunities to steal valuable information. Institutions are developing new ways 
to protect against fraud and phishing. 
• Cyber-crimes: different jurisdictions define cyber-crime depending on how it 
correlates to local situations. Prospering e-commerce entices cyber criminals, 
many purchase attack platforms to carry out their activities. These are carried out 
by exploiting vulnerabilities in the e-commerce industries. Countering these 
activities is difficult as they do not leave traces behind. Combating cyber-crimes 
requires effort in two perspectives: first, uniform cyber laws need to be enacted. 
Second, advanced intrusion detection technology needs to be developed to defend 
against criminal activities. 
More recent developments within the context of intrusion detection are the ongoing 
monitoring and reporting on the development of malicious activities. One example is the 
McAfee Labs Threats report (Beek et al. (2019)). This report drawn attention to the 
increase of ransomware attacks, the increase of data dumps (release of sensitive customer 
data to the dark web), the increase of cyber-attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in remote 
desktop applications and in the HTTP protocol. Two attacks mentioned in the report were 
social engineering, which is still as prevalent as ever, and an increase in attacks exploiting 
the vulnerabilities of IoT devices. Many of these are not necessarily network intrusions 
themselves, more the results of a successful intrusion. 
All the above and more fuel the efforts aimed at creating new and better intrusion 
detection systems. The goals of actors in the social context can be summarized in the 
following points: 
• Risk mitigation: reduce the chance of intrusion, information loss, or fines in the 
form of potential lawsuits. Reduce system downtime due to DDoS attacks, by 
installing a traffic reduction service supported by an intelligent intrusion detector. 
• Infrastructure and national security: prevent the sabotage of key infrastructural 
elements, such as electricity and water supply, increasingly reliant on information 
infrastructure. 
• Protection of private information: restrict access to sensitive information, such as 
credit card numbers, bank account and personal information. 
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• Protection of government secrets: as an extension of the point above, departments 
store information not meant for a public audience. The exposure of these can have 
far-reaching consequences. 
I have already discussed the knowledge context of intrusion detection in chapter 2. Out 
of them I found signature and hybrid NIDS interesting to be studied deeper using 
ensemble techniques and artificial neural networks. To frame my research, I decided to 
use the CRISP-DM process model, displayed in Figure 3. 
3.2. RESEARCH GOALS 
The goal and design problem of this dissertation is to provide a novel intrusion detection 
solution applying machine learning methods. Accordingly, the two research goals I set to 
achieve are: 
RG1. To create an intrusion detection model that can compete with the ones 
introduced in related scientific literature, measured by detection performance 
metrics. Performance in this context is described as the portion of attacks correctly 
and incorrectly classified as being part of normal activity and vice versa. 
RG2. To identify machine learning methods that can improve performance on 
complex event detection problems where target features have a high degree of 
class imbalance. Intrusion detection fits this description, as the available data is 
heavily skewed towards the more common normal, rather than the rarer malicious 
activity. Some of these candidates are synthetic sampling to feed more balanced 
training data, hyperparameter optimization to find the overall best performing 
parameters for a machine leaning model, and ensemble techniques, creating 
composite models for improved predictions. 
Based on these research goals I formulated the research questions of the next chapter. 
3.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
RQ1. Is machine learning a suitable approach for intrusion detection? If machine 
learning is a proper technique for intrusion detection, which are the appropriate 
models?  
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Finding the right machine learning model is a challenging task. It is affected by the 
selected intrusion detection method (signature detection or anomaly detection) as well as 
the available dataset and the sampling method chosen for that dataset. 
The most common and best working non-ensemble machine learning algorithms in 
intrusion detection are decision trees, artificial neural networks and k-nearest neighbor 
algorithms for signature detection. Each has drawbacks though: 
• Decision trees are prone to overfitting, unstable (a small change in training data 
can cause entirely different decision trees) and perform poorly on unevenly 
distributed training classes. 
• Artificial neural networks, like decision trees, are prone to overfitting, and 
generally have long training times. 
• K-nearest neighbor algorithms are fast to train, but need all data for accurate 
predictions, therefore they scale poorly. 
Countless studies in the literature have proven that a good combination of machine 
learning algorithms can detect intrusions well with few false alarms. 
Predictive performance is, however, not the only characteristic for intrusion detectors to 
be compared by. Training time, prediction time and model portability are three additional 
characteristics to consider. Under portability I mean how well can one move the detection 
model between two systems and how much computational resource do they require from 
the operator. However, I kept the evaluation of these aspects out of scope of this 
dissertation in favor of a more thorough study of predictions. 
I answered this research question throughout the dissertation with different machine 
learning models, most prominently in chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, where I provided the 
designs of two intrusion detectors and in chapters 5.1 and 5.2, where I described the 
achieved performances of the same detectors. In addition, the analysis of the related 
literature in chapter 2.3 already provided context for this research question. 
RQ2. Which type of intrusion detection method is more effective from the 
following ones: misuse detection by classification, anomaly detection by outlier 
analysis or a combination of the previous ones?  
This is a more recent question in the field of intrusion detection, also highlighted by Dua 
and Du (2016). On one hand, signature detection can have high recall and low false 
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positive rate, is easy to implement, and provides predictions quickly. However, it is 
incapable of detecting new, unknown attacks. On the other hand, anomaly detection aims 
at building a profile of normal traffic, and then detects anomalous or attack traffic based 
on the difference from this normal profile. Anomaly detection captures unknown attacks 
better; however, it is more difficult for it to set apart attacks and anomalous traffic, as the 
latter might include unusual, yet normal connections as well, highlighted in Ippoliti 
(2011, 2013), therefore, anomaly detection will have high false positive rates. In a good 
intrusion detector, recall is high and false positive rate is low. Signature and anomaly 
detectors use compensatory detection approaches; therefore, it is a good idea to combine 
them into new hybrid detectors. 
A simple combination of the two techniques is not enough though, a more purposeful 
approach must be followed. For a hybrid detector to work, one must make two decisions: 
• Find the best candidate algorithms for the individual signature and anomaly 
detector. 
• Find a way to integrate the two detection approaches to achieve the best balance 
of recall and false positive rate. 
Good candidates for hybridization are models that do not perform conflicting operations 
on the data, for example, decision trees and one class SVM models or any autoencoder 
combined with fully connected artificial neural networks. The choice of integration can 
be simplified to one of the four alternatives shown in Figure 1 as well. 
The chapters intended to provide answers to this question are 4.2.4 and 5.4 where I design 
and evaluate a neural network stacking ensemble as a signature detector enhanced by deep 
autoencoder networks as an anomaly detector. Chapter 5.4 in particular evaluates the 
composite performance of the two models and the anomaly detection capabilities of the 
autoencoder. 
RQ3. What is the level of model performance that can be expected in an 
intrusion detection task? 
Based on reviewing the related literature, contemporary intrusion detection research is 
facing the following challenges: 
• Predominant use of the accuracy measure for performance evaluation on data with 
unevenly distributed classes. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
79 
 
• Different articles created their own samples of a chosen dataset, making 
performance comparisons between them and the proposed models difficult, if not 
impossible. 
• Focus mostly on signature detection, less on other techniques. 
• Intrusion detection is always involved with detecting minority classes. 
There is a high variation on possible model performance measurements. Therefore, I set 
up two criteria for selecting papers from the related literature to compare the proposed 
models with, in order to test the assumptions of this dissertation. 
• Emphasis on recall / detection rate: although accuracy is the most common metric, 
it is inappropriate for performing detections on imbalanced data. A better 
alternative is recall. Throughout the dissertation I favored literature with recall as 
the model performance indicator compared to those with accuracy, though, due to 
how common it is, I could not ignore accuracy completely. Moreover, I had to 
take the alternative names of recall, like detection rate and sensitivity, into account 
as well. To make the search more difficult, some papers claimed to use detection 
rate, when in reality, the definition and provided formula fitted accuracy instead. 
• Data sampling is the second source of complexity and prediction variance in the 
literature. Different samples result in different models with different performance 
measurements. Therefore, I attempted to look for papers that validated their model 
proposals with the complete test samples of the datasets they used. Similarly, I set 
up the intrusion detectors of this dissertation in the following way: I tested them 
on the complete test sample of the respective dataset, regardless of what data I 
used for training. This covered data preprocessing as well: transformations were 
performed on the test sample using calculations from the training data to avoid 
information leakage. 
I used these requirements as filters on the research papers to be used in the final 
performance comparisons in chapters 5.5 and 5.6. Apart from that, I also aimed to test 
techniques like synthetic sampling, particularly with models demonstrated in chapter 
4.2.3 and evaluated in 5.3; and advanced hyperparameter optimization with models in 
chapters 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 5.3 and 5.4 to achieve increased model prediction performance. 
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3.4. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology I used for designing, executing and evaluating my models followed a 
top-down pattern shown in Figure 22. As the goals I set can be achieved by creating and 
evaluating an algorithmic artifact, I found design science research to be a fitting 
methodology. Furthermore, this algorithmic artifact is in fact a machine learning model, 
therefore the concepts and considerations of the CRISP-DM process model for planning, 
implementing and deploying machine learning models can be applied as well, forming 
the second methodological pillar. Finally, the designs in chapter 4 outline the exact 
process of model creation, with the necessary data preprocessing, training and evaluation 
steps involved, forming the lowest level of methodological abstraction. 
 
Figure 22: The methodological abstraction levels followed in this dissertation. Source: own edit. 
To further clarify the connection between design science research and the CRISP-DM 
process model, one must first evaluate the engineering cycle (Wieringa (2014)). The 
engineering cycle is a rational problem-solving process consisting of 5 tasks, each 
displayed in Figure 23, and described in detail together with the CRISP-DM tasks in Table 
3. 
 
Figure 23: The relationship between the Engineering Cycle and CRISP-DM. Based on: Chapman et al. 
(2000) and Wieringa (2014) 
Design science CRISP-DM Model designs
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Engineering cycle (design science) CRISP-DM 
Treatment: interaction between the artifact and 
the problem context. 
In CRISP-DM, a treatment can be an 
implemented machine learning model and its 
effect on the decision-making process. 
Problem investigation: to prepare the researcher 
for designing a treatment, by learning more about 
the problem to be treated. 
 
Business understanding: to understand the 
business background / context / problem 
Data understanding: to evaluate the available 
data sources and to understand the meaning and 
utility of data for machine learning applications. 
Treatment design: design is a decision about 
what the researcher is going to do. A specification 
is the documentation of this decision. 
Multiple methods exist to express design and 
specification within the field of machine learning. 
Data preparation: ~ transform data for machine 
learning. In some contexts, this is referred to as 
data preprocessing. 
Modeling: find applicable model for the problem 
context, design model architecture, design model 
optimization process. 
Evaluation: the design of model evaluation is 
tied to this step (train/test split, CV, nested CV, 
choice of performance metric(s)) 
Treatment validation: the goal is to predict how 
a designed treatment will perform within context 
without it being observed in said context. As 
such, the evaluation is performed under artificial 
conditions. 
Modeling, evaluation: executing the training and 
evaluation processes on separate training data. 
Treatment implementation: implementation and 
use of treatment in the original problem context. 
Deployment: live implementation of the machine 
learning model. 
Implementation evaluation: evaluate how the 
implemented artifact interacts with its real 
context. 
Deployment: performance monitoring of the 
machine learning model. Retrain in case of 
performance degradation. 
Table 3: Comparison of engineering cycle and CRISP-DM tasks. Based on: Chapman et al. (2000) and 
Wieringa (2014) 
The two methodologies are connected by their logically corresponding tasks, for example, 
problem investigation in the engineering cycle involves activities that are similar to 
activities performed during the business understanding and data understanding tasks of 
CRISP-DM. However, design cycle, the focus of design science, consists of only the first 
three tasks of the engineering cycle. Therefore, this dissertation will only discuss CRISP-
DM tasks leading up to and including model evaluation. Deployment, although an 
important task, will only be discussed tangentially in chapter 6. 
The two methodologies have differences as well. The goals of the two methodologies is 
one. The main goal of design science research is not only to deliver a well-designed, 
working artifact, but also to answer scientific questions about the artifact, at the context 
or at the relationship between the two. Comparatively, the goal of CRISP-DM is more 
practical. It is interested in delivering a machine learning algorithm, preferably as a part 
of a working business solution or service, delivering value to both the customers and the 
organization. The CRISP-DM approach therefore is more focused on evaluating the 
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business context and the effects on the business context, rather than on answering research 
questions. 
Some personalization of the CRISP-DM process model, hence, will be necessary. These 
adjustments are not only permitted, but also encouraged by the designers of CRISP-DM, 
as they intended it to be a collection of best practices within the field of data science, 
rather than a rigid standard. Some of the changes compared to the CRISP-DM process 
model are: 
• Greater emphasis on the wider context of the intrusion detection model: this 
includes both the social scientific context via literature reviews and the knowledge 
context by covering the data scientific tools and techniques in use. I covered them 
both already in chapter 2. 
• More emphasis on model evaluation involving the comparison of model 
performances: On one hand, comparisons are conducted between the different of 
intrusion detection models I delivered as part of the design process. This supports 
the disclosure rule of the design science process as well. On the other hand, I 
compared the best performing detector to other works available in the field of 
intrusion detection, placing a higher emphasis on detection rate. 
4. PROPOSED MODEL DESIGNS 
This chapter describes the design and creation of the machine learning model-based 
intrusion detection architectures. In the chapter I introduce the datasets used for model 
training and evaluation first, followed by the detailed description of model architecture 
designs. Throughout this chapter and chapter 5, I followed the CRISP-DM process, 
creating four intrusion detection model variations. 
4.1. INPUT DATASETS 
After reviewing the literature, particularly Stolfo et al. (2000), McHugh (2000) and 
Tavallaee et al. (2009) the most common datasets for intrusion detection in use were: 
DARPA 1998 & DARPA 1999, KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD. These datasets are all 
the products of an experiment conducted in 1998 by MIT Lincoln Labs to survey the state 
of the art in intrusion detection at the time. During the experiment, about 5 million records 
were collected in 5 weeks in the form of raw tcpdump logs. The data simulated the traffic 
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of a typical Air Force LAN, while the researchers carried out multiple network attacks 
against it. 
The first iteration of these experiments were the DARPA 1998 & DARPA 1999 datasets. 
These were highly criticized, particularly by McHugh, (2000). These issues have already 
been discussed in chapter 2.3. The main criticisms were the unit of analysis problem, the 
question of attack distribution and the large level of redundancy among the records. 
The unit of analysis criticism has been resolved by the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, by fixing 
the unit of analysis in network connections. The dataset itself consists of ~5 million 
network connection record for training, and another ~3 million record for testing intrusion 
detection models. The altogether ~8 million records might be too difficult for an intrusion 
detection system to handle; therefore, the authors of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset provided 
a 10% stratified sample of both the training and test datasets. The total number of features 
available is 41, with 40 explanatory and 1 target feature. Designed primarily for signature 
detection, the target feature contains numerous attack types each belonging to five distinct 
attack classes: 
• DoS: denial of service attacks aimed at disabling crucial systems or system 
components. 
• R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine. 
• U2R: unauthorized access to local superuser (~admin) privileges by a local 
unprivileged user. 
• Probe: surveillance and probing, not attacks by themselves but could be used to 
prepare for future attacks. 
• And normal legitimate behavior. 
The assignment of each detailed attack type to their respective class is shown in Table 4. 
Some of the detailed types are only available in the test dataset of KDD Cup 1999. The 
training attack types were well documented by Stolfo et al. (2000); the test attack types, 
however, were not, which caused some confusion in the studied literature. I have 
determined a final detailed attack type to high level attack class assignment shown in 
Table 4 using a simple majority vote between relative class frequencies based on the 
assignment tables published in 10 different articles. The exact process of this is further 
demonstrated in Appendix A. 
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Class Train Test 
Normal normal normal 
DoS back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, 
teardrop 
apache2, mailbomb, processtable, 
udpstorm, worm 
Probe ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, 
satan 
mscan, saint 
R2L ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, 
multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, 
warezmaster 
httptunnel, named, sendmail, 
snmpgetattack, snmpguess, xlock, 
xsnoop 
U2R buffer_overflow, loadmodule, 
perl, rootkit 
ps, sqlattack, xterm 
Table 4: Classification of attack types. Source: own edit (see Appendix A for details). 
Compared to the previous DARPA 1998 and 1999 datasets, the features of KDD Cup 
1999 are better organized and described, and, as a part of data preprocessing, new derived 
features were created based on domain knowledge by Stolfo et al. (2000). These features 
can be grouped into four categories: 
• Intrinsic features: features describing all network connections, regardless of user 
intentions. 
• Content features: capturing information on the content of each network 
connection. 
• Time-based traffic features: features aggregating the connections that had the 
same destination host or service as the selected connection in the prior 2 seconds. 
• Host-based traffic features: as a counterpart to time-based traffic features, host-
based traffic features were created to capture aggregate data not over the prior 2 
seconds, but over the previous 100 connections. 
Tavallaee et al. (2009) identified an issue with the KDD Cup 1999 dataset: a large number 
of redundant observations (Table 5 and Table 6). About 75% of the test set and 78% of 
the training set is duplicated. This redundancy often caused research papers prior to 2009 
to have biased intrusion detectors towards duplicate records. To alleviate this issue, 
Tavallaee et al. (2009) proposed the new NSL-KDD dataset. The authors provided two 
datasets: the first with binary labels and the second with 5-class labels, both having their 
respective training and test sets. 
 Original records Distinct records Reduction rate Final records 
Attacks 3,925,650 262,178 93.32% 58,630 
Normal 972,781 812,814 16.44% 67,343 
Total 4,898,431 1,074,992 78.05% 125,973 
Table 5: Statistics of redundant records in the KDD train set. Source: Tavallaee et al. (2009) 
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 Original records Distinct records Reduction rate Final records 
Attacks 250,436 29,378 88.26% 12,833 
Normal 60,591 47,911 20.92% 9,711 
Total 311,027 77,289 75.15% 22,544 
Table 6: Statistics of redundant records in the KDD test set. Source: Tavallaee et al. (2009) 
Apart from reducing the level of redundancy in both sets of KDD Cup 1999, Tavallaee et 
al. (2009) introduced two additional changes to the original DARPA 1998 data: first, they 
trained 21 machine learning classifiers on the reduced redundancy KDD Cup 1999 
dataset. Each record has been grouped based on how many models predicted its class 
correctly. This information was then stored as a complexity feature in addition to the rest 
of the data and provided an input to the next change. In order to make the size of the 
dataset more manageable, a random sampling has been performed, stratified by class, and 
the new complexity feature. This resulted in the creation of the NSL-KDD dataset, with 
final class membership counts shown in the final records column of Table 5 and Table 6. 
The final issue was the class distribution. Figure 24 shows this for the 10% sample of the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset, while the same for the NSL-KDD training dataset is shown in 
Figure 25. There are too many records for DoS attacks, and not enough for the remaining 
classes. This distribution is unrealistic, a real-life environment can have a ratio closer to 
98-95% to 2-5% between normal traffic and any attacks. Nonetheless, class imbalance 
persists, the only factor that has changed is the class in majority. Neither of the two 
studied datasets proposed solutions to handle class imbalance, finding them is up to the 
person conducting research. Inequalities in class distribution in general can be corrected 
by using one of following strategies recommended by Brownlee (2015): 
• Collect more data. Because the research that produced the DARPA 1998 data 
has concluded a long time ago, this alternative is improbable. 
• Change the performance metric from accuracy to something different, 
discussed in chapter 2.2. 
• Resample the dataset: one can use oversampling on the less represented classes, 
and under sampling on the better represented ones. This serves no benefit by itself, 
as some of the minority classes have <100 observations. Therefore, even if the 
minority classes are 100% oversampled, their number is still insufficient when 
compared to majority classes, and if the majority classes were to be under 
sampled, then the size of the training data will be too small for any meaningful 
model to be trained. 
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• Generate synthetic samples: the idea behind synthetic sampling is to generate 
samples where the records are not necessarily from the original dataset but were 
created with some randomness involved, based on statistical distributions of the 
class they originate from. Some methods of generating synthetic samples are 
reversed Naïve Bayes algorithm, SMOTE, and more recently, variational 
autoencoders. This approach could work by itself, or as the second phase of a 
process aimed at creating a balanced training sample. 
• Try different algorithms: use not just one data mining algorithm on a dataset but 
try out more and see which works best. This is the thought process behind model 
ensembles. 
• Use penalized models: penalized classification imposes an additional cost factor 
to misclassification. In short, the cost of making a mistake is set to be higher for 
the minority class, compared to the majority class. 
• Use a different perspective: view the dataset from the perspective of the area 
studying it. This usually involves different machine learning algorithms, for 
example, clustering or outlier analysis instead of classification. This is the idea 
behind anomaly and hybrid detection models. 
 
Figure 24: KDD Cup 1999 class distributions on the 10% training sample. Source: own edit. 
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Figure 25: NSL-KDD train dataset class distributions. Source: own edit. 
Despite the criticisms formulated, a large portion of the literature still use the KDD Cup 
1999 and NSL-KDD datasets. Therefore, I decided to prefer the NSL-KDD dataset, in 
contrast to newer datasets. In return, these datasets have been evaluated many times 
before, and now work as benchmarks for intrusion detection models. Additionally, 
according to Stolfo et al. (2000), the core idea behind the KDD Cup 1999 dataset (and 
NSL-KDD dataset) is that training data contains one set of attack patterns, while test data 
contains a different set of attack patterns, some unavailable in the training data. These test 
attack patterns are impossible for machine learning models to learn, emulating the 
appearance of new attack types. This makes KDD Cup 1999, and NSL-KDD as an 
extension, conceptually similar to the newer intrusion detection datasets. 
4.2. MODEL EVOLUTION 
I studied intrusion detection models created by combining machine learning algorithms 
in an ensemble. The design and implementation of one model, however, was not an easy 
task due to the specifics of the dataset. I had to perform multiple iterations to find an 
appropriate model. I discuss further elements of the CRISP-DM process in terms of these 
iterations, where each produced a new, better refined version of an intrusion detector. 
Figure 26 shows the detection models created in this iterative process: 
• Version 0 (prototype): the first prototype of the model is outlined and evaluated 
in Brunner (2017), where I published a decision tree bagging classifier trained on 
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a map-reduce-like architecture. I trained this model only on the KDD Cup 1999 
dataset. 
• Version 1 (neural network stacking ensemble): I created a stacking ensemble 
from neural networks trained on different features. I managed to improve 
performance by using a more robust sampling process and grid search 
hyperparameter optimization. In this model I transitioned between KDD Cup 
1999 and NSL-KDD, sampling both differently. 
• Version 2 (migration to TensorFlow): I moved the neural network ensemble over 
to a TensorFlow + Keras platform achieving faster training. I expected further 
improvements in prediction performance by using TPE hyperparameter 
optimization. My second goal with this iteration was to evaluate different 
variations of SMOTE sampling, namely SMOTE ENN, SMOTE Tomek, and 
SVM SMOTE. In this iteration I used the NSL-KDD dataset only. 
• Version 3 (extension with autoencoders): where I extended the best performing 
elements of earlier iterations (like SVM SMOTE sampling and TPE optimization) 
with deep autoencoder networks trained on normal traffic, creating a true hybrid 
intrusion detection approach. For training, I kept the NSL-KDD dataset. 
 
Figure 26: Iterations on the studied detection model. Source: own edit. 
Further chapters show how the modeling and model evaluation steps of CRISP-DM were 
implemented throughout the different iterations of the proposed intrusion detector. I 
Version 0
• Decision tree bagging
• Map-reduce
Version 1
• Stacking neural network
• SMOTE
• Hyperparameter 
optimization
Version 2
• Stacking neural network + Keras
• SMOTE variations
• Gaussian process + TPE 
optimization
Version 3
• Stacking neural network
• Autoencoder networks
• SVM SMOTE
• TPE optimization
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describe implementation details by how data preparation and model training were 
performed, the plans for performance evaluation and techniques how I attempted to 
improve the design of the next model with. 
4.2.1. THE DECISION TREE BAGGING MODEL 
The first machine learning model used for intrusion detection was built using decision 
trees organized into a bagging ensemble on a parallel map-reduce environment. I 
discussed this model in detail in Brunner (2017). I used Java and the WEKA API to 
implement this machine learning model. In further chapters I will refer to this intrusion 
detector as V0 model, due to it being the first model I created. This is a naming I will 
follow consistently throughout the dissertation for the other intrusion detectors as well. 
Data preparation 
 
Figure 27: Data preprocessing for the detection model prototype. Source: own edit. 
The steps of data preparation are outlined in Figure 27. I had to organize unique attacks 
into their respective classes first. To achieve the desired outcome I used an earlier 
conceptual hierarchy from which I created the categorization scheme in Table 4 and in 
Appendix A. 
Next I performed stratified sampling on the 10% sample of the KDD Cup 1999 training 
dataset. Altogether I created 4 datasets with different target features iteratively changing 
the following settings: 
• Target feature: during this first iteration, I performed binary and five-class 
classifications. I based the classes for multiclass classification on the early 
conceptual hierarchy. Binary classification was a choice between normal traffic 
and one of the four attack classes.  
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• Sample size: small or large. This, together with map-reduce parallelization had 
implications on training time only. The exact sample sizes are available in Table 
7. 
• Intent with the sample: I prepared a test and a training sample. However, due to 
frequent memory overflow errors of the Java platform, I had to swap training and 
test datasets around for the binary and multiclass classification tasks. Table 7 
shows how I performed this exactly. Training and test columns show the number 
of observations available in a given sample. 
Target variable Training Test Sample size 
5 classes 3,000 5,000 
S 
2 classes 5,000 3,000 
5 classes 6,000 10,000 
L 
2 classes 10,000 6,000 
Table 7: Sampling setup of the prototype intrusion detector. Source: Brunner (2017) 
Apart from target recategorization and data sampling, I performed no feature selection or 
feature grouping. Moreover, I transformed no numerical or categorical features either. 
Modeling 
I set up the model to work in a parallel map-reduce environment in three different 
architectures (Figure 28) each different in the number of CPUs and CPU cores used: 1 
and 2 CPUs and 2-4-8 cores. Out of these architectures my goal with the 1 processor, 2 
cores architecture was to train a benchmark classifier, to provide simple results for 
comparison with the later ensemble models trained on 4 and 8 processing cores. 
 
Figure 28: Experimental execution architectures of the V0 intrusion detector. Source: own edit. 
The first available core was reserved for a master thread tasked to distribute the stratified 
subsamples to all the remaining threads, each training a decision tree (Figure 29). When 
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done, each thread calculated predictions on the test sample. These were sent back to the 
master, where the final class of each observation was decided based on a majority vote 
between the decision tree predictions. 
 
Figure 29: The model creation and prediction process of the V0 intrusion detector. Source: own edit 
To mitigate the level of uncertainty caused by random elements of the process, I repeated 
training three times for each sample size (small or large), architecture setup (1 processor 
4 cores, 2 processors, 8 cores) and target feature kind (binary and five-class) combination. 
Altogether, including the benchmarks, I repeated the training and testing processes 28 
times. 
Evaluation 
Performance measurement and data collection were determined by target feature kind. I 
collected accuracies and macro-averaged precisions, recalls and F1-scores for five-class 
classification. I expanded these metrics with ROC AUC scores for binary classification. 
Due to my lacking understanding of model ensembles at the time, I only collected base 
classifier performance metrics, but no metrics measuring aggregate classification 
performance. Moreover, in some instances the base classifiers were unable to detect 
minority attack types, thus I had to set precision, recall and F1-score values to zero. This 
is a common behavior in many programming frameworks for machine learning. I had to 
follow this in a manual post-processing step, as the WEKA API at the time did not support 
it.  
Due to the parallelization on the map-reduce architecture, I measured execution time as 
well, although I dropped this in later models, so I could focus more on detection 
performance. 
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Potential improvements of the model 
This first version is best described as a prototype intrusion detector. It had many flaws: 
• I only measured the classification performance for each individual base model, 
the aggregate performance of the ensemble could only be evaluated as the 
arithmetic mean of each base classifier, which does not reflect the real 
classification capabilities of a bagging ensemble. 
• Java and the WEKA API, though useful on their own right, have counterparts that 
are better at performing data preprocessing, model training and testing. Three 
examples are Python, R and the KNIME Analytics Platform. The first two are 
programming languages less susceptible to malfunctions and are easier to 
maintain. Additionally, Python has readability advantage over most other 
programming languages as well. KNIME Analytics Platform is a free 
environment for developing and maintaining data workflows. Written in Java and 
originating from the WEKA API, it is an ideal choice for someone who prefers 
using the two. 
• More robust sampling methods are to be explored, having a large effect on model 
performance. 
• New machine learning models were recommended for use in detection models, 
particularly artificial neural networks. 
• Opportunities related to feature group creation were not explored. 
• Out of binary and five-class classification, only the latter should be kept, being 
greater challenge. This is supported by the nature of network intrusions as well, 
after all, different mitigation controls should be applied to DoS attacks than to 
R2L or U2R attacks. 
However, some findings of this early version are undeniably valuable. For example, the 
application of model ensembles was a forward-looking idea. With all the above 
considered, I designed the next experiment. 
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4.2.2. THE STACKED NEURAL NETWORK MODEL 
The next intrusion detection model has been implemented using the Python scientific 
stack (a collection of Python modules designed for data manipulation and data scientific 
tasks, the core modules being pandas + numpy + scikit-learn + matplotlib). I created a 
new stacking ensemble of artificial neural networks and evaluated it for detection 
performance. In the following chapters I will refer to this model as V1. 
Data Preparation 
 
Figure 30: Data preprocessing for the V1 detector. Source: own edit. 
Figure 30 shows the modifications to data preprocessing performed on the 10% sample 
of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset first, then later on the NSL-KDD dataset. I highlighted the 
new steps compared to the preprocessing of the V0 model in green, and the two altered 
steps in orange: 
• Some categorical features were recognized incorrectly as numerical by the Python 
interpreter, I corrected these in the first preprocessing step. Furthermore, as the 
second part of this process, I encoded all categorical features using one-hot 
encoding to be more appropriate for processing by the neural networks. 
• The target feature was created using the class assignments described in Table 4. I 
dropped binary classification in this iteration, however. 
• I performed a simple feature selection to remove explanatory features with no 
variance (equivalent to not having information content). I based this feature 
selection on relative deviation. 
• I fundamentally redesigned sampling generate balanced samples more efficiently. 
This process was different for the two datasets. For the 10% sample of KDD Cup 
1999, it was performed in two stages. Stage one performed a balancing stratified 
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split, where minority classes had higher probability to be selected in the sample, 
the exact sampling fractions are in Table 8. The second stage balanced the sample 
further by performing SMOTE sampling on the intermediate sample. This two-
stage approach yielded a completely balanced sample. For the NSL-KDD dataset, 
due to its more manageable size, I only used SMOTE. 
Class Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R 
Sampling fraction 2.50% 0.50% 50% 100% 100% 
Table 8: Sample fractions to balance class distributions in the 10% KDD Cup 1999 sample before 
SMOTE resampling. Source: own edit 
• I split the data to feature groups according to the findings of Stolfo et al. (2000). 
The sample was grouped into intrinsic, content, time-based traffic and host-based 
traffic feature groups. 
• As the last step of data preprocessing, I normalized the training sample with 
min-max normalization for the neural networks to reach meaningful results. 
One might ask whether the sample created from the 10% KDD Cup 1999 data is a valid 
representation of the original. I have validated this in a separate experiment where I 
repeated the proposed sampling process 150 times, then compared them to the original 
training dataset. I based this evaluation on the nonparametric two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test from statistics. The null hypothesis of the K-S test states that the two samples 
were drawn from the same statistical distribution. These K-S tests were then performed 
for each class, feature and sampling iteration. The result is a per class aggregation of the 
acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis, where acceptance counts as 1 and rejection 
as 0. My goal with this test was to provide insights into how well the sampling matched 
the original data. 
For the NSL-KDD data, as SMOTE is guaranteed to yield a synthetic sample with a 
distribution matching the original data closely, answering the above question has no 
additional benefit. 
Modeling 
I trained multiple neural networks, one for each feature group and one as a final 
aggregator model. The modeling setup is visible in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31: The model creation and prediction process of the V1 model. Source: own edit 
An important element to stacking ensembles is the variance of the base models, which is 
usually achieved by different base models. In V1, I tried to achieve variation by feeding 
different data features to the base classifiers instead. 
I trained every model in the ensemble in a similar process. First, I optimized each with 
grid search hyperparameter optimization with five-fold CV for more stable results. The 
target metric I optimized for was recall, the hyperparameters I changed are visible in 
Table 9. The optimization process altered only the initial learning rate, the exponent for 
the decaying learning rate and the momentum for every neural network. Further settings 
available were, for example, hidden layer and neuron per hidden layer counts. In those 
cases however, grid search would have taken too long to conclude and yield an optimal 
neural network architecture. As a compromise, I gave each model a fixed architecture. 
The base classifiers were trained on three hidden layers with 40, 20 and 10 neurons 
respectively, whereas the aggregator was trained only on two hidden layers with 10 and 
5 neurons. I base my argument for the smaller architecture for the aggregator model on 
that it received only 𝑘 ∙ 5 features as input, one for each target class value per base 
classifier. 
Parameter Base models Aggregator model 
hidden layer (40, 20, 10) (10, 5) 
activation RELU 
solver Adam 
alpha (L2 regularization) 0.0001 
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Parameter Base models Aggregator model 
learning rate type inverse scaling 
initial learning rate 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1, 0.15, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
LR decay power 0.25, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
momentum 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Table 9: Hyperparameter settings for the V1 detector. Source: own edit 
Evaluation 
I used the standard measures of accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score for performance 
evaluation, obtained from testing the ensemble with the dedicated test datasets of KDD 
Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD respectively. I performed transformations using the same one-
hot encoding, feature group splitting rule and normalizer objects I fitted using the training 
datasets to limit the effect of information leakage. Moreover, I performed no sampling on 
the test datasets either. 
Potential improvements of the model 
This iteration has taken a major step forward in terms of quality and classification 
performance compared to the prototype V0 model. However, I identified new issues as 
well: 
• Although I did not measure with research intent, the training process with grid 
search hyperparameter optimization took a significant amount of time, which was 
a result of multiple factors: the notoriously long training time of neural networks, 
the grid search algorithm itself and the cross-validation iterations. I found 
TensorFlow + Keras with GPU acceleration capabilities a good candidate to 
improve this training time, with the potential benefit of improving model 
performance further. 
• I performed hyperparameter optimization using grid search, though I considered 
random search at some point as well. Both have flaws, grid search takes a long 
time, while random search is not guaranteed to find global optimum. Gaussian 
and tree-structured parzen estimator hyperparameter optimization both evaluate a 
small number of combinations, but they do it more intelligently, thus converge 
faster to global optima. Moreover, they can search in larger parameter spaces, 
therefore more parameter dimensions could be evaluated. 
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• Later in the iteration, as I evaluated synthetic sampling for utility, I discovered 
multiple modifications to the SMOTE sampling algorithm. Some of these 
variations had the potential to further improve prediction performance, therefore 
I found it useful to include them in the next iteration. 
4.2.3. NEURAL NETWORKS ON TENSORFLOW AND KERAS 
The next iteration was a natural evolution of the V1 model. I created it by implementing 
two major changes to the training process shown in chapter 4.2.2: first, I changed the 
models from scikit-learn MLPClassifiers to Keras models on TensorFlow backend. 
Second, I used TPE hyperparameter optimization instead of grid search during model 
training. I refer to models created this way as V2 detectors, with variations in naming 
suggesting variations in the sampling I applied on data the models were trained with. 
According to the Google Brain Team (2015) “TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source 
platform for machine learning. It has a comprehensive, flexible ecosystem of tools, 
libraries and community resources that lets researchers push the state-of-the-art in ML 
and developers easily build and deploy ML powered applications”. Developed by 
Google, it has quickly obtained popularity in the fields of machine learning and AI 
research. 
The latest release of TensorFlow has native support for Keras, a high-level API for neural 
network architecture development. According to the Keras documentation (Chollet 
(2015)): “Keras is a high-level neural networks API, written in Python and capable of 
running on top of TensorFlow, CNTK, or Theano. It was developed with a focus on 
enabling fast experimentation”. 
Recently, Google released TensorFlow 2.0, which tied the Keras API closer, which, at 
the same time discontinued support for Theano backend. To keep my models up to date, 
I used TensorFlow 2.0 as well. 
Data Preparation 
The data preparation step  in Figure 32, as the majority of my changes affected modeling, 
remained largely unchanged compared to the previous iteration (shown in Figure 30), 
except for two. First, I experimented with multiple variations of synthetic sampling, 
namely SMOTE ENN, SMOTE Tomek and SVM SMOTE, the former two being 
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combinational over and under sampling approaches, while the latter being a strictly over 
sampling approach. My second change was added to meet a requirement of Keras 
regarding the target class: the target needs to be represented in a number encoded format 
in order for cross entropy loss to work, which I added as the last step to preprocessing. 
 
Figure 32: Data preprocessing for the V2 models. Source: own edit 
Regarding execution speed, although more manageable, the NSL-KDD training dataset 
still contained enough observations and features to make synthetic resampling a slow 
process to execute. After taking the recommendations of (scikit-learn developers, 2018), 
the following adjustments were made to the synthetic samplers: 
• I set all their n_jobs parameter to -1. This setting enables multi-threaded execution 
during resampling, the -1 value tells the code to use all available CPU cores for 
execution, thus enabling it to take advantage of all available resources. 
• The SVM classifier used by SVM SMOTE has no n_jobs parameter, instead, it is 
optimized with the cache_size parameter. Adjusting this from the default 200 MB 
to 4096 MB enabled faster execution for SVM SMOTE as well. 
Modeling 
In the modeling phase I changed the backend and the API of the neural networks and 
introduced the new optimization strategy. The model architecture is presented in Figure 
33. 
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Figure 33: The model creation and prediction process of the V2 models implemented in Keras on 
TensorFlow backend. Source: own edit 
The architecture setup shares a lot in common with the V1 model: I trained and optimized 
each base model, then trained the aggregator on the class probability predictions of the 
base models. The differences were in the backend and the hyperparameter optimization 
strategy I used. One of the many reasons for choosing TensorFlow was a better access to 
computational resources, notably the potential to access the GPU of the computer 
modeling is performed on. A question is the degree of benefit from doing so, as GPU 
training involves a computational overhead to set the data up for processing. 
Furthermore, Bayesian model optimization together with the flexibility of TF and Keras, 
allowed training to explore a wider range of hyperparameters, for example, the number 
of hidden layers, the number of neurons per hidden layer and the activation function per 
hidden layer together with the already explored learning rate and learning rate decay over 
time parameters. This expanded optimization has the potential of finding more accurate 
predictions. I chose TPE algorithm for hyperparameter optimization, as it possessed 
advantageous properties compared even to gaussian process optimization. The target 
measure to optimize for has been the sparse categorical cross entropy loss function of the 
Keras API. 
The parameterization of TPE, however, is different than that of grid search, visible in 
Table 10. I defined the parameter settings in accordance with Bergstra et al. (2011), 
Bergstra, Yamins and Cox (2013). The details of this is visible in Table 2. Distributions 
to sample from were log uniform for learning rate and dropout rate and uniform for 
learning rate decay. I set the number of hidden layers to be chosen from a list of values, 
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in this case, integers between 1 and 5 inclusive. The number of hidden layers parameter 
also determined the number of neurons and activations per layer parameters (one for each 
hidden layer), each sampling from a quantized uniform distribution converted to integer 
value and a choice between sigmoid, RELU and tanh functions, respectively. This 
dependent hyperparameter value selection is one of the many advantages of the TPE 
algorithm over gaussian processes. The settings in Table 10 enabled a simple neural 
network architecture search for each base and the aggregator model alike. 
Parameter Generator function 
Learning rate hp.loguniform(10-3, 101) 
Dropout rate hp.loguniform(10-3, 5 * 10-1) 
Learning rate decay hp.uniform(0.1, 0.5) 
Hidden layer number hp.choice(1, 5) 
Neurons per layer hp.quniform(5, 50, q=1) converted to integer 
Activations per layer hp.choice(sigmoid, RELU, tanh) 
Table 10: TPE hyperparameter settings for the V2 intrusion detectors. Source: own edit 
Other parameters important to neural networks were not optimized. These were the 
number of epochs during training (set to 100), batch size (set to 1024) and a lower bound 
for learning rate reduction (set to 10-3). The learning rate reduction, together with an early 
stopping criterion with patience set to the square root of the number of epochs were added 
as callback policies expanding the capabilities of the training process and reducing 
execution time. Another unaffected parameter was L2 regularization, the coefficient of 
which I fixed at 10-3. Finally, I used the Adam solver of Kingma and Ba (2014) for 
training, just like with the V1 model of chapter 4.2.2. 
Evaluation 
The evaluation process is the same as it was in previous experiments, however, I altered 
the scope of measures as I only examined accuracy and recall. My choice for these two 
measures was influenced by their widespread use and general recommendations in the 
literature. 
The main benefit I expected from using TensorFlow and Keras were the potential of better 
optimized neural network training algorithms, which can exploit the capabilities of multi 
core CPUs as well as GPUs. Moreover, Keras models are more flexible when it comes to 
parameter settings, enabling per-layer activation functions, neuron counts, regularization, 
etc. With TPE optimization, the key advantage is that it performs a limited set of trials, 
just like how random search works, however it converges on good results faster compared 
to grid search, and, in some cases, it can even outperform it. 
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As a secondary goal, I evaluated more advanced synthetic sampling approaches as part 
of this iteration. These included SMOTE Tomek (Batista et al. (2003)), SMOTE ENN 
(Batista, Prati and Monard (2004)) and SVM SMOTE ((Nguyen, Cooper and Kamei 
2009)). Based on empirical results, I expected models trained on samples generated by 
SVM SMOTE to perform slightly better, due to how it samples from border regions. 
Potential improvements of the model 
The models trained in this iteration only performed signature detection. I planned to 
evaluate at least one hybrid intrusion detector in this dissertation, providing more insight 
to the second research question I formulated in chapter 3.3. I found a good candidate in 
the shape of autoencoder networks. Two benefits from using them are: 
• First, the least complicated single layer autoencoder networks can be viewed as a 
nonlinear extension of the PCA algorithm, therefore, they are inherently capable 
of dimensionality reduction. 
• Second, being neural networks themselves, I could integrate them into the V2 
stacking neural network architecture demonstrated in this chapter. 
4.2.4. AUTOENCODER ENHANCED STACKING NEURAL NETWORK 
The key improvement of this model version over V2 is the extension of base classifiers 
with deep autoencoder networks trained only on normal traffic. Changes to data 
preparation and modeling processes were only minor, mostly involving the usage of the 
best performing elements described in chapter 4.2.3. My goal with the addition of 
autoencoders was increasing the quality of model predictions, justifying the ordinal 
increase in the naming convention to V3 in the following chapters. 
Data Preparation 
The data preprocessing in Figure 34 only saw minor changes, aimed at optimizing the 
workflow and at synthetic sampling. I implemented the former by using new 
preprocessing tools offered by the latest release of the scikit-learn API (Pedregosa et al. 
(2011)), and by merging logically similar transformations in a single step. I managed to 
join one-hot encoding, min-max normalization and target feature numerical encoding 
together in the same preprocessing step. The second change I implemented was the use 
of SVM SMOTE sampling, as it proved to be the best performing synthetic sampling 
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process according to the studied literature, particularly to Lopez-Martin, Carro and 
Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019). 
 
Figure 34: Data preprocessing for the V3 architecture. Source: own edit 
Modeling 
Model training (Figure 35) received a major update when I added deep AEs to the base 
classifier levels. I trained and saved each of these autoencoders only on normal traffic in 
a separate process, then, before training the base models of the neural network stacking 
model, I loaded and used these autoencoders to predict all connection data. Attack 
connections are predicted as if they were normal traffic, therefore I expected the squared 
difference between the actual and predicted features to be higher for attacks than for 
normal traffic. This difference can be calculated for each observation and feature, yielding 
new datasets to train and test with. I performed the rest of model training as I described 
in chapter 4.2.3, I used the TPE algorithm for hyperparameter optimization with the same 
hyperparameter space definitions I shown earlier in Table 10. 
 
Figure 35: The model creation and prediction process of the V3 model. Source: own edit 
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I set up the architecture of the deep autoencoders differently than the architecture of the 
stacking neural network models, due to their different purpose. These different settings 
are shown in Table 11. As part of the study I performed on deep AE networks, I 
experimented with linear, sigmoid, RELU and tanh activation functions applied on all 
hidden layers of the autoencoder with the intent of using the activation which provided 
the lowest MSE on the target features. Further parameters I used were the Adam solver 
with default learning rate, and early stopping criterion, which was a policy shared between 
the autoencoders and the models of the stacking neural network with identical parameters. 
I did not perform regularization on the hidden layers of the autoencoder. 
Parameter name Parameter setting 
Activation Linear 
Layer reduction rate 2 
Optimizer Adam (LR=0.001) 
Bottleneck Round(√|𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡|) 
Epochs 100 
Early stopping patience √𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑠 
Table 11: Autoencoder parameter settings. Source: own edit 
To better understand layer reduction rate and bottleneck parameters of Table 11, the setup 
process of one autoencoder must be understood first. I divided this process into two 
stages: 
1. Encoder construction: the input feature count is taken to be the neuron count for 
the first hidden layer. For each subsequent hidden layer, the used neuron count is 
saved to a list and the neuron count for the subsequent layer is divided by the layer 
reduction rate. Then, the next iteration is performed with the new calculated 
neuron count. This iteration continues while the current neuron count is larger 
than a predefined bottleneck parameter, set to the square root of the input feature 
count. 
2. Decoder construction: the decoder network is constructed from the reversed list 
of encoder neuron counts. 
Evaluation 
I did not change the stacking neural network performance evaluation process from the 
previous iterations described in chapter 4.2.3, I kept accuracy and recall as the core 
metrics to demonstrate. I did so to maintain the ability to compare results achieved by this 
variant with the results of previous variants. 
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I tested the autoencoders separately, on training and test datasets of NSL-KDD. The 
predictive performance of autoencoders is defined on how closely they can reconstruct 
data from a low-dimensional representation. This is best characterized using the MSE 
function. I performed these comparisons for each class value and feature group, expecting 
different results by both values and groups, but not much different between the training 
and test datasets. A further evaluation of autoencoders was the small optimization of the 
activation functions, which I already described. 
Potential improvements of the model 
Although this iteration had the potential for the most promising results, I still found 
opportunities for adjustments. Particularly, the following could be improved on: 
• Although NSL-KDD (and KDD Cup 1999) is a widely studied and accepted 
benchmark for comparing intrusion detectors, its source is one of the oldest in the 
field, dating back to 1999. Although both NSL-KDD and KDD Cup 1999 simulate 
the appearance of new attacks by excluding some attack categories from the 
training set, new datasets created since then may have new insights useful for 
machine learning algorithms. New candidate datasets include Kyoto 2006 (Song 
et al. (2011)), UNSW-NB15 (Moustafa and Slay (2015)) and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 
(Sharafaldin, Lashkari and Ghorbani (2018)). UNSW-NB15 looks to be the most 
promising, it is more up to date, has dedicated training and test datasets and both 
packet and flow features. 
• Deep autoencoders are just one type of autoencoders that can be effective in an 
intrusion detection environment. Newer autoencoders include sparse 
autoencoders and variational autoencoders, both used effectively for improving 
intrusion detector systems in Al-Qatf et al. (2018), Lopez-Martin, Carro and 
Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019) and Yang et al. (2019). 
• I used the results of the autoencoders as the squared difference between the 
original and the predicted features. This approach is uncommon, most studies (Al-
Qatf et al. (2018), Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-Esguevillas (2019) and Yang 
et al. (2019)) used the latent representation of a variational autoencoder to 
generate new outputs or used the reduced dimensional representation. When 
applied to the intrusion detector demonstrated in this chapter, this change would 
likely reduce model complexity to a level, where even the use of model ensembles 
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could be omitted entirely, and instead, a neural network could be trained directly 
on reduced dimensional set of features. Furthermore, it is also possible that, being 
generative models, variational autoencoders could replace synthetic sampling 
altogether. 
• Finally, the current and previous iterations all relied on feature groups proposed 
primarily by Stolfo et al. (2000). The original purpose of these feature groups was 
to provide feature subsets better suited at detecting specific classes of traffic. A 
similar process could be developed to calculate feature importance per class in a 
one vs rest setting and take the top performing features to further modeling. This 
would create an ensemble built from base classifiers performing well for on 
specific class each. For example, these base classifiers could be the encoders of 
trained autoencoder networks, although it is to be determined whether a single 
variational autoencoder would provide better predictions. 
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5. RESULTS 
In this chapter I summarize the detection results that the models achieved. I organized 
this chapter similarly to the model outline in chapter 3.4 and Figure 26: I discuss the 
results of each model in the order of their creation, going from V0 to V3. Following the 
separate evaluation of these detectors, I discuss their results in relevance to each other. 
Finally, in chapter 5.6, I take these results an compare them with results provided by 
several papers in the field of intrusion detection research to see if my detectors can 
compete in a wider scientific context. 
5.1. DECISION TREE BAGGING RESULTS 
The results of the V0 detector can be seen in Table 12 and Table 13 . The metrics I used 
were accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score and, in the case of binary classification, AUC, 
all calculated using custom samples from the 10% KDD Cup 1999 dataset. In the original 
article of Brunner (2017) I evaluated the effects of parallelization on classification 
performance using differently sized training and test samples as well. There, I concluded 
that map-reduce parallelization and different sample sizes had no effect on the prediction 
performance of the base classifier models. Therefore, when I aggregated the performance 
metrics for demonstration in this dissertation, I filtered the effects of both characteristics 
out of the aggregate results calculation. For those interested in the original measurements, 
I made the source tables available in Appendix B. 
Binary classification (Table 12) achieved moderate accuracy and AUC at 78.8% ± 1.23% 
and 0.773 ± 0.0237 respectively. The ± components were due to the aggregation; they 
do not indicate cross validation folds. Precision was the highest metric at 0.925 ± 0.0372 
and recall and F1-score were the lowest at 0.513 ± 0.0332 and at 0.659 ± 0.0266. 
Measurement Value 
Accuracy 78.8% (±1.32%) 
Precision 0.925 (±0.0372) 
Recall 0.513 (±0.0332) 
F1-score 0.659 (±0.0266) 
AUC 0.773 (±0.0237) 
Table 12: Aggregate measurements for the binary classification case of the V0 model. Based on Brunner 
(2017) 
Comparing binary with five-class classification (Table 13), where accuracy was the 
highest at 97.9% ± 1.24% with the remaining precision (0.491 ± 0.0944), recall (0.458 
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± 0.0582) and F1-score (0.473 ± 0.0708) measurements showing worse performances. 
The high accuracy in this case is misleading, as training and test samples were not 
balanced at the time, and accuracy tends to rate classifier models better when they assign 
most observations to the majority class. 
Measurement Value 
Accuracy 97.9% (±1.24%) 
Precision 0.491 (±0.0944) 
Recall 0.458 (±0.0582) 
F1-score 0.473 (±0.0708) 
Table 13: Aggregate measurements for the five-class multiclass classification case of the V0 model. 
Based on Brunner (2017) 
Binary classification achieved better results. This is understandable as binary 
classification only requires models to make a choice between normal and attack traffic, 
also highlighted by Petersen (2015). This also means that the misclassifications made 
between the different attack classes remain masked. Depending on the intrusion detection 
controls requested, this masking may be unacceptable, as different control policies need 
to be applied for different attack patterns. Therefore, I considered studying intrusion 
detection performance as a multiclass classification problem more favorable in further 
intrusion detectors. One candidate algorithm recommended were artificial neural 
networks, preferably joined in an ensemble, for example, in the form of stacking 
classifiers. 
The results of this chapter provide one example answer to my first research question in 
chapter 3.3. 
5.2. STACKING NEURAL NETWORK RESULTS 
The datasets I used to train the V1 ensemble were KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD. Due 
to differences in dataset sizes and certain steps of data preprocessing I applied, it would 
be a mistake if I was to aggregate or even compare results achieved on the two datasets 
with each other. Therefore, I decided to show the results separately, first on KDD Cup 
1999, where I tested the stability of the custom sampling process I designed, and 
prediction performance of the models. This time I included detection performance metrics 
at base classifier and aggregator levels both, an improvement over the V0 model of 
chapter 5.1. On NSL-KDD, I evaluated detection performance only, as I simplified the 
data sampling process to only include SMOTE sampling. 
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KDD Cup 1999 - Sampling stability 
Sampling stability evaluation was designed to test the specialized two-stage sampling 
process, repeated 150 times. I used Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests at each sampling iteration 
to compare the original 10% KDD Cup 1999 dataset and the generated samples for each 
class and feature, including one-hot encoded categorical columns. I set a special decision 
column to 0 if I could not reject the null hypothesis of K-S test, 1 otherwise. The result is 
an aggregation of these decisions to target class values. Table 14 shows these aggregate 
results, containing mean rejection rate with ~95% confidence interval estimated from 
standard deviation. 
H0 Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R 
Rejected % 0.16%±0.13% 0.02%±0.04 0.00%±0.00% 0.00%±0.00% 2.73%±0.76% 
Table 14: V1 sampling validation results on KDD Cup 1999 data. Source: own edit 
Sample testing results show that probe and R2L classes matched the original data 
perfectly for all explanatory features, while DoS and normal categories matched their 
respective distributions in the majority of tests. The only exception was the U2R class, 
where 2.73% (with a confidence interval of ±0.76%) of tests rejected the possibility that 
the sample has been drawn from the same distribution as the 10% KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
It is likely that this has been caused by how underrepresented U2R class was in the 
original dataset. 
KDD Cup 1999 - Model performance 
I trained each model (the four base classifiers and the aggregator model) using the 
preprocessed training sample and grid search hyperparameter optimization. I tested 540 
different combinations in total with exact hyperparameter values I shown earlier in Table 
9.  
I performed model testing using the dedicated test dataset of KDD Cup 1999. The results 
of this can be viewed in Table 15 and Table 16. Table 15 shows achieved model 
accuracies for each class and base model as well as accuracy achieved by the ensemble 
under the aggregator model. The best base models were those trained on intrinsic and 
host-based traffic for normal, host-based traffic for DoS, time- and host-based traffic for 
probe and R2L and host-based traffic and content for U2R classes. Overall, content model 
performed the worst, however, I cannot say it was completely redundant, as it still 
contained useful information about U2R attacks, partially confirming the findings of 
Stolfo et al. (2000). 
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The aggregator model improved accuracy further compared to the base models. The 
aggregator model improved detection accuracy for nearly every class, the only exception 
being probe detection on the model trained on host-based traffic data (99.16% against 
99.07% of the aggregator), but even there the difference is minor. 
The final row of Table 15 shows overall accuracies for each model. Despite how it seems, 
this overall accuracy value has no connection with the per-class values. Per class 
accuracies were meant to measure model performance in detecting that one class, while 
overall accuracy is measuring the performance of a model in general. Based on overall 
accuracies, the aggregator managed to improve the detections of all models, with the base 
model trained on host-based traffic features being the closest in detection. 
 Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator 
Normal 91.76% 79.54% 92.10% 63.26% 92.13% 
DoS 83.56% 85.11% 96.71% 17.16% 96.74% 
Probe 85.27% 99.05% 99.16% 15.86% 99.07% 
R2L 93.83% 93.36% 94.17% 74.41% 94.70% 
U2R 98.62% 86.50% 99.32% 99.77% 99.92% 
Overall 78.77% 74.94% 91.03% 15.31% 91.52% 
Table 15: Aggregate V1 model accuracy with base model accuracies measured on KDD Cup 1999. 
Source: own edit 
Table 16 shows the remaining aggregate classification measures for base and aggregator 
models. Class recall, precision and F1-scores were all macro-averaged to calculate the 
results shown in Table 16. As I mentioned before, the primary measure I evaluated was 
recall, which shown promising results with the aggregator and one base model trained on 
intrinsic features as well. However, only the aggregator model could achieve consistently 
high recall together with high precision (achieving the highest F1-score as a result). 
 Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator 
Recall 0.668 0.635 0.595 0.470 0.665 
Precision 0.476 0.447 0.555 0.333 0.626 
F1 score 0.402 0.442 0.525 0.269 0.582 
Table 16: Macro-averaged precision, recall and F1-score of the V1 model measured on KDD Cup 1999. 
Source: own edit 
I also attached a more detailed version of Table 16 showing base and aggregator model 
performances on intrusion class value level in Appendix C. 
NSL-KDD – Model performance 
The performance comparison on NSL-KDD dataset is available in Table 17. Out of the 
base classifiers, intrinsic model performed the best on normal class, time-based traffic 
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model detected DoS, probe and U2R attacks well and host-based traffic model was the 
best on R2L class. Content model was the worst at detecting attacks except R2L and U2R. 
The final aggregator improved on almost every class, except normal traffic, where it could 
not achieve better per class accuracy than the base classifier trained on intrinsic data. 
Based on overall accuracy, I set up the following ranking from worst to best model: 
content, intrinsic, host-traffic, time-traffic and aggregator. Performance improvement 
achieved by the aggregator model is understandable as it uses knowledge and patterns 
acquired earlier by the base classifiers. 
The results the models achieved when I used the NSL-KDD dataset for training are worse 
than the results achieved when I used the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Due to redundancies, 
certain observations received a higher representation in training and test datasets. 
Correctly classified, these redundant records have a stronger representation in Table 15, 
compared to Table 17, where each observation is equal in importance. This is a possible 
reason why accuracies trained on KDD Cup 1999 seem to be better. 
 
Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator 
Normal 84.71% 80.30% 79.44% 81.58% 82.30% 
DoS 81.73% 88.14% 86.97% 70.29% 91.00% 
Probe 79.74% 94.44% 92.00% 89.26% 93.64% 
R2L 88.56% 86.46% 89.18% 89.09% 90.09% 
U2R 96.98% 99.35% 97.65% 98.07% 99.18% 
Overall 65.86% 74.34% 72.62% 64.15% 78.11% 
Table 17: Aggregate V1 model accuracy with base model accuracies measured on NSL-KDD. Source: 
own edit 
In Table 18 recall, precision and F1-score are visible, calculated on the test dataset of 
NSL-KDD. Based on recall, the intrinsic model performed best out of the base models, 
even outperforming aggregate results. With precision, it was the base model trained on 
the host-based traffic features that provided the best result, closely followed by the model 
trained on time-based traffic features, which simultaneously provided the best F1-score. 
The aggregator model managed to improve precision and F1-score compared to the base 
models. 
 
Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator 
Recall 0.576 0.609 0.515 0.453 0.558 
Precision 0.512 0.580 0.607 0.451 0.668 
F1 score 0.483 0.584 0.509 0.372 0.566 
Table 18: Macro-averaged precision, recall and F1-score of the V1 model measured on NSL-KDD. 
Source: own edit 
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As with the KDD Cup 1999 measurements, I published a detailed version of Table 18 in 
Appendix D for those who are interested. As I considered aggregator model performance 
to be much more important to analyze in this dissertation, I decided to exclude base model 
performance measurements from further chapters. Moreover, instead of providing class-
specific recalls, precisions and F1-scores for each model, I only shared confusion matrices 
in further appendices tied to chapters 5.3 and 5.4. I found this an easier approach to follow, 
while allowing the reader to calculate additional performance metrics as they see fit. 
The results of this and the previous chapter confirm that machine learning works as an 
intrusion detector, answering the first research question in chapter 3.3. 
5.3. KERAS AND TENSORFLOW STACKING NEURAL NETWORK RESULTS 
I compared V2 models for performance in groups determined by the synthetic sampling 
approach. I executed all experiments according to details I explained in chapter 4.2.3, 
with 50 hyperparameter optimization iterations at first. However, with 50 iterations, the 
aggregator models started to show signs of overfitting, therefore, later I reduced the 
number of hyperparameter optimization iterations to 25. Results in this and the following 
chapters were provided by the models performing best out of these 25 iterations. 
Earlier I mentioned that a key advantage of TensorFlow is the potential execution time 
improvement on computers equipped with a GPU. This improvement is conditional, 
requiring a setup overhead from the TensorFlow backend and depends on the dimensions 
of the weight matrix. For example, a more complex model with weights in the millions, 
GPU utilization is highly beneficial, as it was determined by Lind and Pantigoso 
Velasquez, (2019) as well. As none of the models trained in this dissertation reached such 
complexities, I decided to drop GPU utilization and work with CPU only instead. 
Model prediction performances are visible in Table 19 for accuracy. The models 
performed well on each class, regardless of the sampling approach used. The class all 
models had difficulty predicting was normal, which indicates that a large portion of 
attacks were classified as normal traffic incorrectly. I excluded overall accuracies from 
Table 19, for the same reasons I highlighted while discussing the accuracies in Table 15 
(per-class and overall accuracies are different metrics). Overall accuracies were 77.09% 
for SMOTE ENN, 78.34% for SMOTE Tomek and 77.75% for SVM SMOTE. In this 
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regard SMOTE Tomek provided the best predictions, although, the differences between 
the sampling methods are rather small. 
Accuracy SMOTE ENN SMOTE Tomek SVM SMOTE 
Normal 80.67% 82.38% 80.78% 
DoS 90.16% 90.52% 90.74% 
Probe 93.01% 93.14% 93.57% 
R2L 90.68% 91.02% 90.73% 
U2R 99.66% 99.64% 99.68% 
Table 19: Aggregate V2 model accuracies. Source: own edit 
The recall values of Table 20 provide more information on predictions. The models 
provided the best results on the majority normal and DoS classes and predicted probe, 
R2L and U2R classes worse as they started belonging more and more to minority. 
Moreover, the sampling methods provided similar macro-averaged recall values ranging 
within one percentage point, with the minor advantage of SMOTE ENN sampling. 
Recall SMOTE ENN SMOTE Tomek SVM SMOTE 
Normal 0.9255 0.9198 0.9140 
DoS 0.8259 0.8592 0.8438 
Probe 0.5225 0.5580 0.5944 
R2L 0.3258 0.3289 0.3109 
U2R 0.3731 0.2985 0.2985 
Average 0.5946 0.5929 0.5923 
Table 20: Aggregate V2 model recalls. Source: own edit 
Based on the data I collected, I cannot state with certainty which synthetic sampling of 
the three evaluated can improve model performance the most, therefore, I compared the 
results with the models discussed in chapter 2.3. Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas (2019) reported SVM SMOTE models to give a small advantage, therefore I 
used this sampling approach for the model described in chapter 4.2.4. To assist with 
further performance analysis, I attached the confusion matrices for all the V2 base and 
aggregator models to this dissertation in Appendix E, Appendix F and Appendix G. 
As part of my third research question, I set the goal of finding additional techniques that 
could help an intrusion detector in providing more accurate predictions. This chapter 
provided models enhanced with two such techniques: synthetic sampling and more 
advanced hyperparameter optimization. 
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5.4. AUTOENCODER ENHANCED STACKING NEURAL NETWORK RESULTS 
My goal with the autoencoder iteration was to evaluate the predictive performance of a 
hybrid intrusion detection solution. I implemented this hybrid detector by extending the 
V2 model of chapter 4.2.3 with autoencoders trained on normal traffic. This process 
required evaluations on two artefacts: the autoencoders themselves, and the extended 
stacking model. 
Autoencoder model results 
I conducted two analyses on the autoencoder models: the first involved the testing and 
evaluation of the activation functions. I set this up in a way similar to grid search 
hyperparameter optimization. I measured the results of these experiments using the mean 
squared error function common in regression tasks. The measured MSE values can be 
seen in Table 21. All autoencoders, except the one trained on intrinsic data, performed 
the best with linear activation functions, while intrinsic AE performed better with RELU 
activations. Based on these results, I decided to use linear activation for each autoencoder. 
Feature Group Linear RELU Sigmoid Tanh 
Intrinsic 0.00060 0.00012 0.00205 0.00013 
Content 0.00016 0.00031 0.00186 0.00018 
Host-traffic 0.00304 0.00461 0.01012 0.00335 
Time-traffic 0.00442 0.00609 0.01096 0.00447 
Table 21: Autoencoder MSE per feature group and activation. Source: own edit 
My second analysis of autoencoders measured their performance. Just like with the 
previous analysis, I used the MSE between the original explanatory features and the 
predictions the AE models made. With this analysis I aimed to prove the usefulness of 
training autoencoders on normal traffic only. Because the models only saw normal traffic, 
their reconstruction error would be much higher on attack classes. the results of this 
analysis can be seen in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Per-class autoencoder model errors on NSL-KDD dataset. Source: own edit. 
Figure 36 shows the per-class and per feature group performance of the autoencoder 
models. The intrinsic and the two traffic AEs were good at differentiating DoS and probe 
attacks, R2L and U2R classes were more challenging, though: MSEs for these categories 
were similar, or even lower than what the three models achieved on normal traffic. This 
similarity, together with their minority state makes these classes even harder for machine 
learning models to detect. The last remaining content autoencoder was unique in how 
well it managed to find differences between normal and U2R traffic. This is another proof, 
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that, no matter how poorly models trained on content features perform, they still 
contribute to the overall performance. 
Based on the results in Figure 36, an autoencoder network can work as an anomaly 
detector, partially answering my second research question. 
Model performance 
Following autoencoder model predictions, the stacking neural networks were trained as 
usual. As in chapter 5.3, I show two tables, one for the accuracy measures and the other 
for recall values, both describing only the aggregator model predictive performance. 
Table 22 shows per class accuracies. The model provided the best accuracy for U2R, 
while DoS, R2L and normal also maintained high detection accuracies. Probe class 
provided the worst per-class accuracy at only 84.95%. Overall accuracy of the aggregator 
model was 74.26%, a surprisingly decreased value compared to the results published in 
chapter 5.3. 
Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R 
87.20% 90.82% 84.95% 88.84% 96.72% 
Table 22: Aggregate V3 model accuracies. Source: own edit 
Viewing the analysis from a different perspective, Table 23 shows the recalls of the 
aggregator model. The best recall values were achieved on normal, DoS and probe traffic. 
The worst achieved recall was on R2L. Their average improved compared to the earlier 
iterations. 
Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R Average 
0.8367 0.7728 0.7732 0.3262 0.5821 0.6582 
Table 23: Aggregate V3 model recalls. Source: own edit 
As in the previous chapters, I published the confusion matrices of all the trained neural 
networks in Appendix H. 
This chapter proved that hybrid models work as viable intrusion detector models. 
Additionally, the V3 model further utilized synthetic sampling and advanced 
hyperparameter optimization, providing more evidence to answer my third research 
question. 
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5.5. COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The most important conclusions can be drawn when one compares the results of each 
model variant. In this chapter, I performed this comparison between these variants on a 
per-class value basis trained on the NSL-KDD dataset. These comparisons encompass 
two metrics, accuracy and recall. To make these comparisons easier, I created a ranking 
scheme inspired by the ranking ideas outlined in Kovács and Kő (2018), adjusted to 
benefit from the characteristics of confusion matrices. 
Table 24 demonstrates the aggregator model accuracies. As in previous chapters, V1 
stands for the scikit-learn-based NN staking ensemble, V2 for the TF + Keras stack and 
V3 for the model enhanced by autoencoders. Interestingly, according to per-class 
accuracies, the V1 model outperformed the more complex Keras models, particularly in 
detecting DoS and probe attacks. Moreover, the V3 model is not necessarily the best 
performing model either, only providing better results for normal traffic. I explain this 
with the autoencoder training process and how I trained them on normal traffic. Following 
neural networks saw explanatory features that were less different from normal traffic, 
therefore they have gotten better at detecting that exact class. 
Based on overall accuracies, V2 SMOTE Tomek performed best with 78.34%, followed 
by the V1 model at 78.11% and V2 SVM SMOTE at 77.75%. The last two models were 
the V2 SMOTE ENN and the V3 detectors, both achieving 77.09% and 74.26%, 
respectively. 
  
V1 
V2 
V3 Support 
SMOT ENN SMOTE Tomek SVM SMOTE 
Normal 82.30% 80.67% 82.38% 80.78% 87.20% 9711 
DoS 91.00% 90.16% 90.52% 90.74% 90.82% 7460 
Probe 93.64% 93.01% 93.14% 93.57% 84.95% 2421 
R2L 90.09% 90.68% 91.02% 90.73% 88.84% 2885 
U2R 99.18% 99.66% 99.64% 99.68% 96.72% 67 
Table 24: Accuracy table for all model variants. Source: own edit. 
Model performance shifts when I include the recall measures of Table 25. With recall, I 
observed that the V3 model traded performance on majority classes (normal and DoS) for 
performance on minority classes, especially U2R. This caused a significant increase in 
the macro-averaged recall. 
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  V1 
V2 
V3 Support 
SMOT ENN SMOTE Tomek SVM SMOTE 
Normal 0.9452 0.9255 0.9198 0.9140 0.8367 9711 
DoS 0.8126 0.8259 0.8592 0.8438 0.7728 7460 
Probe 0.6898 0.5225 0.5580 0.5944 0.7732 2421 
R2L 0.2400 0.3258 0.3289 0.3109 0.3262 2885 
U2R 0.1045 0.3731 0.2985 0.2985 0.5821 67 
Average 0.5584 0.5946 0.5929 0.5923 0.6582 22544 
Table 25: Recall table for all experiments. Source: own edit 
I also included support values to Table 24 and Table 25. This support stands for how 
many records from the test dataset belongs to a specific class. I used these support values 
for a performance ranking as inverse class weights. First, I ranked the models for each 
class and metric, extending this ranking to the overall accuracy average precision values 
as well, assigning them artificial 50% weights. I distributed the remaining 50% between 
the classes according to the following formula: 
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠_𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗 = (1 −
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
)/(𝑘 − 1) ∗ 2 
My goal with this formula was to penalize the effect of majority classes more, and the 
multiplication by 2 in the denominator was needed to adjust the sum of weights to 50%. 
The end results of this ranking process are visible in Table 26. When ranked according to 
accuracy, the V2 SMOTE Tomek model performed best. With recall rankings, the V3 
model proved to be the best alternative. 
  
V1 
V2 
V3 
SMOT ENN SMOTE Tomek SVM SMOTE 
Accuracy 2.34 3.80 1.79 2.60 4.46 
Recall 4.30 2.53 2.79 3.66 1.73 
Table 26: Model rankings in terms of accuracy and recall. Source: own edit 
With all the above considered, determining the best intrusion detector still remains a 
challenging task, influenced by the problem the models were created to address. As the 
cost of predicting a false negative is greater, going for a high recall is preferable. Based 
on this line of thought, the V3 stacking neural network model extended with autoencoders 
is the correct model to choose. 
The models’ comparisons in this chapter provided additional information on the 
performance levels of several intrusion detectors necessary to answer the third research 
question in chapter 3.3. These models include ensemble signature detectors supported by 
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different variants of synthetic sampling and a hybrid detector model based on a deep 
autoencoder network. Depending on the choice of performance metric, stacking models 
enhanced by autoencoder networks can provide an improved detection performance. 
5.6. COMPARISON TO EXTERNAL RESULTS 
To truly understand how the proposed model predictions performed, I compared them to 
results I found in the wider intrusion detection context. This information gathering proved 
to be a more challenging task than I anticipated at first. For example, most intrusion 
detection papers published accuracy only as the primary metric for intrusion detection. 
Accuracy alone can be a misleading measure when class imbalance is high. Recall, a 
better metric for intrusion detection is seldom published, and even if it is, it is often 
referred to by different names, like detection rate or sensitivity, or defined incorrectly 
with the formula of accuracy or other metrics. The fact that there are three different 
averaging methods for recall (macro, micro and weighted) did not help either. The third 
challenge I faced was with class assignments. Separate studies assigned detailed attack 
categories to different classes. Luckily, this issue was only prevalent in attack categories 
present in the test samples of the DARPA 1998 family of datasets, attack classes in the 
training datasets were sufficiently described in Stolfo et al. (2000). Nonetheless, this issue 
with class assignments was the main reason why I decided to conduct the analysis of 
Appendix A. With these difficulties and my earlier results in mind, I created a comparison 
table based on the key metrics I collected. 
Table 27 shows the results comparison with intrusion detection papers. I collected most 
of these from papers studying autoencoder network performance and included the 
performance of non-ensemble models as well. The mean accuracy of the available models 
was 77.72%; V2 SMOTE Tomek, V2 SVM SMOTE and V1 models managed to 
outperform this from my proposed models. Yang et al. (2019) also published model 
recalls, the average of which was 51.23%. All models published in this dissertation 
managed to perform above this value. In fact, the autoencoder enhanced model achieved 
the best recall, even in comparison to the best models in the intrusion detection literature. 
Model Accuracy Recall 
KNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 76.51% 48.3% 
Multinomial NB (Yang et al., (2019)) 78.73% 47.69% 
RF (Yang et al., (2019)) 76.49% 48.84% 
SVM (Yang et al., (2019)) 72.28% 45.88% 
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Model Accuracy Recall 
DNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 80.22% 52.77% 
DBN (Yang et al., (2019)) 80.82% 53.61% 
ROS-DNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 78.26% 49.59% 
SMOTE-DNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 81.16% 51.49% 
ADASYN-DNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 80.1% 51.47% 
ICVAE-DNN (Yang et al., (2019)) 85.97% 62.66% 
VGM + RF (Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-Esguevillas, 
(2019)) 
73.61% N/A 
VGM + Logistic Regression (Lopez-Martin, Carro and 
Sanchez-Esguevillas, (2019)) 
77.29% N/A 
VGM + Linear SVM (Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas, (2019)) 
77.23% N/A 
VGM + MLP (Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas, (2019)) 
79.26% N/A 
SVM SMOTE + RF (Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas, (2019)) 
74.25% N/A 
SVM SMOTE + Logistic Regression (Lopez-Martin, Carro 
and Sanchez-Esguevillas, (2019)) 
76.29% N/A 
SVM SMOTE + Linear SVM (Lopez-Martin, Carro and 
Sanchez-Esguevillas, (2019)) 
77.99% N/A 
SVM SMOTE + MLP (Lopez-Martin, Carro and Sanchez-
Esguevillas, (2019)) 
77.98% N/A 
Decision Tree (Yin et al., (2017)) 74.6% N/A 
NB (Yin et al., (2017)) 74.4% N/A 
RF (Yin et al., (2017)) 72.8% N/A 
NB Tree (Yin et al., (2017)) 75.4% N/A 
MLP (Yin et al., (2017)) 78.1% N/A 
RNN (Yin et al., (2017)) 81.29% N/A 
SAE + SMR (Javaid et al., (2016)) 79.1% N/A 
AE + SVM (Al-Qatf et al., (2018)) 80.48% N/A 
Proposed V3 (AE + Stacking NN) 74.26% 65.82% 
Proposed V2 + SMOTE ENN 77.09% 59.46% 
Proposed V2 + SMOTE Tomek 78.34% 59.29% 
Proposed V2 + SVM SMOTE 77.75% 59.23% 
Proposed V1 (Stacking NN) 78.11% 55.84% 
Table 27: External comparisons in terms of accuracy and recall. Source: own edit 
The authors of Yang et al. (2019) published per-class recalls, enabling a more detailed 
comparison. In fact, global macro recalls in Table 27 were calculated from the per-class 
recalls shown in Table 28. The mean recall values based on the collected data were 95.5% 
for normal, 77.44% for DoS, 64.52% for probe, 13.84% for R2L and 4.85% for U2R 
classes. My proposed models performed under average for normal classes, above average 
for DoS, with the exception of V3, above average for probe, except for the V2 models, 
and all proposed models performed above average for R2L and U2R classes. 
Model Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R 
KNN (Yang et al., 2019) 92.78% 82.25% 59.4% 3.56% 3.5% 
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Model Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R 
Multinomial NB (Yang et al., 2019) 96.03% 37.1% 82.61% 22.22% 0.5% 
RF (Yang et al., 2019) 97.37% 80.24% 58.53% 7.55% 0.5% 
SVM (Yang et al., 2019) 92.82% 74.85% 61.71% 0% 0% 
DNN (Yang et al., 2019) 96.1% 85.4% 65.3% 14.56% 2.5% 
DBN (Yang et al., 2019) 97.04% 83.11% 69.85% 12.56% 5.5% 
ROS-DNN (Yang et al., 2019) 92.61% 80.32% 56.26% 12.75% 6% 
SMOTE-DNN (Yang et al., 2019) 96.59% 82.19% 56.75% 10.93% 11% 
ADASYN-DNN (Yang et al., 2019) 96.43% 83.28% 59.81% 9.84% 8% 
ICVAE-DNN (Yang et al., 2019) 97.26% 85.65% 74.97% 44.41% 11% 
Proposed V3 (AE + Stacking NN) 83.67% 77.28% 77.32% 32.62% 58.21% 
Proposed V2 + SMOTE ENN 92.55% 82.59% 52.25% 32.58% 37.31% 
Proposed V2 + SMOTE Tomek 91.98% 85.92% 55.80% 32.89% 29.85% 
Proposed V2 + SVM SMOTE 91.40% 84.38% 59.44% 31.09% 29.85% 
Proposed V1 (Stacking NN) 94.52% 81.26% 68.98% 24.00% 10.45% 
Table 28: Recall comparison per class. Source: Yang et al. (2019) & own edit 
The autoencoder enhanced model proposal provided the worst recall on normal 
connections and performed bad on DoS attacks compared to the measurement of Yang et 
al. (2019). The V3 model performed better, however, at predicting probe and U2R attacks 
and not much worse with R2L classes. It can be said that the V3 model traded good 
performance on majority classes for better classifications on minority classes, which also 
explains the performance degradation experienced with accuracy metrics. 
This chapter summarized several works from the related literature and compared their 
reported performance with the models’ performances I proposed in my research. Based 
on certain per-class and aggregate measures, at last one of the proposed models (V3) can 
compete and outperform works in the related literature, answering my third research 
question in chapter 3.3.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
The main goal of my dissertation was to provide a novel intrusion detection solution 
applying machine learning methods. I have introduced the field of, the data science and 
machine learning tools and techniques used for, and the literature studying intrusion 
detection first. Then, based on the design science methodology and the CRISP-DM 
process model I have designed, implemented and evaluated four intrusion detector 
models. For evaluation I compared the four models with one another first, then with 
additional model proposals from the related literature. I discussed three research questions 
in my dissertation. 
The first research question dealt with the suitability of machine learning models. Based 
on the literature review and the machine learning models I created, I proved that machine 
learning is a suitable approach for detecting intrusions. It is easy for machine learning 
models to provide accurate predictions when detecting DoS, probe and normal activity. 
Minority classes, like U2R and R2L attacks are more complicated. To overcome this 
challenge, the right course of action is not necessarily the choice of a new model. There 
is no “free lunch” in data science, there is no single best model which can give perfect 
predictions. Instead, a viable approach is to strive for ensemble models. The comparisons 
of chapter 5.2, Appendix C and Appendix D between base classifiers and aggregate 
classifiers have pointed out the usefulness of this approach. 
Speaking of ensembles, the second research question put misuse detection with ensembles 
and hybrid detection into perspective. Misuse detection can achieve good results, 
especially when the models are combined into ensembles, but it does have its limits. To 
test the magnitude of detection performance increase from hybrid detection, I created the 
model described in chapter 4.2.4. My expectation based on the literature was an intrusion 
detector that achieved an even better classification performance. The results were, 
however, more nuanced. The V3 model did achieve the best overall recall, even when it 
was compared to the related literature, but its overall accuracy suffered for it. Other 
models, like a more advanced conditioned variational autoencoder could help clarify the 
results. 
My third research question was about the levels of model performance. Primarily based 
on the related literature, I can set up a form of hierarchy between the known intrusion 
detection techniques. Single-model misuse detection can achieve acceptable detection 
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results, but better detections can be generated by ensemble models, and even better by 
hybrid approaches. Currently, data generative models, like CVAE and generative 
adversarial networks (GANs), formulate the cutting edge in intrusion detection. The 
question is whether there is a significant difference between the two approaches in terms 
of prediction performance, which is a potential topic for a future study. The dissertation 
also highlights two techniques important from a detection performance evaluation 
perspective: hyperparameter optimization and synthetic sampling. The former is 
underutilized in intrusion detection research, the most common technique used was grid 
search, when more advanced ones exist, like Bayesian optimization and tree-structured 
parzen estimators. For synthetic sampling, the most common method was SMOTE. The 
majority of the models discussed in the literature apply only the base variant of SMOTE, 
while I took a step further and compared SMOTE ENN, SMOTE Tomek and SVM 
SMOTE, However, I did not find significant differences in the predictions among the 
three. 
A different angle intrusion detection systems can be evaluated from is more practical. 
Ahamad et al. (2009) and Beek et al. (2019) reported an increase in volume and 
complexity of cyber-crimes in the last decade, showing no signs of slowing down. By 
providing inputs to alerting and prevention systems, intrusion detection could play an 
important role in a holistic information security system. My research can additionally 
provide guidance on what models do and do not work for detecting malicious activity. 
NIDS is not a one size fits all solution, though. There are many attacks, like social 
engineering that exploit the weakest link in an information security system: the human. 
An algorithm, no matter how well designed and implemented it might be, will not stop 
someone who looks like a janitor if the security guards let them in without supervision. 
The key to preventing such events is the application of defense in depth, meaning that a 
host of different controls are applied at different layers of an information system. 
Intrusion detection itself, for example, can protect the network layer or the host layer. 
Furthermore, I left the discussion of the last steps of the design science methodology and 
CRISP-DM process (Table 3 and Figure 22) out of scope for my dissertation, as that 
would have required model implementation into a live environment, which depends on 
the social context of the research process. However, if implementation is the intended 
purpose, then a more detailed context study involving the study of stakeholder goals, 
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information system entry points, particularly the review of the network protocols and 
potential open ports, the information infrastructure, and an information security audit. 
This latter shall be repeated annually to not only implement, but also maintain a high-
profile security infrastructure. 
A different approach to intrusion detection deals with its big data nature, particularly the 
velocity of modern network traffic. Here, the recommendations of Molina-Coronado et 
al. (2020) and ideas from stream processing can be applied. The recommendation is an 
intrusion detector that learns not large amounts of data at rest, but continuously as new 
observations and patterns are being provided. This concept is called incremental learning, 
and it combines well with stream processing. Furthermore, stream processing enables the 
system to benefit from the otherwise underutilized temporal nature of network traffic 
better. 
A final topic to consider during deployment is simplicity of the deployment process itself. 
Recent advances like containerization, and tools like Docker, can help tremendously with 
operation in a live environment and model maintenance. Splitting up the software 
environment to development, test and production enables the developers to find potential 
mistakes and bugs in the code, before the models get to be used. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
124 
 
7. REFERENCES 
Abadeh, M. S. et al. (2007) “A parallel genetic local search algorithm for intrusion detection in computer 
networks,” Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 20(8), pp. 1058–1069. doi: 
10.1016/j.engappai.2007.02.007. 
Aghdam, M. H. and Kabiri, P. (2016) “Feature Selection for Intrusion Detection System Using Ant 
Colony Optimization.,” IJ Network Security, 18(3), pp. 420–432. 
Ahamad, M. et al. (2009) “Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2009,” Georgia Tech Information Security 
Center (GTISC), 34, pp. 1–9. 
Al-Qatf, M. et al. (2018) “Deep learning approach combining sparse autoencoder with SVM for network 
intrusion detection,” IEEE Access. IEEE, 6, pp. 52843–52856. 
Almseidin, M. et al. (2017) “Evaluation of Machine Learning Algorithms for Intrusion Detection 
System,” in IEEE (ed.) Intelligent Systems and Informatics (SISY), 2017 IEEE 15th International 
Symposium on. IEEE, pp. 000277–000282. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02330. 
Anderson, J. P. (1972) Computer security technology planning study. volume 2. 
Anderson, J. P. (1980) “Computer security threat monitoring and surveillance,” Technical Report, James 
P. Anderson Company. 
Batista, G. E. et al. (2003) “Balancing Training Data for Automated Annotation of Keywords: a Case 
Study.,” in WOB, pp. 10–18. 
Batista, G. E., Prati, R. C. and Monard, M. C. (2004) “A study of the behavior of several methods for 
balancing machine learning training data,” ACM SIGKDD explorations newsletter. ACM, 6(1), pp. 20–
29. 
Beek, C. et al. (2019) McAfee Labs Threats Report August 2019. Available at: 
https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/threat-center/mcafee-labs/reports.html. 
Bergstra, J. S. et al. (2011) “Algorithms for hyper-parameter optimization,” in Advances in neural 
information processing systems, pp. 2546–2554. 
Bergstra, J., Yamins, D. and Cox, D. D. (2013) “Hyperopt: A python library for optimizing the 
hyperparameters of machine learning algorithms,” in Proceedings of the 12th Python in science 
conference, pp. 13–20. 
Bhuyan, M. H., Bhattacharyya, D. K. and Kalita, J. K. (2013) “Network Anomaly Detection: Methods, 
Systems and Tools,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. IEEE, 16(1), pp. 303–336. doi: 
10.1109/SURV.2013.052213.00046. 
Bodon, F. and Buza, K. (2014) Adatbányászati algoritmusok. 
Bouzida, Y. et al. (2004) “Efficient intrusion detection using principal component analysis,” in 3éme 
Conférence sur la Sécurité et Architectures Réseaux (SAR), La Londe, France, pp. 381–395. 
Breiman, L. et al. (1984) Classification and Regression Trees. 1st ed. New York: Routledge. 
Brochu, E., Cora, V. M. and De Freitas, N. (2010) “A tutorial on Bayesian optimization of expensive cost 
functions, with application to active user modeling and hierarchical reinforcement learning,” arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1012.2599. 
Brownlee, J. (2015) 8 Tactics to Combat Imbalanced Classes in Your Machine Learning Dataset. 
Available at: https://machinelearningmastery.com/tactics-to-combat-imbalanced-classes-in-your-
machine-learning-dataset/ (Accessed: March 31, 2018). 
Bruneau, G. (2001) “The history and evolution of intrusion detection,” SANS Institute, 1. 
Brunner, C. (2017) “Processing Intrusion Data with Machine Learning and MapReduce,” Academic and 
Applied Research in Public Management Science, 16(1), pp. 37–52. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
125 
 
Brunner, C. (2019) “A comparative study of Antminer+ and Decision Tree classification performances,” 
SEFBIS Journal, 13, pp. 15–23. 
Buczak, A. L. and Guven, E. (2015) “A survey of data mining and machine learning methods for cyber 
security intrusion detection,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. IEEE, 18(2), pp. 1153–1176. 
doi: 10.1109/COMST.2015.2494502. 
Budzik, J. (2019) Many Heads Are Better Than One: The Case For Ensemble Learning. Available at: 
https://www.kdnuggets.com/2019/09/ensemble-learning.html (Accessed: September 29, 2019). 
Cavusoglu, Ü. (2019) “A new hybrid approach for intrusion detection using machine learning methods,” 
Applied Intelligence. Springer, 49(7), pp. 2735–2761. 
Chapman, P. et al. (2000) “CRISP-DM 1.0: Step-by-step data mining guide,” SPSS inc, 16. 
Chawla, N. V et al. (2002) “SMOTE: Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique,” Journal of 
Artificial Intelligence Rearch, 16, pp. 321–357. 
Chebrolu, S., Abraham, A. and Thomas, J. P. (2005) “Feature deduction and ensemble design of intrusion 
detection systems,” Computers & security. Elsevier, 24(4), pp. 295–307. 
Chollet, F. (2015) KERAS Documentation. Available at: https://keras.io (Accessed: September 15, 2019). 
Cortes, C. and Vapnik, V. (1995) “Support-vector networks,” Machine learning. Springer, 20(3), pp. 
273–297. 
Damiani, J. (2019) A Voice Deepfake Was Used To Scam A CEO Out Of $243,000, Forbes. Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/09/03/a-voice-deepfake-was-used-to-scam-a-ceo-out-of-
243000/#3efedc652241 (Accessed: June 7, 2020). 
Divekar, A. et al. (2018) “Benchmarking datasets for anomaly-based network intrusion detection: KDD 
CUP 99 alternatives,” in 2018 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Computing, Communication and 
Security (ICCCS), pp. 1–8. 
Dua, S. and Du, X. (2016) Data mining and machine learning in cybersecurity. CRC press. 
Elhag, S. et al. (2015) “On the combination of genetic fuzzy systems and pairwise learning for improving 
detection rates on Intrusion Detection Systems,” Expert Systems with Applications. Elsevier Ltd, 42(1), 
pp. 197–202. doi: 10.1016/j.eswa.2014.08.002. 
Ester, M. et al. (1996) “A density-based algorithm for discovering clusters in large spatial databases with 
noise.,” in Kdd, pp. 226–231. 
Fayyad, U., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G. and Smyth, P. (1996) “From data mining to knowledge discovery in 
databases,” AI magazine, 17(3), p. 37. 
Folino, G., Pizzuti, C. and Spezzano, G. (2005) “GP ensemble for distributed intrusion detection 
systems,” in International Conference on Pattern Recognition and Image Analysis, pp. 54–62. 
Google Brain Team (2015) TensorFlow.org. Available at: https://www.tensorflow.org/ (Accessed: 
September 15, 2019). 
Han, J., Kamber, M. and Pei, J. (2011) Data mining: concepts and techniques. Elsevier Ltd. 
Hasan, M. A. M. et al. (2016) “Performance evaluation of different kernels for support vector machine 
used in intrusion detection system,” International Journal of Computer Networks and Communications, 
8(6), pp. 39–54. 
Ingre, B., Yadav, A. and Soni, A. K. (2017) “Decision tree based intrusion detection system for NSL-
KDD dataset,” in International Conference on Information and Communication Technology for 
Intelligent Systems, pp. 207–218. 
Ippoliti, D. (2011) Ph. D. Thesis Proposal Automated Network Anomaly Detection with Learning and 
QoS Mitigation. 
Ippoliti, D. (2013) “Automated network anomaly detection with learning, control and mitigation,” p. 196. 
Available at: http://gradworks.umi.com/36/07/3607573.html. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
126 
 
Javaid, A. et al. (2016) “A deep learning approach for network intrusion detection system,” in 
Proceedings of the 9th EAI International Conference on Bio-inspired Information and Communications 
Technologies (formerly BIONETICS), pp. 21–26. 
Kevric, J., Jukic, S. and Subasi, A. (2017) “An effective combining classifier approach using tree 
algorithms for network intrusion detection,” Neural Computing and Applications. Springer, 28(1), pp. 
1051–1058. doi: 10.1007/s00521-016-2418-1. 
Kim, G., Lee, S. and Kim, S. (2014) “A novel hybrid intrusion detection method integrating anomaly 
detection with misuse detection,” Expert Systems with Applications. Elsevier, 41(4), pp. 1690–1700. 
Kingma, D. P. and Ba, J. (2014) “Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization,” arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1412.6980. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6980. 
Kingma, D. P. and Welling, M. (2013) “Auto-encoding variational bayes,” arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1312.6114. 
Kovács, T. and Kő, A. (2018) “Termelési hálózatok gyárainak összesített teljesítménymérése 
többváltozós döntési modellek alkalmazásával,” Vezetéstudomány / Budapest Management Review, 49(4), 
pp. 32–43. doi: 10.14267/VEZTUD.2018.04.04. 
Latah, M. and Toker, L. (2018) “Towards an efficient anomaly-based intrusion detection for software-
defined networks,” IET networks. IET, 7(6), pp. 453–459. 
Lau, F. et al. (2000) “Distributed denial of service attacks,” in 2000 IEEE international conference on 
systems, man and cybernetics., pp. 2275–2280. 
Lind, E. and Pantigoso Velasquez, Ä. (2019) “A performance comparison between CPU and GPU in 
TensorFlow.” Stockholm. 
Lopez-Martin, M., Carro, B. and Sanchez-Esguevillas, A. (2019) “Variational data generative model for 
intrusion detection,” Knowledge and Information Systems. Springer, 60(1), pp. 569–590. 
Lutins, E. (2017) DBSCAN: What is it? When to Use it? How to use it. Available at: 
https://medium.com/@elutins/dbscan-what-is-it-when-to-use-it-how-to-use-it-8bd506293818 (Accessed: 
August 10, 2019). 
Mahfouz, A. M., Venugopal, D. and Shiva, S. G. (2020) “Comparative Analysis of ML Classifiers for 
Network Intrusion Detection,” in Fourth International Congress on Information and Communication 
Technology, pp. 193–207. 
McCulloch, W. S. and Pitts, W. (1943) “A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity,” 
The bulletin of mathematical biophysics. Springer, 5(4), pp. 115–133. 
McHugh, J. (2000) “Testing Intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA 
intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by Lincoln Laboratory,” ACM Transactions on 
Information and System Security, 3(4), pp. 262–294. doi: 10.1145/382912.382923. 
Molina-Coronado, B. et al. (2020) “Survey of Network Intrusion Detection Methods from the Perspective 
of the Knowledge Discovery in Databases Process,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.09697. 
Moustafa, N. and Slay, J. (2015) “UNSW-NB15: a comprehensive data set for network intrusion 
detection systems (UNSW-NB15 network data set),” in 2015 Military Communications and Information 
Systems Conference (MilCIS), pp. 1–6. 
Mukkamala, S., Sung, A. H. and Abraham, A. (2005) “Intrusion detection using an ensemble of 
intelligent paradigms,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications. Elsevier, 28(2), pp. 167–182. doi: 
10.1016/j.jnca.2004.01.003. 
Navlani, A. (2018) KNN Classification using Scikit-learn. Available at: 
https://www.datacamp.com/community/tutorials/k-nearest-neighbor-classification-scikit-learn (Accessed: 
August 8, 2019). 
Nemati, H. R. and Barko, C. D. (2001) “Issues in organizational data mining: A survey of current 
practices,” Journal of data warehousing. THE DATA WAREHOUSE INSTITUTE, 6(1), pp. 25–36. 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
127 
 
Ng, A. and others (2011) “Sparse autoencoder,” CS294A Lecture notes, 72(2011), pp. 1–19. 
Nguyen, H. M., Cooper, E. W. and Kamei, K. (2009) “Borderline over-sampling for imbalanced data 
classification,” in Proceedings: Fifth International Workshop on Computational Intelligence & 
Applications, pp. 24–29. 
Parampottupadam, S. and Moldovann, A.-N. (2018) “Cloud-based Real-time Network Intrusion Detection 
Using Deep Learning,” in 2018 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital 
Services (Cyber Security), pp. 1–8. 
Parsaei, M. R., Rostami, S. M. and Javidan, R. (2016) “A hybrid data mining approach for intrusion 
detection on imbalanced NSL-KDD dataset,” International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and 
Applications, 7(6), pp. 20–25. 
Pedregosa, F. et al. (2011) “Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python,” Journal of Machine Learning 
Research, 12, pp. 2825–2830. 
Petersen, R. (2015) Data Mining for Network Intrusion Detection - A comparison of data mining 
algorithms and an analysis of relevant features for detecting cyber-attacks. Mittuniversitetet - Mid 
Sweden University. 
Piech, C. (2012) K Means. Available at: https://stanford.edu/~cpiech/cs221/handouts/kmeans.html 
(Accessed: August 10, 2019). 
Protić, D. D. (2018) “Review of KDD Cup’99, NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+ datasets,” Vojnotehnički 
glasnik, 66(3), pp. 580–596. 
Quinlan, J. R. (1986) “Induction of decision trees,” Machine learning. Springer, 1(1), pp. 81–106. 
Rumelhart, D. E. et al. (1988) “Learning representations by back-propagating errors,” Cognitive 
modeling, 5(3), p. 1. 
Russel, S. J. and Norwig, P. (2010) Artificial Intelligence A modern approach. 3rd ed. Prentice Hall. 
Sakr, M. M., Tawfeeq, M. A. and El-Sisi, A. B. (2019) “Network Intrusion Detection System based PSO-
SVM for Cloud Computing,” International Journal of Computer Network and Information Security. 
Modern Education and Computer Science Press, 11(3), p. 22. 
Samuel, A. L. (1959) “Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers,” IBM Journal of 
Research and Development, 3(3), pp. 210–229. 
Saporito, G. (2019) A Deeper Dive into the NSL-KDD Data Set. Available at: 
https://towardsdatascience.com/a-deeper-dive-into-the-nsl-kdd-data-set-15c753364657. 
Sapre, S., Ahmadi, P. and Islam, K. (2019) “A Robust Comparison of the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD IoT 
Network Intrusion Detection Datasets Through Various Machine Learning Algorithms,” arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1912.13204. 
Scarfone, K. and Mell, P. (2007) “Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems ( IDPS ) 
Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology,” Nist Special Publication, 800–
94, p. 127. doi: 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94. 
Schölkopf, B. et al. (2000) “Support vector method for novelty detection,” in Advances in neural 
information processing systems, pp. 582–588. 
scikit-learn developers (2018) “scikit-learn user guide,” p. 2377. Available at: https://scikit-
learn.org/stable/index.html. 
Sharafaldin, I., Lashkari, A. H. and Ghorbani, A. A. (2018) “Toward generating a new intrusion detection 
dataset and intrusion traffic characterization.,” in ICISSP, pp. 108–116. 
Sharda, R., Delen, D. and Turban, E. (2018) Business Intelligence, Analytics, and Data Science: A 
managerial perspective. 4th ed. Pearson. 
Smith, S. (2014) 5 Famous Botnets that held the internet hostage. Available at: 
https://tqaweekly.com/episodes/season5/tqa-se5ep11.php (Accessed: June 7, 2020). 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
128 
 
Smolyakov, V. (2017) Ensemble Learning to Improve Machine Learning Results. Aug. Available at: 
https://blog.statsbot.co/ensemble-learning-d1dcd548e936 (Accessed: March 20, 2019). 
Snoek, J., Larochelle, H. and Adams, R. P. (2012) “Practical bayesian optimization of machine learning 
algorithms,” in Advances in neural information processing systems, pp. 2951–2959. 
So-In, C. et al. (2014) “An evaluation of data mining classification models for network intrusion 
detection,” 2014 Fourth International Conference on Digital Information and Communication 
Technology and its Applications (DICTAP), pp. 90–94. doi: 10.1109/DICTAP.2014.6821663. 
Sohn, K., Lee, H. and Yan, X. (2015) “Learning structured output representation using deep conditional 
generative models,” in Advances in neural information processing systems, pp. 3483–3491. 
Song, J. et al. (2011) “Statistical analysis of honeypot data and building of Kyoto 2006+ dataset for NIDS 
evaluation,” in Proceedings of the first workshop on building analysis datasets and gathering experience 
returns for security, pp. 29–36. 
Srivastava, N. et al. (2014) “Dropout: A Simple Way to Prevent Neural Networks from Overfitting,” 
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 15(56), pp. 1929–1958. Available at: 
http://jmlr.org/papers/v15/srivastava14a.html. 
Statt, N. (2019) Thieves are now using AI deepfakes to trick companies into sending them money, The 
Verge. Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/5/20851248/deepfakes-ai-fake-audio-phone-calls-
thieves-trick-companies-stealing-money (Accessed: June 7, 2020). 
Stolfo, S. J. et al. (2000) “Cost-based Modeling for Fraud and Intrusion Detection: Results from the JAM 
Project,” in Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX’00. 
IEEE, pp. 130–144. 
Tavallaee, M. et al. (2009) “A Detailed Analysis of the KDD CUP 99 Data Set,” in IEEE Symposium on 
Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications - CISDA. IEEE, pp. 1–6. 
Tian, D., Liu, Y. and Xiang, Y. (2009) “Large-scale network intrusion detection based on distributed 
learning algorithm,” International Journal of Information Security. Springer, 8(1), pp. 25–35. 
Tomek, I. (1976) “Two modifications of CNN.,” IEEE transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 
6(11), pp. 769–772. 
Tsai, C. F. et al. (2009) “Intrusion detection by machine learning: A review,” Expert Systems with 
Applications. Elsevier Ltd, 36(10), pp. 11994–12000. doi: 10.1016/j.eswa.2009.05.029. 
Wieringa, R. J. (2014) Design science methodology for information systems and software engineering. 
Springer. 
Wilson, D. L. (1972) “Asymptotic properties of nearest neighbor rules using edited data,” IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. IEEE, (3), pp. 408–421. 
Yang, Yanqing et al. (2019) “Improving the classification effectiveness of intrusion detection by using 
improved conditional variational autoencoder and deep neural network,” Sensors. Multidisciplinary 
Digital Publishing Institute, 19(11), p. 2528. 
Yao, H. et al. (2017) “An Intrusion Detection Framework Based on Hybrid Multi-Level Data Mining,” 
International Journal of Parallel Programming. Springer US, pp. 1–19. doi: 10.1007/s10766-017-0537-7. 
Yao, Y. Y., Zhao, Y. and Maguire, R. B. (2003) “Explanation-oriented association mining using a 
combination of unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms,” in Conference of the Canadian Society 
for Computational Studies of Intelligence, pp. 527–532. 
Yin, C. et al. (2017) “A deep learning approach for intrusion detection using recurrent neural networks,” 
Ieee Access. IEEE, 5, pp. 21954–21961. 
Zhang, J. and Zulkernine, M. (2006) “A hybrid network intrusion detection technique using random 
forests,” in The First International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. Vienna: IEEE, 
pp. 1–8. doi: 10.1109/ARES.2006.7. 
Zhang, J., Zulkernine, M. and Haque, A. (2008) “Random-Forests-Based Network Intrusion Detection 
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
129 
 
Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, 
38(5), pp. 649–659. doi: 10.1109/TSMCC.2008.923876. 
  
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
130 
 
8. PUBLICATIONS 
Journal articles 
Brunner, C. (2019): A comparative study of Antminer+ and Decision Tree classification performances. 
SEFBIS, issue 13, pp. 15-23. 
Brunner, C. (2017): Processing Intrusion Data with Machine Learning and MapReduce. ACADEMIC AND 
APPLIED RESEARCH IN MILITARY AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, issue 16, pp. 37-
52. 
Abstracts in conference proceedings 
Brunner, C. (2019): Behatolás-detektálás Tensorflow Platformon. 16. Országos Gazdaságinformatikai 
Konferencia (p. 32). Budapest: NJSZT Neumann János Számítógép-tudományi Társaság GIKOF 
Gazdaságinformatikai Kutatási és Oktatási Fórum. 
Brunner, C. (2018): Hálózati behatolás detektálás Neurális hálózatok összevonásával. OGIK’2018 
Országos Gazdaságinformatikai Konferencia – Az előadások összefoglalói (p. 75). Sopron, 
Alexander Alapítvány a Jövő Értelmiségéért. 
Brunner, C. (2017): Ant Colony Algorithm in Data Mining. XIV. Országos GazdaságInformatikai 
Konferencia (p. 31). Győr: Alexander Alapítvány a Jövő Értelmiségéért. 
Brunner, C. (2016): Behatolási adatok feldolgozása gépi tanulás és MapReduce segítségével. XIII. 
Országos Gazdaságinformatikai Konferencia (pp. 25-26). Dunaújváros: DUE Press. 
Conference presentations 
Brunner C. (2019): Behatolás-detektálás Tensorflow Platformon- Presented at: 16. Országos 
Gazdaságinformatikai Konferencia; Nov 8-9; Budapest, Hungary 
Brunner, C. (2018): Hálózati behatolás detektálás Neurális hálózatok összevonásával. Presented at: 
OGIK’2018 Országos Gazdaságinformatikai Konferencia; Nov 9-10; Sopron, Hungary 
Brunner, C. (2017): Ant Colony Algorithm in Data Mining. Poster presented at: XIV. Országos 
GazdaságInformatikai Konferencia; Nov 10-11; Sopron, Hungary. 
Brunner, C. (2016): Behatolási adatok feldolgozása gépi tanulás és MapReduce segítségével. Presented at: 
XIII. Országos GazdaságInformatikai Konferncia; Nov 11-12; Dunaújváros, Hungary. 
Other works 
Brunner, C. (2019): Hálózati behatolás detektálás Neurális hálózatok összevonásával. In L. Bacsárdi, G. 
Bencsik, & Z. Pödör, OGIK'2018 Országos Gazdaságinformatikai Konferencia - Válogatott 
közlemények. Sopron, Hungary: Alexander Alapítvány a Jövő Értelmiségéért. 
In preparation 
Brunner, C., Kő, A., & Fodor, S. (2020): A novel ensemble method based on Neural Networks with 
hyperparameter optimization for Intrusion Detection. Manuscript 
  
Csaba Brunner – Intrusion Detection by Machine Learning 
131 
 
9. APPENDIX 
Appendix A: As part of this dissertation, 10 independent articles were collected to verify 
which detailed class belongs to which attack category. The exact articles and the 
evaluation are visible here. After data collection, the relative frequencies of each attack 
category have been calculated. The attack category with the most “votes” became the 
final category for a given detailed attack class used later as a data preparation step prior 
to model training. 
Appendix B: Detailed performance measurements for the decision tree bagging classifier 
(V0 experiment). This intrusion detector was implemented using the map-reduce 
programming paradigm coded using the implementation of the Message Passing Interface 
in Java. Runtime considerations of this parallelization approach, however, do not affect 
classification performance, therefore measurements between parallel setups and sample 
sizes have been aggregated.  
Appendix C & Appendix D: Detailed performance measurements for intrinsic, time-
traffic, host-traffic, content and aggregator models of the V1 models measured with KDD 
Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD test datasets. Each of the base models performed poorly on 
different classes of the test set. Results were improved by the final or aggregator model. 
Appendix E, Appendix F & Appendix G: The V2 models were repeated with three 
distinct synthetic sampling processes as variants, the base and aggregator model 
confusion matrices have been provided with the intention to be used for calculating 
further performance metrics when considered necessary. 
Appendix H: confusion matrices for the V3 model. A key element of this was the 
application of autoencoder networks, a kind of neural network designed to learn an 
internal representation of the input space. Therefore, the inputs to the stacking neural 
network were comprised of the per-feature difference between the original feature values 
and those predicted by autoencoders trained on normal traffic only.  
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dos probe r2l u2r N/A Result 
apache2 Test dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
back Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
buffer_overflow Train u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
ftp_write Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
guess_passwd Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
httptunnel Test r2l r2l r2l u2r u2r u2r r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 70% 30% 0% r2l 
imap Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
ipsweep Train probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
land Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
loadmodule Train u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
mailbomb Test dos N/A N/A dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 80% 0% 0% 0% 20% dos 
mscan Test probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
multihop Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
named Test r2l r2l N/A r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 90% 0% 10% r2l 
neptune Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
nmap Train probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
perl Train u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
phf Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
pod Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
portsweep Train probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
processtable Test dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
ps Test u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
rootkit Train u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
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Detailed Class Train/ 
Test 
(Ingre, 
Yadav 
and 
Soni, 
2017) 
(Sakr, 
Tawfeeq 
and El-
Sisi, 
2019) 
(Mahfouz, 
Venugopal 
and Shiva, 
2020) 
(Yang 
et al., 
2019) 
(Latah 
and 
Toker, 
2018) 
(Aghdam 
and 
Kabiri, 
2016) 
(Saporito, 
2019) 
(Hasan 
et al., 
2016) 
(Parampottupadam 
and Moldovann, 
2018) 
(Protić, 
2018) 
dos probe r2l u2r N/A Result 
saint Test probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
satan Train probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe probe 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% probe 
sendmail Test r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
smurf Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
snmpgetattack Test r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
snmpguess Test u2r r2l r2l r2l r2l u2r r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 80% 20% 0% r2l 
spy Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l u2r r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 90% 10% 0% r2l 
sqlattack Test u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
teardrop Train dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
udpstorm Test dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos dos 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% dos 
warezclient Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
warezmaster Train r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
worm Test u2r dos dos r2l r2l u2r dos r2l dos dos 50% 0% 30% 20% 0% dos 
xlock Test r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
xsnoop Test r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l r2l 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% r2l 
xterm Test u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r u2r 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% u2r 
Appendix A: The data used to create a conceptual hierarchy, which in turn is used later to recategorize attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 and NSL-KDD datasets 
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4 cores Small sample (3-5 000 obs.) Large sample (6-10 000 obs.) 
  1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 
Accuracy 0.785 0.791 0.772 0.796 0.795 0.792 0.809 0.799 
Precision 0.959 0.975 0.866 0.967 0.965 0.902 0.903 0.969 
Recall 0.483 0.490 0.508 0.506 0.507 0.539 0.585 0.513 
F-score 0.642 0.652 0.641 0.664 0.664 0.675 0.710 0.671 
AUC 0.735 0.766 0.783 0.793 0.811 0.789 0.776 0.777 
 
8 cores Small sample (3-5 000 obs.) Large sample (6-10 000 obs.) 
  1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 
Accuracy 0.793 0.782 0.788 0.796 0.797 0.756 0.777 0.799 
Precision 0.893 0.931 0.903 0.967 0.936 0.895 0.881 0.969 
Recall 0.546 0.493 0.525 0.506 0.529 0.442 0.512 0.513 
F-score 0.678 0.644 0.664 0.664 0.676 0.592 0.648 0.671 
AUC 0.789 0.719 0.784 0.793 0.772 0.771 0.757 0.777 
 
4 cores Small sample (3-5 000 obs.) Large sample (6-10 000 obs.) 
  1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 
Accuracy 0.978 0.964 0.981 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.980 0.987 
Precision 0.477 0.449 0.513 0.511 0.532 0.558 0.489 0.576 
Recall 0.438 0.438 0.466 0.525 0.469 0.469 0.452 0.507 
F-score 0.456 0.444 0.489 0.518 0.498 0.510 0.470 0.539 
 
8 cores Small sample (3-5 000 obs.) Large sample (6-10 000 obs.) 
  1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 1. run 2. run 3. run 1p2c 
Accuracy 0.970 0.977 0.976 0.984 0.981 0.981 0.980 0.987 
Precision 0.397 0.467 0.476 0.511 0.513 0.445 0.470 0.576 
Recall 0.421 0.437 0.441 0.525 0.470 0.439 0.438 0.507 
F-score 0.408 0.452 0.458 0.518 0.490 0.442 0.453 0.539 
Appendix B: Detailed performance measurements for the decision tree bagging classifier 
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Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator  
Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score 
Normal 0.971 0.744 0.842 0.664 0.504 0.573 0.956 0.728 0.827 0.700 0.817 0.754 0.978 0.720 0.830 
DoS 0.791 0.998 0.883 0.826 0.997 0.903 0.964 0.994 0.979 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.961 0.997 0.979 
Probe 0.702 0.067 0.122 0.730 0.733 0.731 0.669 0.733 0.699 0.966 0.016 0.031 0.727 0.664 0.694 
R2L 0.074 0.555 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.308 0.098 0.071 0.493 0.123 0.088 0.585 0.152 
U2R 0.800 0.016 0.032 0.957 0.002 0.004 0.329 0.012 0.023 0.614 0.339 0.437 0.571 0.165 0.256 
Appendix C: Detailed performance measurements for intrinsic, time-traffic, host-traffic, content and aggregator models of the V1 detector on KDD Cup 1999 
 
Intrinsic Time-traffic Host-traffic Content Aggregator  
Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score Recall Precision F1 score 
Normal 0.857 0.801 0.828 0.736 0.792 0.763 0.928 0.696 0.795 0.750 0.809 0.778 0.945 0.726 0.821 
DoS 0.547 0.847 0.665 0.723 0.899 0.801 0.728 0.856 0.787 0.889 0.530 0.664 0.813 0.906 0.857 
Probe 0.547 0.276 0.367 0.770 0.728 0.748 0.549 0.651 0.596 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.690 0.710 0.700 
R2L 0.374 0.583 0.456 0.815 0.483 0.607 0.204 0.807 0.325 0.181 0.846 0.298 0.240 0.947 0.383 
U2R 0.552 0.054 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.164 0.023 0.040 0.448 0.070 0.121 0.104 0.053 0.071 
Appendix D: Detailed performance measurements for intrinsic, time-traffic, host-traffic, content and aggregator models of the V1 detector on NSL-KDD 
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Intrinsic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
DoS 4086 86 654 5 0 
Normal 1110 8319 30 808 0 
Probe 1973 879 1407 611 0 
R2L 289 368 119 1081 28 
U2R 2 59 211 380 39 
Content 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
DoS 6315 2358 2286 1128 15 
Normal 792 7274 135 776 10 
Probe 0 0 0 0 0 
R2L 353 59 0 976 11 
U2R 0 20 0 5 31 
Time-traffic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
DoS 5316 368 15 0 0 
Normal 921 6902 308 316 1 
Probe 566 675 1922 195 1 
R2L 615 1750 175 2358 65 
U2R 42 16 1 16 0 
Host-traffic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
DoS 5344 515 598 31 7 
Normal 1751 8650 578 1718 26 
Probe 112 166 1206 175 3 
R2L 226 206 14 724 13 
U2R 27 174 25 237 18 
Aggregator 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 
DoS 6161 466 453 1 0 
Normal 1130 8988 702 1779 23 
Probe 78 192 1265 148 2 
R2L 89 50 1 940 17 
U2R 2 15 0 17 25 
Appendix E: V2 with SMOTE ENN sampling confusion matrices 
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Intrinsic  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 4079 86 738 5 0 
Normal 671 8312 31 807 0 
Probe 1980 884 1322 611 0 
R2L 285 370 119 1082 28 
U2R 445 59 211 380 39 
 Content 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 0 1 0 31 0 
Normal 792 7275 135 777 11 
Probe 6315 2357 2286 1097 15 
R2L 353 57 0 976 10 
U2R 0 21 0 4 31 
Time-traffic  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5056 390 80 1 0 
Normal 1216 6861 340 330 1 
Probe 557 691 1877 175 1 
R2L 137 523 12 393 1 
U2R 494 1246 112 1986 64 
Host-traffic  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5521 516 766 28 5 
Normal 1611 8595 342 1654 20 
Probe 149 200 1273 229 5 
R2L 159 225 23 760 17 
U2R 20 175 17 214 20 
 Aggregator 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 6410 473 610 4 1 
Normal 949 8932 460 1757 28 
Probe 82 244 1351 149 1 
R2L 19 53 0 949 17 
U2R 0 9 0 26 20 
Appendix F: V2 with SMOTE Tomek sampling confusion matrices 
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 Intrinsic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 4049 87 566 3 0 
Normal 796 8256 27 798 0 
Probe 2015 940 1500 622 0 
R2L 285 369 117 1081 28 
U2R 315 59 211 381 39 
Content  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 6315 2357 2286 1111 15 
Normal 792 7224 135 765 3 
Probe 0 1 0 17 0 
R2L 353 112 0 984 31 
U2R 0 17 0 8 18 
 Time-traffic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5378 402 111 1 0 
Normal 969 7307 268 346 2 
Probe 491 217 1916 158 0 
R2L 612 1768 124 2354 65 
U2R 10 17 2 26 0 
Host-traffic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5851 541 624 56 8 
Normal 1376 8422 512 1540 18 
Probe 96 252 1218 258 6 
R2L 117 315 25 820 17 
U2R 20 181 42 211 18 
Aggregator  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 6295 470 450 2 0 
Normal 1108 8876 532 1834 25 
Probe 36 295 1439 136 1 
R2L 21 60 0 897 21 
U2R 0 10 0 16 20 
Appendix G: V2 with SVM SMOTE sampling confusion matrices 
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 Intrinsic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 3181 111 443 4 0 
Normal 700 9379 392 1732 15 
Probe 2894 124 1263 153 0 
R2L 240 57 148 626 13 
U2R 445 40 175 370 39 
 Content 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 0 0 0 0 0 
Normal 1 2 0 1 2 
Probe 7459 9643 2421 1905 28 
R2L 0 50 0 972 9 
U2R 0 16 0 7 28 
Time-traffic  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5171 385 298 7 0 
Normal 183 147 19 3 0 
Probe 446 498 1493 107 0 
R2L 1649 8664 454 2768 67 
U2R 11 17 157 0 0 
 Host-traffic 
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 1477 13 230 4 2 
Normal 736 5327 107 1595 16 
Probe 3381 274 1458 308 13 
R2L 741 73 58 40 6 
U2R 1125 4024 568 938 30 
Aggregator  
Ground Truth 
DoS Normal Probe R2L U2R 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
 DoS 5765 72 293 10 0 
Normal 241 8125 127 914 18 
Probe 1065 1114 1872 663 2 
R2L 126 373 65 941 8 
U2R 263 27 64 357 39 
Appendix H: V3 detector confusion matrices 
